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Foreword
Severe and lengthy recessions since 1970 have left many state 
unemployment insurance (UI) programs with problems of insolvency 
and debt. The federal-state system of unemployment insurance was in 
tended to be a self-financing social insurance program in which states 
levied payroll taxes on covered employers and paid benefits to eligible 
workers. Because benefit outlays have been exceeding tax revenues, 
however, there has been a widespread loss of trust fund reserves, large 
scale borrowing, and substantial debt accumulation. Although the 
volume of borrowing and aggregate indebtedness have started to decline 
in the mid-1980s, it is likely that indebtedness will persist in some states 
and that trust fund reserves will remain unacceptably low for most of the 
decade.
In reviewing the history of funding problems in unemployment in 
surance since World War II, Dr. Vroman focuses on the period from 
1970 to 1983, with emphasis on those states where funding problems 
have been most severe. He also analyzes recent debtor state adjustments, 
along with conditions associated with debt avoidance, and offers his 
findings as a basis for insights into why the problems have arisen and 
what policy issues should be considered.
Facts and observations expressed in this study are the sole responsibili 
ty of the author. His viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Robert G. Spiegelman 
Executive Director
February 1986

Preface
In the mid-1980s, the federal-state system of unemployment insurance 
in the U.S. appears to be recovering from financial problems experienced 
during the 1970s and the back-to-back recessions of 1980 and 1981-82. 
During 1984 and 1985, the volume of borrowing by debtor states fell, 
loan repayments increased measurably and aggregate indebtedness 
declined. From an actuarial perspective, however, the conditon of the 
system is still very poor. Even if the current economic recovery proceeds 
at a brisk pace for the rest of the decade, it is not likely that trust fund 
reserves will be rebuilt to a level that satisfies accepted actuarial stan 
dards. Indebtedness is likely to persist in several major northern in 
dustrial states for most of the decade. The onset of a new recession could 
trigger a repetition of borrowing activities and debt accumulation that 
occurred during 1980-83.
The present volume focuses on the recent history of financing prob 
lems in unemployment insurance. It reviews post-World War II ex 
periences, emphasizing the period from 1970 to 1983. Chapter 1 provides 
an overview of the funding problem. Chapter 2 is devoted mainly to 
analyses of the individual states where funding problems have been most 
serious. It also includes a cross-state analysis of recent debtor state ad 
justments. Chapter 3 focuses on some of the conditions associated with 
debt avoidance. To the extent that there are success stories in the system 
of unemployment insurance programs, they are contained in this 
chapter. The volume is intended to document recent funding problems in 
this established program of social insurance and to provide insights into 
why the problems have arisen. Although it does not offer a prescription 
for avoiding future funding problems, a concluding section does briefly 
discuss some relevant policy issues.
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The Funding Problem
State unemployment insurance (UI) programs have recent 
ly been experiencing financial problems of a magnitude un 
precedented in their entire history. A series of severe and 
lengthy recessions since 1970 has caused benefit payments to 
exceed tax revenues by wide margins in many years, depleted 
trust fund balances and forced several states to borrow large 
amounts from the federal loan fund account in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund. During calendar year 1983, 27 
states borrowed a total of $6.6 billion. The total outstanding 
debt at the end of the year was $13.3 billion. 1 During 1984, a 
year of strong economic growth, state indebtedness was 
reduced but still remained at $9.5 billion on December 31, 
1984.
State UI programs, created in the 1930s, 2 were intended to 
be self-financing social insurance programs that levied 
payroll taxes on covered employers and paid benefits to eligi 
ble unemployed workers. Typical beneficiaries are laid-off 
workers who satisfy other eligibility criteria, e.g., they have 
sufficient employment or earnings prior to unemployment, 
are able to work, and available for work. Workers collect UI 
benefits for a limited time period until they are recalled, find 
another job, leave the labor force, or exhaust their benefits. 
Maximum regular benefit duration allowed under state laws 
is usually 26 weeks or less, but the actual duration of benefits 
drawn per claimant has typically averaged from 12 to 16 
weeks during the last 10 years.
2 The Funding Problem
A unique feature of UI programs is their method of taxa 
tion. 3 The original authorizing legislation (Title IX of the 
1935 Social Security Act) provided for a Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax (or PUT) that was to equal 3 percent of payroll in 
covered employment and to be paid by all covered 
employers. The legislation also provided for a tax offset for 
state UI taxes paid, up to 90 percent of the PUT or 2.7 per 
cent of payroll for employers in states that established ac 
ceptable UI programs. If employers paid UI taxes to the state 
at a rate of less than 2.7 percent, they could still receive full 
credit for the maximum PUT tax offset provided their reduc 
ed state tax rate was based on experience. Thus the net PUT 
tax rate which employers paid to the federal government was 
.3 percent. Originally the UI payroll taxes were levied on 
total payroll, but in 1940 the taxable wage base was set at 
$3,000 per employee to correspond with the wage base under 
the OASI (or Social Security) program.
This general arrangement for federal and state UI taxes 
has continued down to the present. In 1984, the net PUT tax 
rate was levied at a rate of .8 percent of taxable payrolls 
(wages up to $7,000 per covered employee), after the tax off 
set of 2.7 percent for state UI taxes. In 1985 the same net 
PUT rate continues to be in force, but the maximum offset 
doubles to 5.4 percent. Each state UI program must have a 
maximum tax rate of at least 5.4 percent. 4 Thus, between 
1938 and 1985, the net PUT tax rate has increased from .3 to 
.8 percent of taxable payroll, the gross PUT rate has increas 
ed from 3.0 to 6.2 percent and the tax offset has increased 
from 2.7 to 5.4 percent. The taxable wage base, set at $3,000 
in 1940, is $7,000 in 1985.
State UI programs are influenced by both federal and state 
legislation. The individual states determine their own 
eligibility criteria, weekly benefit levels, and the number of 
weeks of benefits payable. In most states, weekly benefits are
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50 to 60 percent of previous wages, but subject to a weekly 
benefit maximum. Maximum regular benefit duration 
payable is usually 26 weeks.
The UI payroll taxes levied by the states on covered 
employers are deposited in the Unemployment Trust Fund in 
the U.S. Treasury and credited to individual state trust fund 
accounts. The states draw on these accounts to make benefit 
payments. The federal unemployment tax revenues, now .8 
percent of taxable payroll, are paid directly to the U.S. 
Treasury, and then allocated to various federal accounts in 
the Unemployment Trust Fund. This component of revenue 
(the Federal Unemployment Tax or FUT) pays for federal 
and state UI administrative costs, including the Ul-related 
costs of the U.S. Employment Service (ES). Since 1970, a 
portion of FUT revenues has been allocated to finance the 
federal share of extended benefit (EB) costs. Between 1970 
and 1983, the FUT tax rate has increased to pay for higher 
EB costs and increased costs of UI administration. 5
The employer payroll taxes imposed by the states to 
finance program benefits are experienced rated. Under ex 
perience rating, benefit payments made to former employees 
and to workers on temporary layoff are a major determinant 
of employer taxes. Experience rating was intended to reduce 
labor turnover by making employers financially liable for 
layoffs. Those with fewer layoffs pay less taxes. In practice, 
covered employers are only partially experience rated so that 
the cost of a given layoff may not be fully borne by the 
employer who initiates the layoff. Thus, an important frac 
tion of state UI taxes (often up to half) is raised by flat rate 
levies applied to all covered employers. As with benefits, 
employer tax rates are determined by state legislation 
(although the minimum tax base per employee and the max 
imum statutory employer tax rates are influenced by federal 
legislation).
4 The Funding Problem
State UI programs are supposed to be fully self-financed. 
Trust fund balances act as cushions in financing benefit 
payments during recessions. After being drawn down, they 
are to be rebuilt in subsequent economic expansions when 
experienced rated employer taxes rise.
The actual management of state UI trust fund balances 
has departed substantially from the preceding description. In 
fact, there has been a rather steady erosion of UI trust funds 
dating from the late 1940s. During the 1970s, a financing 
problem in state UI became apparent, and it has become an 
even more serious problem in the present decade. Between 
1972 and 1979, 23 of the 51 "state" programs (including 
D.C.)6 needed federal loans to continue payments for regular 
state UI benefits and the state share of extended benefits. 
From January 1, 1980 to December 31, 1984, more than 
$17.9 billion in loans were disbursed among 32 jurisdictions. 
Altogether, 38 states have borrowed at least once between 
1972 and December 1984.
The state UI funding problem is the result of several 
distinct and identifiable factors. (1) The economy has ex 
perienced four separate recessions since 1969: in 1970-71, 
1974-75, 1980 and 1981-82. Two of the recessions (1974-75 
and 1981-82) were especially severe by historic standards. 
Frequent and severe economic downturns have caused very 
heavy demands for benefits between 1970 and 1983. (2) The 
recessions of the mid-1970s and the 1980s have had an 
unusual regional composition. States in the Northeast and 
Midwest have experienced worse unemployment problems 
than other states. As a result, the most serious funding prob 
lems have been concentrated in the so-called frost belt states. 
(3) Indexing for wage changes was introduced into many 
state programs in an asymmetrical manner during the 1960s 
and the 1970s. The benefit side was indexed to average wages 
while the taxable wage base was not indexed and changed on 
ly infrequently, e.g., the wage base for the Federal
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Unemployment Tax increased only in 1972, 1978 and 1983. 
As a result, tax revenues have tended to grow more slowly 
than benefit payments. The taxable wages that support the 
program now represent less than half of total wages in 
covered employment. (4) The scope of employer-financed 
benefit payments was broadened in 1970 with the creation of 
the Federal-State Extended Benefit (EB) program. Because 
of the high average rate of unemployment since 1972, benefit 
payouts under EB have exceeded original expectations. More 
details about each of these four contributing factors will be 
discussed later in this chapter under "Origins of the Funding 
Problem."
Trust Fund Balances and Loans 
to State UI Programs
Long Term Trust Fund Decline
Table 1-1 illustrates with aggregate data the funding situa 
tion for state UI programs over the post-World War II 
period. The seven years that are identified are years im 
mediately prior to recessions. End of year aggregate trust 
fund balances for these years (column 1) ranged from $6.7 to 
$12.6 billion. In absolute magnitude the 1979 balance was 
not a great deal larger than the 1948 balance and less than 
that of 1953. Column 2 shows that as a percentage of 
covered wages and salaries the fund balance declined from 
7.9 in 1948 to .9 percent in 1979.
Columns 3, 4 and 5 provide information on the benefit 
potential that the trust fund balances represent. The average 
benefit paid for a week of total unemployment appears in 
column 3. Weekly benefit levels that grew by about half be 
tween 1948 and 1959 and again between 1959 and 1969, near 
ly doubled between 1969 and 1979. High inflation coupled 
with indexation combined to produce rapid growth in weekly 
benefit levels during the 1970s. Average potential regular
Table 1-1 
Aggregate State UI Trust Fund Balances and Related Measures
Pre-Recession Years 1948 to 1979a
End-of-year net trust fund balance
Year
1948
1953
1957
1959
1969
1973
1979
Amount 
($ millions) 
(1)
7,603
8,913
8,659
6,674
12,550
10,845
8,623
Percent of 
total covered 
payrolls
(2)
7.9
6.4
5.0
3.6
3.4
2.1
0.9
Average 
weekly 
benefit 
paid
($) 
(3)
19.03
23.58
28.17
30.41
46.17
59.00
89.67
Average 
potential 
benefit 
duration (weeks)** 
(4)
21.1
22.1
23.4
23.6
24.4
24.3
24.0
Fund capacity 
at average 
entitlement 
(millions of persons) 
(l)/(3)x(4) 
(5)
18.94
17.10
13.14
9.30
11.14
7.56
4.01
Average 
covered 
employment 
(millions) 
(6)
33.08
36.67
39.67
39.54
52.36
59.91
71.35
H
cr 
o>
Person c 
years-to- O; 
employment ^ 
ratio hfl
(7) 23
.466
.331
.235
.213
.126
.056
SOURCE: Columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns 5 and 7 are
based on other data in the table.
a. Data exclude Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
b. Payable under state regular benefit provisions, excluding federal-state shared extended benefits.
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benefit duration (excluding extended benefits) for claimants 
(column 4) also has grown since 1948, but since 1969 it has 
remained close to 24 weeks.
Column 5 then shows the implications of growth in 
average weekly payment levels and potential duration on the 
benefit capacity of the trust fund balances. In 1948, the 
$7,603 million year-end balance could have financed benefits 
for nearly 19 million persons at average total benefit entitle 
ment levels that year. By 1979 the trust fund could cover only 
4 million persons at such levels, less than one-fourth of the 
1948 capacity, so measured.
A proxy for the potential unemployment risk exposure of 
state UI is the level of covered employment. Between 1948 
and 1979 it more than doubled, rising from 33 to 71 million 
(column 6). Thus, while the real level of the aggregate trust 
fund balance declined sharply, the potential volume of 
claims increased. Combined, these developments meant that 
the benefit cushion in the trust fund declined very 
dramatically over this time period. Column 7 expresses this 
cushion, as measured in column 5, as the fraction of annual 
covered employment that could be compensated by the ex 
isting trust fund. It fell from .572 to .056 during these 32 
years. Thus, the ability of state UI programs to provide com 
pensation benefits without immediate resort to higher 
employer taxes or emergency loans has declined in a 
precipitous manner over the post-World War II period. The 
real trust fund benefit cushion at the end of 1979 was about 
one-tenth of its 1948 level.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of table 1-1 is the 
steady downtrend in the trust fund reserve position as in 
dicated in columns 2 and 7. The only noticeable slowdown in 
the long term downtrend occurred between 1959 and 1969. 
Most of this decade was characterized by steady and substan 
tial economic growth. Even though the 1959 reserves had
8 The Funding Problem
been depleted by the 1958 recession, they still were somewhat 
more adequate than reserves 10 years later. If the 1969 ag 
gregate trust fund balance was adequate, the 1979 balance 
clearly was not. The small cushion represented by the 1979 
trust fund has been a major contributing factor behind the 
recent loans and the current indebtedness of the state UI pro 
grams.
With the full benefit of hindsight, it can be inferred that 
trust fund balances in the late 1940s were excessive for the 
needs of the program. Two ways to reduce excessive balances 
were through experience rated tax reductions and not raising 
the taxable wage base. After UI trust funds became depleted 
in the 1970s, it has not always been easy for states to raise 
employer taxes. One can speculate that the earlier situation 
of excess reserves followed by downward tax adjustments 
did not serve the UI system well when it later became 
necessary to increase average tax rates and tax bases.
Reasonable people may disagree in defining an adequate 
level of state UI trust fund reserves. Factors such as the 
average or usual level of state unemployment, the level and 
availability of benefits to the unemployed and the severity of 
a given recession are all relevant in assessing trust fund ade 
quacy. One measure of adequacy has been developed by a 
committee of the Interstate Conference of Employment 
Security Agencies (ICESA). Their guideline involves a com 
parison of the trust fund reserve to the highest total of 
benefits for a 12-month period with each expressed as a pro 
portion or ratio of total covered wages. The 12-month high 
benefit cost ratio is based on total payrolls for the period of 
those costs (or a year close to that period) while the reserve 
ratio is based on payrolls for the latest period. The reserve 
ratio is expressed as a multiple of the benefit cost ratio and is 
to be between 1.5 and 3.0. Under this guideline, a multiple of 
1.5 (representing 18 months of benefits paid in an environ-
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ment of unusually high unemployment) can be termed a 
minimum adequate level of reserves.
Table 1-2 presents detail on the distribution of reserve 
ratio multiples for 51 jurisdictions (the 50 states plus the 
District of Columbia) in 1969, 1973 and 1979. Also shown 
are medians of the 51 state multiples and multiples based on 
aggregate U.S. data. The table shows that most of the 1969 
multiples exceeded the guideline. Thirty-five were 1.5 or 
larger and 15 of the remaining 16 fell between 1.00 and 1.49. 
The only state with a ratio below 1.0 was Michigan. In 1973, 
21 state multiples exceeded 1.5 while 18 were less than 1.0. 
Of the 18, however, note that just 4 state ratios fell below 
.50. By 1979, only 2 state ratios exceeded 1.5 while 9 were 
negative and another 29 fell between 0 and .99. Using the 1.5 
reserve ratio multiple guideline, the state systems went from 
a situation of at least minimum fund adequacy in 35 jurisdic 
tions down to just 2 jurisdictions between 1969 and 1979.
For many states, the 1979 reserve ratio multiples in table 
1-2 utilize data on benefit costs from the 1974-75 recession. 
Since that recession was unusually long and severe, it is in 
structive to note the distribution of reserve ratio multiples 
based on pre-1974 benefit cost experiences. The bottom line 
in the table shows these ratios for 1979.Although they are 
larger in several states, only 5 equal or exceed 1.5 while 31 
are still smaller than 1.0. Thus, widespread reserve inade 
quacy is still present even when benefit experiences from 
pre-1974 recessions are used in the reserve ratio multiple 
calculations.
Based on the preceding, two broad statements about state 
UI trust fund balances can be made. (1) Aggregate data 
show clearly that between 1948 and 1979 the program evolv 
ed from a situation of trust fund overabundance to inade 
quacy. The measure of fund adequacy developed in column 
7 in table 1-1, the ratio of person years of benefits to covered
10 
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employment, reached a level in 1979 that was about one- 
tenth the size of its 1948 level. The critical period in this 
evolution was the years following 1969 when state reserve 
ratio multiples fell to levels that were generally below a sug 
gested actuarial standard of 1.5. (2) The decline in trust fund 
reserves has been widespread and not confined to just a few 
states. Using the 1.5 minimum reserve ratio multiple 
guideline, the number of jurisdictions with inadequate trust 
fund reserves increased from 16 in 1969 to 49 in 1979. 
Widespread deficits, emergency federal loans and large debts 
are all direct consequences of inadequate state UI program 
funding.
Because funding has been inadequate, most UI programs 
have had to borrow at least once in the past decade. Of the 
51 "states," i.e., the 50 plus the District of Columbia, 23 
borrowed sometime in the 1970s while 32 borrowed 
sometime between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1984. 
Altogether 38 different states have borrowed at least once 
between 1972 and December 1984. 7 Over these 13 years a 
total of $23.4 billion was lent to insolvent state UI programs.
Although the present study focuses primarily on state fund 
insolvency and debt, one has to recognize the diversity of in 
dividual state experiences. Several states have never become 
insolvent while others have borrowed only relatively small 
amounts for brief periods. The programs that have been suc 
cessful in avoiding major funding problems are examined in 
chapter 3. Despite the diversity of state experiences, it must 
be emphasized that the loss of fund adequacy has been a per 
vasive phenomenon. Only two states entered the 1980s with 
reserve ratio multiples of at least 1.5. Even after all UI in 
debtedness is eliminated, it will require substantial additional 
trust fund rebuilding to achieve a distribution of reserve 
ratio multiples approaching that which existed at the end of 
1969. In other words, a long-run solvency problem will con 
tinue to exist even after all current indebtedness has been 
eliminated.
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Trust Fund Insolvency and Debt
Table 1-3 displays aggregate annual data on loan activities 
and indebtedness since 1969. Columns 1 and 2 respectively 
show the start-of-year trust fund position of the programs 
(more precisely the reserve ratio multiple) and the annual 
unemployment rate for the civilian labor force. Because the 
1974-75 recession followed closely after the 1970-71 
downturn, very little trust fund rebuilding occurred in 1972 
and 1973. As a consequence, benefit payments associated 
with the very high unemployment rates of 1975-77 caused a 
precipitous decline in the aggregate reserve ratio multiple 
and loans were required by many state UI programs. Loans 
of $4.5 billion were made in 1975-77 and for the entire 
1972-79 period the total was $5.5 billion. Substantial loan 
repayments occurred in 1979, but $3.7 billion of debt re 
mained at the end of that year as the economy entered 
another major recessionary period.
The recession of 1980 seriously impacted state UI pro 
grams whose trust funds were even more depleted than they 
had been in 1974-75. About $3.1 billion was borrowed in 
1980-81. When unemployment then rose to even higher levels 
in 1982 and 1983, annual loans of $5.2 billion and $6.6 
billion were required. More than half (27) of the state UI 
programs had to borrow in 1983. With practically nonexis 
tent trust fund cushions large benefit payouts meant an im 
mediate need for federal loans. State borrowing in 1983 
equaled about one-third of all benefit payments made under 
regular state UI and EB programs.
The year 1983 was noteworthy not only for the amount of 
loans but also for the volume of loan repayments. The $3.9 
billion of repayments was nearly three times the amount 
repaid in 1979, the second highest previous repayment year. 
A heavy volume of loan repayments occurred despite the fact 
that 1983 was a year of serious recession. Loan repayments
Table 1-3 
Summary Data on State UI Trust Fund Adequacy, Loans, Loan Repayments and Debt, U.S., 1969 to 1984
States
Start-of- Unemploy- requiring
Year
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978 
1979
1980 
1981
1982 
1983
1984
year reserve
ratio multiple
(1)
.72
.68
.51
.18
.00
.04
.92
.24
.06
.06
.25
.41 
.29
.23 
-.10
-.20
ment rate
(percent)
(2)
3.5
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
7.1
6.1
5.8
7.1 
7.6
9.7 
9.6
7.5
loans
(number)
(3)
0
0
0
1
2
3
14
21
18
10 
3
8 
9
16
27
18
Loan
Loans repayments
(Smillions)
(4)
0
0
0
32
62
17
1,456
1,827
1,265
826 
46
1,471 
1,614
5,187 
6,632
3,005
(Smillions)
(5)
0
b
0
0
0
0
13
36
110
337 
1,307
305 
321
813 
3,914
6,826
End-of-
year debt
(Smillions)
(6)
0
0
0
32
94
111
1,554
3,345
4,500
4,989 
3,728
4,894 
6,187
10,561 
13,279
9,452
End-of-year
states in debt
(number)
(7)
0
0
0
1
2
3
14
20
20
16 
11
14 
15
21 
21
17
SOURCE: Data in columns (1), (6) and (7) taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Column (2) 
taken from U.S. Executive Office of the President, Economic Report of the President (1984). Columns (4) and (5) are based on unpublished
data from the U S. Department of Labor . All data refer to the 50 states
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plus the District of Columbia.
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totaling $6.8 billion took place in 1984. Since the recent 
loans are interest-bearing, debtor states have been repaying 
them at a particularly rapid rate. Over 80 percent of total 
loan repayments in both 1983 and 1984 were made on 
interest-bearing debt. In contrast, loan repayments were of 
minor importance during 1975-77, the years of highest 
unemployment during the 1970s. Because of these recent 
repayments end-of-year indebtedness grew by only $2.7 
billion (from $10.6 to $13.3 billion) between 1982 and 1983, 
while it declined by about $3.8 billion between 1983 and 
1984. To better understand why large repayments occurred 
in a year of such high unemployment it will be useful to 
describe the repayment provisions of the federal laws, the 
costs of indebtedness and how these costs have increased in 
the 1980s.
Repayment of loans by the states can be made in two 
ways. (1) States can make voluntary payments from their 
trust fund accounts to the federal loan account. 
(2) Employers in debtor states may be subject to increased 
taxes under the Federal Unemployment Tax. As noted 
earlier, the basic net FUT rate is .8 percent. For states with 
outstanding loans, however, the FUT net rate is automatical 
ly raised by predetermined amounts and the proceeds are us 
ed to repay debts. These higher taxes can be termed FUT 
penalty taxes.
Penalty taxes are applied after a state loan has been 
outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive years. The 
penalty tax rate is .3 percent of federally taxable payroll in 
the first year of applicability and it rises by increments of .3 
percent in subsequent years8 until the outstanding loan is ful 
ly repaid. (The FUT rate increases are really reductions in the 
amount of the tax credit allowed. Thus, the full tax offset of 
2.7 percent prior to 1985 was reduced to 2.4, then to 2.1, and 
so on. After 1984, the full offset of 5.4 percent is reduced to 
5.1, 4.8, etc.). Connecticut was the first state to need federal
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loans (March 1972 was the first loan date), and its employers 
were subject to a .3 percent PUT penalty tax payable in 1975 
(based on 1974 taxable wages).
Altogether, a total of 23 different states secured loans in 
the 1970s, but only 7 actually paid penalty taxes prior to 
1980. 9 Full implementation of the penalty tax provisions was 
twice deferred by legislation during the 1970s. Because it was 
viewed as inappropriate to impose penalty taxes in a period 
of high unemployment and low employer profits, federal 
amendments of the repayment provisions were enacted in 
1975 (PL94-45) and 1977 (PL95-19) that deferred until 1978 
and then until 1980 the full applicability of the penalty tax 
provisions. The loans made during the 1970s were not finan 
cially onerous for the debtor states for another reason. There 
were no interest charges on the outstanding debt.
Individual debtor states followed a variety of policies in 
repaying the loans. By the end of 1979, 12 of the 23 that had 
borrowed had completely paid off their loans by transfer 
from their reserve accounts, and 2 more completed their debt 
repayments during 1980. 10 Although 12 of the 23 debtor 
states had fully repaid their loans by the end of 1979, about 
two-thirds of the principal ($3.7 of $5.5 billion) remained 
outstanding. Of the $3.7 billion debt, $3.2 billion was con 
centrated in just four states (Connecticut - $.4 billion; 
Illinois - $.9 billion; New Jersey - $.7 billion; and 
Pennsylvania - $1.2 billion). Besides these states, the other 
five that continued in debt past 1980 were Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, Maine, Rhode Island and Vermont. 
These states did little or nothing to repay their loans, even 
though the bulk of the lending occurred prior to 1978. 11 
Because of inflation, each year of repayment deferral reduc 
ed the real burden of their indebtedness.
The failure of some debtor states to make substantial loan 
repayments in the late 1970s was an important consideration
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in subsequent federal legislative actions. First, a further 
deferral of PUT penalty taxes was not seriously considered in 
1979 and the penalty took effect in nine states in 1980. The 
dollar amount of FUT penalty taxes rose from $60 million in 
1979 to over $300 million in 1980. 12 Second, the Reagan Ad 
ministration in 1981 proposed that future loans would carry 
interest charges. This proposal was adopted as part of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of August 1981 
(PL97-35). New loans made after March 31, 1982 carry an 
annual interest charge if not fully repaid within the same 
fiscal year. Interest was charged on the average outstanding 
loan balance, and the interest rate was the same as the rate 
paid on state UI trust fund investments (but subject to a 
maximum rate of 10 percent per year). 13 Combined, these in 
terest and FUT penalty applications meant that future loans 
would be more expensive and debt repayment would be more 
prompt. 14
The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act also con 
tained provisions to limit FUT penalty taxes. Four solvency 
requirements were listed that, if met by a state, could limit 
the penalty taxes applicable during the years 1981 to 1987. 
The four requirements were: (1) to maintain unemployment 
tax effort; (2) not to reduce net solvency in the program; 
(3) to have the tax rate (based on total wages) at least equal 
the prior five-year average benefit cost rate; and (4) to avoid 
increases in total indebtedness after 1981. 15 The last two re 
quirements were applicable starting in 1983. States could 
limit FUT penalty taxes in 1981 and 1982 merely by not 
lowering employer taxes and not raising benefits or easing 
benefit eligibility. The FUT penalty rate was limited to .6 
percent or to the pre-1981 rate if it exceeded .6 percent. Since 
FUT penalty taxes are payable in January of the year after 
they accrue, this legislation meant that a .6 percent penalty 
tax was levied in eight states in January 1982 and only in 
Connecticut was it higher.
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The economic downturn of 1981-82, however, led to a 
renewed concern about the financial problems confronting 
debtor states. As unemployment increased in late 1981 and 
throughout 1982, it became clear that the higher costs of 
debt repayment would be experienced while the states were in 
the midst of a very severe recession. The Tax Equity and 
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (PL97-248, also known as 
TEFRA) contained provisions designed to lessen recession- 
induced economic hardships both for workers with long term 
unemployment and for state UI programs with financing 
problems. A program of Federal Supplemental Compensa 
tion (FSC) was created to provide extra weeks of long term 
benefits to workers exhausting their regular state UI or EB 
entitlements. 16
Important TEFRA provisions focused on financing and 
debt repayment issues. (1) The Federal Unemployment Tax 
was modified in several ways. Starting in 1983, the taxable 
wage base was raised from $6,000 to $7,000 per covered 
workers and the net tax rate was increased from .7 to .8 per 
cent of taxable wages. Also the gross federal UI tax rate was 
raised from 3.5 to 6.2 percent starting in 1985. This change 
doubles the maximum credit allowed employers for state UI 
taxes from 2.7 to 5.4 percent since the net FUT rate remains 
at .8. State tax rates may not be less than 5.4 except through 
experience rating and maximum state tax rates still less than 
5.4 will have to rise to at least that level.
(2) Starting in 1983, debtor states could avoid FUT penal 
ty taxes for their employers. To avoid these taxes, a state 
must (i) repay current year advances before November 10, 
(ii) pay from its reserves an amount toward reducing its prior 
debt equivalent to the potential penalty taxes, (iii) have a 
trust fund balance on November 1 equal to at least three 
months worth of benefits and (iv) enact a net increase in pro 
gram solvency. Wisconsin, for example, which first obtained 
loans in 1982, will be able to avoid FUT penalty taxes in 1985
18 The Funding Problem
because it satisfies these four TEFRA financial re 
quirements. 17
Other TEFRA financial provisions were as follows. (3) It 
limited the potentially sharp increases in FUT penalty taxes 
(much larger than .3 percent) applicable after several years in 
debtor states that had not improved the financial solvency of 
their programs. (4) States with very high insured unemploy 
ment rates (lURs) were allowed to defer up to three-fourths 
of their annual interest payment due after the end of 1982. 
The deferred amounts were to be repaid in the subsequent 
three years and to accrue interest while they remained un 
paid. The threshold IUR was 7.5 percent, a rate so high that 
only Michigan©s rate for the first six months of 1982 exceed 
ed this level.
An examination of these TEFRA financial provisions 
shows they were intended both to improve overall state UI 
program solvency and to provide partial financial relief to 
some debtor states. Improved program solvency would result 
in some states from the tax base increase in 1983, the higher 
gross FUT tax rate in 1985 and from inducements for states 
to enact legislation. Penalty taxes could be avoided if solven 
cy was improved. Avoidance of penalty taxes by paying the 
equivalent from the state fund permits the state to finance 
the repayment through an experience rated rather than a flat 
rate tax.
Because unemployment continued to rise throughout 
1982, the volume of new loans rose sharply and exceeded $5 
billion for the year. States faced the obvious prospect of high 
interest charges in 1983 and later years. In fact, since market 
interest rates remained high throughout 1982, it was ap 
parent that interest payments would become increasingly 
burdensome. The legislation of 1981 and 1982 gave the states 
the ability to limit their FUT penalty taxes, but they could 
not reduce their interest payments. In states with large debts,
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interest charges would soon exceed PUT penalty taxes, and 
high unemployment meant that increased borrowing was in 
evitable. The partial financial relief provided to Michigan 
with its unusually high IUR was not available to other states 
and even that relief had its price, i.e., interest accrued on the 
deferred interest payments.
The Social Security Amendments of March 1983 
(PL98-21) contained provisions that addressed the costs of 
UI loans and indebtedness. For debtor state UI programs, 
interest and debt repayment terms were made potentially 
easier. If a debtor state maintained its tax effort and increas 
ed its net solvency in 1983 (or the first year of indebtedness) 
through tax increases and/or benefit reductions by 25 per 
cent (and then by more in subsequent years), it would be 
allowed during fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985 to defer un 
til later years at no cost 80 percent of the interest payments 
on federal loans made after March 31, 1982. 18 Interest defer 
rals would also be allowed if taxes as a percent of a total 
payroll equaled or exceeded 2 percent in calendar year 1982. 
Only two debtor states were eligible under this alternative in 
terest deferral criterion: Rhode Island and West Virginia.
A second financial inducement to improve net solvency 
was provided in the form of potentially lower interest rates. 
If net solvency was improved by 50 percent in 1983 (or the 
first year of indebtedness), the state would be eligible for a 1 
percentage point reduction in the interest rate charged on 
interest-bearing debt, e.g., from 10 to 9 percent for 1982 
loans. 19
The 1983 Social Security Amendments also addressed the 
potential costs of PUT penalty taxes. The four solvency re 
quirements listed in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1981 were again introduced as criteria for limiting these 
taxes. In this 1983 legislation, however, any state satisfying 
all four requirements would be eligible for a permanent cap
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(as opposed to a temporary cap lasting only until 1987) on 
FUT penalty taxes. Also, criteria were listed for reducing an 
nual increments in penalty tax rates (to .1 or .2 percent per 
year) in states where some but not all of the four re 
quirements were met. 20 All of these provisions have the ef 
fect of allowing states to reduce and/or defer the financial 
obligations associated with their debts.
By charging interest on new loans, the federal government 
has provided the states with strong financial incentives to 
repay outstanding debts. If debts are repaid quickly, i.e., in 
the year that they are incurred, interest charges can be com 
pletely avoided. Voluntary repayments can be applied to 
interest-bearing debt even if the state has older debt incurred 
before April 1, 1982. The repayment activities of 1983 and 
1984 previously noted in table 1-3 reflect this repayment 
behavior. Between April 1, 1982 and December 31, 1983, for 
example, new loans totaled $10.1 billion but only $6.4 billion 
was still outstanding at the end of 1983. As noted, loan 
repayments in the first nine months of 1984 totaled $5.9 
billion. Compared to earlier periods, this is a very rapid rate 
of repayment, particularly considering that 1983-84 have 
been years of very high unemployment.
The interest costs and FUT penalty taxes when coupled 
with the potential financial relief provided by the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments give debtor states very strong in 
ducements to modify their UI laws. Following the Amend 
ments, legislation has been enacted or at least proposed in 
nearly all states with large debts. Chapter 2 will examine 
these legislative initiatives in some detail. Before moving on 
to the specifics of the changes, however, there are 
background issues regarding the origins of the funding crisis 
that need to be addressed.
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Origins of the Funding Problem
The funding problem that state UI programs are currently 
experiencing has origins in the recent overall performance of 
the economy. Adverse economic developments coupled with 
key revenue and benefit features of UI programs have 
resulted in a persistent tendency for benefit payouts to ex 
ceed revenues since 1969. Four developments will be examin 
ed in subsequent paragraphs: (1) real GNP growth; 
(2) regional growth differentials; (3) recent inflation and 
(4) the Federal-State Extended Benefit (EB) program. All 
four have contributed to the funding problem.
Variations in Real GNP Growth Rates
Table 1-4 presents summary data on U.S. macroeconomic 
performance between 1949 and 1983. The starting point, 
1949, is the year of the first post-World War II recession and 
a year when state UI programs had abundant, perhaps 
overabundant, trust fund reserves. Indicators in the table are 
organized roughly by decade with the exact time periods be 
ing 1949-59, 1960-69, 1970-79 and 1980-83. Although most 
are long time intervals, they do illustrate important contrasts 
in economic performance. The aggregate of state trust fund 
balances at the start of these four periods can be characteriz 
ed respectively as overabundant, adequate, inadequate, and 
very inadequate. The aggregate reserve position, net of 
loans, declined sharply during the 1949-59 and the 1970-79 
periods.
Annual rates of growth in the economy©s output of final 
goods and services (real GNP) averaged just above 3 percent 
in the 1950s and 1970s, more than 1 full percentage point 
below the 4.6 percent average of the 1960s. The latter period 
had just one recession (1960-61) and a prolonged period of 
economic growth between 1961 and 1969. Due to two reces 
sions (1980 and 1981-82) the 1980-83 period had very low 
real growth.
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Table 1-4
Economic Performance and State UI Net Trust Fund Reserves 
U.S. and Region, 1949-1983
1949-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-83
Indicator3 and region** Annual averages
Real GNP growth rate 3.4 4.6 3.3 .7
Unemployment rate
All persons 16 and older 4.6 4.8 6.2 8.5 
Men 25 and older 3.6 3.1 3.6 6.3
Real labor productivity 
growth rate 2.3 2.5 1.4 1.0
Employment growth rate
Total U.S.
North
South and West
Inflation rate
1.4
.8
2.4
2.4
2.6
2.1
3.3
2.2
2.5
1.4
3.8
6.3
-.1
-1.0
.9
7.3
Start of period net UI trust fund reserves 
as a percent of prior year payrolls
Total U.S.
North
South and West
7.9
7.6©
8.5
3.6
3.2
4.2
3.4
3.4
3.5
0.9
-0.1
2.0
SOURCES: Rates of GNP and labor productivity (output per man hour) growth and infla 
tion (implicit price deflator for GNP) based on national income accounts data (for nonfarm 
business sector) from U.S. Executive Office of the President, Economic Report of the 
President (1984), table B-41, p. 267.
Unemployment rates based on monthly household survey and employment growth rates 
on the establishment survey. Data taken from Employment and Earnings (May 1984), pp. 
128/151 and earlier U.S. Department of Labor Publications.
Trust fund reserves and payrolls data from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment 
Insurance Financial Data (1984).
a. Economic performance indicators are measured as percentage changes and averaged 
over the indicated period; UI trust fund reserves are measured at the start of each period 
and expressed as a percentage of total covered payrolls in the previous year, 
b. The "North" region includes states in the North East and North Central divisions as 
defined by the Census Bureau; the "South and West" includes all other states.
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The effects of economic recessions are apparent not only 
in economic growth rates, but also in the average unemploy 
ment rates. Because high unemployment leads to increased 
demand for UI benefits, average unemployment rates have 
obvious implications for UI trust fund payouts. Since World 
War II the composition of U.S. unemployment has 
undergone a long run change with an increasing share of the 
total made up of younger persons and women, groups whose 
unemployment rates are typically higher than the rates ex 
perienced by adult men. This changing mix has tended to in 
crease the economy©s average unemployment rate in more re 
cent years and to increase the minimum unemployment rate 
consistent with a full employment economy. 21 Table 1-4 il 
lustrates the importance of this mix effect by displaying two 
sets of average unemployment rates; the rate for all persons 
16 and older and the rate for adult men 25 and older. The 
adult male unemployment rate, which is more comparable 
across time periods, clearly illustrates the economy©s 
superior performance of the 1960s in comparison to the ad 
jacent earlier and later decades. Since adult men are the 
demographic group most likely to be UI beneficiaries, 
movements in their average rate provide a useful gauge of 
the demand for UI benefits. Both average unemployment 
rates are very high in the 1980-83 period.
The data on real GNP growth rates and adult male 
unemployment rates convey similar messages. Frequent 
recessions in the 1950s and 1970s caused substantial drains 
on UI trust fund reserves. Because the system started the 
1950s with excessive reserves, however, it emerged from the 
1950s with generally adequate reserves, although 12 states 
had less than adequate reserves, including 3 in debt. Ten 
years later, aggregate reserves still seemed generally ade 
quate, but 16 states had reserve ratio multiples that fell 
below 1.5. The excessive reserve cushion from the late 1940s 
was not present at the start of the 1970s, and, as a result, the
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recessions of this decade necessitated borrowing by many 
state UI programs. Given the low reserves and very high 
unemployment rates of 1980-83, borrowing in this latest 
period has also been widespread.
Disparities in Regional Rates of Economic Growth
Output growth translates into employment growth as in 
creased real production raises demand for labor and creates 
more jobs. The association between output growth and 
employment growth, however, is also influenced by labor 
productivity growth. For a given rate of output growth, a 
lower rate of productivity growth will imply a faster rate of 
employment growth. Table 1-4 documents the slowdown in 
labor productivity growth that occurred in the 1970s when 
average man hour productivity grew by 1.4 percent per year 
compared to averages of 2.3-2.5 percent in the preceding two 
decades. Because of the productivity slowdown average 
employment growth was nearly as fast in the 1970s as it had 
been in the 1960s, despite the slower pace of output growth. 
On average, employment grew by 2.5 percent per year in the 
1970s compared to 2.6 percent in the 1960s. Since employ 
ment growth and productivity growth are very sensitive to 
short-run business cycle developments, their slow growth in 
1980-83 reflects cyclical factors.
Over the entire period since World War II, there have been 
systematic differences in regional rates of economic growth. 
States in the South and West have consistently exhibited 
higher than average growth while states in the North have 
grown more slowly. Table 1-4 illustrates these regional dif 
ferences with data on employment growth rates. The 
cumulative effect of the employment growth differentials 
over this 34-year period is quite dramatic. In 1948, states in 
the North had 63 percent of total U.S. employment, but by 
1983 their employment share had declined to 47 percent.
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Since 1970, the differences in regional growth rates have 
been especially pronounced. The first energy crisis of 
1973-75 increased the relative costs of doing business in the 
North (so-called frost belt states) and hastened the pace of 
regional population and employment reallocations. Em 
ployment growth data in table 1-4 illustrate the increased 
regional disparities. As noted, employment growth for the 
U.S. as a whole was only .1 percent lower in the 1970s com 
pared to the 1960s. However, employment growth during the 
1970s was .7 percent lower in the North but actually .5 per 
cent higher in the South and West when compared to the 
preceding decade. These wider regional disparities have per 
sisted through the first four years of the present decade.
Given the way that UI programs are financed, increased 
regional growth disparities can have differential implications 
for trust fund balances in individual states. Consider some 
consequences of a company closing a plant in the North and 
simultaneously opening a plant in the South or West. The 
claims of laid-off workers are the obligation of the program 
in the state where the plant closure occurs. The closing will 
cause a loss of tax revenues as well as an increase in benefit 
claims. Even if the worker moves out of the state to find a 
new job, he or she can file an interstate claim that is the 
financial obligation of employers in the original state. New 
and expanding plants in the growing region pay taxes for 
new employees as soon as the workers are hired. For new 
plants, the employer taxes are not reduced by an experience 
factors so that trust fund reserves are accumulated quickly in 
the first few years of operation. New employees must work 
for a time before satisfying the monetary eligibility re 
quirements for state UI benefits. Thus, when the regional 
distribution of employment changes, there is some tendency 
for UI trust funds to be reduced in regions that are losing 
employment while at the same time they are increased in 
regions where employment is growing.
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To date there has not been a detailed study of how 
disparities in regional rates of economic growth affect state 
UI trust fund balances. It is clear from aggregate data in 
table 1-4, however, that employment growth disparities have 
been unusually wide in 1970-79 and 1980-83. It is also ob 
vious in table 1-4 that the aggregate trust fund reserves of 
states in the South and West did not deteriorate as much dur 
ing the 1970s as they did in the North. Reserves as a propor 
tion of covered wages in the two regions were roughly equal 
in 1970; .034 in the North and .035 in the South and West. 
By 1980, however, reserves in the South and West were .020 
of covered wages while the net reserve balance for the North 
as a whole was negative. In both the 1970s and in 1980-83 the 
bulk of loans to state UI programs has gone to states in the 
North.
Table 1-5 provides more detail on the regional aspect of 
state UI loan activities in the 1970s and in 1980-83. Column 1 
displays the percentage breakdown of covered wages among 
the Census Bureau©s four geographic regions and nine divi 
sions. If funding problems were randomly distributed by 
state and region, these percentages would provide a rough 
guide as to how loans would be distributed. The actual 
percentage distributions of loans are then shown in columns 
2 and 3. During the 1970s, loans were heavily concentrated in 
the North East with 17.6 and 41.5 percent going to New 
England and Middle Atlantic states respectively. Most of the 
remainder (28.4 percent) went to states in the East North 
Central division. The latter division accounted for 58.8 per 
cent of all loans in the 1980s, a reflection of the current 
recession©s severity in these heavily industrialized states. 
Thus, although states in the North were the main loan recip 
ients in both periods, loans went mainly to Northeastern 
states in the 1970s and mainly to North Central states in the 
1980s. Note also in columns 4 and 5 that per dollar of 
covered wages, New England was the largest user of loans in
Table 1-5
Federal Loans to State UI Programs 
Employment Growth and Unemployment by Region
Percent of Percent of 
covered federal loans to
Census regions
and divisions
North East
New England
Middle Atlantic
North Central
East North Central
West North Central
South
South Atlantic
East South Central 
West South Central
West 
Mountain
Pacific
U.S. Total - percent
U.S. Total - $ billions
wages
1979
(1)
23.1
5.7
17.4
28.2
21.2
7.0
28.9
13.8
5.0 
10.1
19.9
4.5
15.4
100.0
934.5
SOURCES: Columns (l)-(5) are based on
state UI programs
1972-79 1980-83
(2)
59.1
17.6
41.5
31.5
28.4
3.1
5.6
4.1
1.0
.5
3.9
.5
3.4
100.0
5.5
U.S. Department
_.«_« tf\ _  J /*7\ .
(3)
18.5
.6
17.9
65.3
58.8
6.5
14.9
2.8
2.5 
9.7
1.3 
1.3
0
100.0
14.9
of Labor,
Loans as a 
percent of 1979
covered wages
1972-79
(4)
1.5
1.8
1.4
.7
.8
.3
.1
.2
.1 
.0
.1 
.1
.1
.6
~
1980-83
(5)
1.3
.2
1.6
3.7
4.4
1.5
.8
.3
..8 
1.5
.1 
.4
0
1.6
~
Annual 
employment
growth, percent
1970-79
(6)
.9
1.7
.6
1.9
1.5
2.7
3.7
3.5
3.3 
4.2
4.0 
5.6
3.5
2.5
--
1980-83
(7)
.1
.3
-.1
-1.9
-2.2
-1.1
1.0
1.2
-1.1 
1.9
.6
1.2
.4
-.1
--
Average 
unemployment rate
percent
1970-79
(8)
7.0
6.9
7.0
5.6
6.1
4.2
5.5
5.6
5.7 
5.2
7.4 
6.0
7.8
6.2
-
1980-83
(9)
8.0
6.7
8.5
9.7
10.8
6.9
7.9
7.6
10.4 
7.0
8.4
7.5
8.8
8.5
-
Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984) and unpublished data
Hy
"d 
Bt
OQ
2?
o 
a;
nT
from the U.S. Department of Labor. Columns (6) and (7) which are based on annual averages from the Labor Department©s Establishment 
Survey refer to non-agricultural wage and salary employment. Unemployment rates in columns (8) and (9) are based on the Labor Department- 
Census Bureau monthly household survey of the labor force. Data in columns (6) through (9) taken from Employment and Earnings (May 
1984), pp. 128/151 and earlier U.S. Department of Labor publications.
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the 1970s but a very minor user in the 1980s. It is clear that 
funding problems are now most severe in the East North 
Central states. All five (Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois 
and Wisconsin) have had to borrow in recent years.
Employment growth rates in the various regions and divi 
sions are summarized in columns 6 and 7. As previously 
noted the South and West grew much faster than the na 
tional average in the 1970s (and, incidentally, even faster 
than their own growth rates of the 1960s) while the North 
East was the slowest growing region. The concentration of 
the 1980-83 downturn in the North Central region is in 
dicated by the negative employment growth which is 
especially large in the East North Central division (-2.2 per 
cent). Note also that New England grew faster than the na 
tional average in the 1980-83 period.
The contrasting experiences of the North East and North 
Central regions between 1970-79 and 1980-83 are also il 
lustrated by the average unemployment rates in columns 8 
and 9. During the 1970s, unemployment rates in the North 
East exceeded the national average while the East North 
Central division experienced roughly average rates. Their 
positions were exactly reversed in 1980-83 when the 
unemployment rate in the East North Central division was 
2.3 percentage points above the national average. Especially 
noticeable in this period was the low unemployment in New 
England. Its average rate was lower than during the 1970s 
and 1.8 percentage points below the national average (6.7 
versus 8.5 percent). It is clear from table 1-5 that in 1970-79 
and again in 1980-83 loans went mainly to states in regions 
with high unemployment.
Following the economic downturn of 1981-82 there have 
been sharply higher unemployment rates in the major 
energy-producing states of the South (Louisiana, Oklahoma 
and Texas) and in (coal-producing) Kentucky and West
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Virginia. For these five states, unemployment rates in 1980 
were 6.7, 4.8, 5.2, 8.0 and 9.4 percent respectively. In 1983 
the corresponding rates were 11.8, 9.0, 8.0, 11.7 and 18.0 
percent. Because of sharp increases in unemployment four of 
the five energy-producing states have recently experienced 
UI funding problems. Louisiana and Texas borrowed $1.1 
billion in 1983. Except for loans made to the State of 
Washington in the 1970s, these loans to Texas and Louisiana 
are the only large-scale advances made to states outside the 
North in either the 1970s or 1980-83. Table 1-5 shows that 
states in the West South Central division (Texas, Louisiana, 
and Arkansas) have accounted for 9.7 percent of total bor 
rowing in the 1980-83 period. Although the scale of their 
borrowing has been generally small, it should be noted that 
nine southern and eight western states have had to borrow at 
least once since 1972.
The Pacific division contrasts with others in having both 
high employment growth and high unemployment, par 
ticularly during the 1970s. The absence of large-scale bor 
rowing in this division could be evidence that high growth 
has favorable effects on state UI program financing. As 
noted above, the effects of high growth could operate either 
through the revenue side of the program, e.g., having more 
new firms contribute at a rate that exceeds their long-run 
average cost, or the benefit side, e.g., high growth leads to a 
delay in acquiring monetary eligibility and/or to less long 
term unemployment. Whatever the reason (or reasons), it is 
clear that states in the Pacific division have had fewer fund 
ing problems than states in other divisions with high 
unemployment.
The data in table 1-5 clearly show that UI trust fund prob 
lems have not occurred in a random manner across the 
economy. In both the 1970s and in 1980-83, loans have been 
concentrated in regions with high rates of unemployment 
and low rates of employment growth.
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Inflation
The economy experienced much higher inflation rates in 
the 1970s than it did in the preceding two decades. Table 1-4, 
for example, shows that annual inflation rates (as measured 
by the implicit price deflator) averaged 2.4 and 2.2 percent 
during 1949-59 and 1960-69 respectively. Average inflation 
rates were more than twice as high in 1970-79 and 1980-83 
(6.3 and 7.3 percent). The combination of both high infla 
tion and high unemployment experienced during the 1970s 
was unusual, and the term stagflation became widely used to 
describe this situation. The OPEC oil price increases of 
1973-75 and 1979-81 were an important cause for the 
economy©s stagflation.
High rates of inflation have important implications for 
state UI financing. In many programs, increased wage infla 
tion causes benefit payments to increase automatically and 
roughly by an amount that matches the higher inflation, 
while tax revenues do not keep pace. The institutional 
features of many programs that cause the asymmetric 
response are quite easy to describe. The weekly benefit max 
imum is often tied to an index of average earnings, e.g., the 
average weekly wage in manufacturing or the average for all 
covered employment. Thus, when inflation increases this is 
soon translated into higher weekly wages, a higher weekly 
benefit maximum and increased weekly benefits.
Indexation of the maximum weekly benefit became 
noticeably more widespread in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1971, 
half of the states had instituted indexation and 10 more 
followed suit later in the 1970s. In this same period there was 
a trend towards liberalizing the level of the maximum benefit 
relative to the average weekly wage. Thus, in 1971 the weekly 
benefit maximum equaled or exceeded 60 percent of the 
average weekly wage in only 8 states, but by 1983 the number 
had grown to 22. Both changes cause average weekly benefits 
to respond strongly to changes in average weekly wages.
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Benefit data from the 1960s and 1970s illustrate this re- 
sponsiveness. For the three years 1959, 1969, and 1979, 
average weekly benefits for the entire economy were $30.40, 
$46.17, and $89.68 respectively. The implied compound 
growth rate in weekly benefits over the 1960s and 1970s (4.3 
and 6.9 percent respectively) exceed the inflation rates for 
the two decades as shown in table 1-4. When measured 
relative to average weekly wages in covered employment, 
i.e., the gross replacement rate, benefits became a somewhat 
larger fraction, increasing from .334 in 1959 to .344 in 1969 
and then to .361 in 1979. During the 1960s and 1970s, the 
benefit side of UI could be described as being fully indexed. 
Thus when inflation increased sharply in the 1970s this 
meant that the financial obligation to pay benefits would 
have increased sharply even if unemployment rates of the 
1970s had been no higher than those of the 1960s.
Increasing benefit obligations would not pose financial 
problems if UI tax revenues were also fully indexed to the in 
flation rate. Each state has an annual taxable wage base per 
covered employee. In most states in most years, this max 
imum has been the same as the taxable wage base for the 
Federal Unemployment Tax (FUT). Between 1940 and 1971 
this maximum was $3,000 per worker. Because the federal 
maximum was unchanged for this long period while average 
wages were growing, taxable wages came to represent a 
smaller and smaller proportion of total wages. The ratio of 
taxable to total wages declined from .928 in 1940 to .453 in 
1971. Several states raised their taxable wage bases above the 
$3,000 federal level in the 1960s and in 1970-71. The national 
ratio of taxable to total wages in 1971 would have been even 
lower than .453 had all states retained the $3,000 wage base.
During the 1960s there was an increasing recognition that 
the FUT taxable wage base was inadequate to finance 
benefits. Thus the base was raised to $4,200 in 1972 and then 
to $6,000 in 1978. Because of higher inflation during the
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1970s, however, the ratio of taxable to total wages continued 
to decline. By 1982 taxable wages represented only .405 of 
total wages even though the wage base was twice its 1971 
level. Even with an increase to $7,000 in 1983 and to higher 
levels in several states, taxable wages continue to represent 
less than half of all wages in covered employment.
Table 1-6 presents summary data on tax bases and average 
tax rates in state UI programs since 1960. It documents the 
downtrend in the ratio of taxable to total wages (column 2) 
and shows how the increases in the PUT maximum of 1972, 
1978 and 1983 increased the ratio in those three years. Col 
umns 3 and 4 respectively show the average tax rates on tax 
able wages and total wages. In the 1970s, the average rate on 
taxable wages did rise, but the tax rate on total wages was no 
higher than it was in the early 1960s. This clearly illustrates 
the effect of the long term downtrend in the ratio of taxable 
to total wages. Although average tax rates increased follow 
ing the recessions of the 1970s, they did not increase enough 
to adequately replenish UI trust funds. Given the low taxable 
wage base per employee, even larger increases in statutory 
tax rates were needed.
Increasingly, individual states have recognized that the 
PUT taxable maximum is an inadequate base for employer 
UI taxes. Table 1-6 shows the number of states with max 
imums higher than the PUT maximum. By 1984, this number 
stood at 31. Although individual states have legislated higher 
maximums, they typically have not been set that much above 
the PUT taxable wage base. Thus, 23 states had maximums 
above $3,000 in 1971 but only 5 exceeded $4,200 in 1972. 
Note, however, after the next two tax base increases that 12 
state maximums exceeded $6,000 in 1978 and then 24 exceed 
ed $7,000 in 1983. Although 31 state maximums were above 
$7,000 in 1984, only 9 exceeded $10,000. Thus even among 
states that have legislated higher maximums there has been a 
reluctance to go too far beyond the PUT taxable maximum.
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Table 1-6 
State UI Tax Data, 1960 to 1984
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
PUT
taxable 
wage base 
(1)
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
3,000
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
7,000
Ratio of 
taxable-to- 
total wages 
(2)
.611
.600
.590
.581
.570
.558
.553
.533
.517
.497
.477
.453
.517
.500
.475
.452
.465
.451
.496
.474
.447
.423
.405
.424
NA
Average tax 
rate on taxable 
wages 
(percent) 
(3)
1.92
2.05
2.35
2.33
2.24
2.12
1.93
1.66
1.49
1.40
1.37
1.44
1.65
1.96
1.97
1.99
2.50
2.83
2.72
2.72
2.49
2.43
2.53
2.75
NA
Average tax 
rate on total 
wages 
(percent) 
(4)
.17
.23
.39
.35
.27
1.18
1.07
.89
.77
.70
.65
.65
.85
.98
.94
.90
.16
.27
.35
.29
.11
.03
.02
.17
NA
States with 
tax bases above 
the PUT 
tax base3 
(5)
6
6
9
10
15
16
18
18
22
22
22
23
5
4
5
10
20
23
12
14
16
19
24
24
31
SOURCES: Based on data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment In 
surance Financial Data (1984). Average tax rates in column (3) were computed at The Ur 
ban Institute. Data for 1983 are preliminary, 
a. This column refers to the 50 states plus the District of Columbia. 
NA = not available.
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One obvious way to increase the responsiveness of UI 
taxes to inflation is to index the taxable wage base. Hawaii 
indexed its wage base in 1965 and several other states follow 
ed suit in the mid-1970s. Typically, the tax base is set to a 
specific percentage, say 67 or 100 percent, of the state©s 
average wage in the previous (calendar or fiscal) year. By 
1984 there were 14 states with taxable wage bases indexed to 
average wages. All nine states with tax bases above $10,000 
in 1984 were states where the tax base was indexed. It is clear 
that indexing has led to larger increases in the tax base than 
have periodic legislated increases. In chapter 3 we will review 
the performance of states that have indexed their taxable 
wage bases to determine if they had less serious trust fund 
problems in the 1970s and 1980s when compared to the 
average experience of other states.
Considering the financing difficulties that state UI pro 
grams have had since 1970, it seems that stagflation poses 
especially serious problems. In a period of stagflation total 
benefit payments increase both because high unemployment 
raises weeks compensated and because inflation raises 
average weekly benefits. To the extent that the taxable wage 
base is fixed in nominal terms, most of the revenue ad 
justments must take the form of higher employer tax rates. 
In the aggregate, employer tax rates were not raised suffi 
ciently in the 1970s and in 1980-83 to prevent the need for 
large scale U.S. Treasury loans. High inflation since 1969 
has clearly played a role in the state UI funding problem.
The Costs of Extended Benefits
The Federal-State Extended Benefit (EB) program was 
enacted in 1970 (PL91-373) to provide up to 13 extra weeks 
of benefits to exhaustees during recessions. A set of trigger 
mechanisms was specified that would activate EB payments 
whenever state and/or national insured unemployment rates 
exceeded predetermined thresholds. 22 Benefits were first
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available in 1971, and they have been paid in every year since 
1971.
The costs of the EB program are a shared federal-state 
responsibility with each paying for half of the total. The 
federal share of EB costs was originally projected to be 
covered by a .1 percent Federal Unemployment Tax con 
tribution rate in 1970 and 1971 and then a .05 percent rate in 
later years. To cover the other half of EB costs, states were 
to tax employers using whatever method they desired. Some 
states have levied a flat rate tax, while others have experience 
rated EB costs.
In practice, EB has proven more costly than originally an 
ticipated. Between 1971 and 1976 the federal half of EB costs 
totaled $3.4 billion while cumulative 1970-76 EB taxes were 
only about $1 billion. 23 The deficit in the federal share of EB 
costs was made up by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. To 
repay these Treasury advances a "temporary" increase of .2 
percent in the FUT tax rate was imposed in 1977 and has 
been in effect in all subsequent years. 24
Financing the state share of EB costs has been difficult in 
several states. The initial federal actuarial cost projections, 
as reflected in the FUT tax rate increase of 1970, were so low 
that most states did not change their existing tax schedules. 
Raising UI tax rates is often controversial and difficult to ac 
complish, and in many states it was easier to avoid conflicts 
by retaining existing tax schedules. The impacts of high in 
flation and the subsequent recessions (with attendent in 
creases in long duration unemployment) meant that a 
substantial new dollar volume of claims on state trust fund 
accounts resulted from the EB program.
The state share of EB costs has contributed to the volume 
of UI loans in the 1970s and 1980s. Employer EB-related 
contributions are a part of UI taxes in each state and extend-
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ed benefit payments are debited either to individual 
employer accounts or to a noncharged benefits account. 25 
Large outlays for the state share of EB costs cause state trust 
funds to be drawn down in exactly the same manner as 
payments of regular state UI benefits. The cumulative state 
share of EB costs between 1971 and 1983 was $7.7 billion. 
Although there are no published estimates on the cumulative 
amount of state taxes earmarked to pay for EB, they certain 
ly have been much less than the $7.7 billion of benefit 
payments. Thus, because of EB, deficits in state trust fund 
accounts between 1971 and 1983 have been larger than they 
would have been in the absence of this program.
Although EB payments undoubtedly have helped relieve 
economic hardships among the long term unemployed, it is 
now clear that the program was created just as state UI was 
entering a period of heavy demand for benefits. No major 
new additions to state UI taxes were mandated, and the new 
federal taxes mandated in 1970 were clearly inadequate to 
meet the federal share of actual EB costs. As a result EB 
payments have helped contribute to the UI funding problems 
recently experienced by several states. 26
Reviewing the four factors discussed above it does not 
seem surprising that a state UI funding problem emerged in 
the 1970s and has been even more severe in 1980-83. High 
unemployment, uneven regional growth rates, high inflation 
and unexpected costs of EB all have contributed to the recent 
tendency for benefit outlays to exceed revenues in state UI. 
The severity of the funding problem has varied widely from 
one state to the next. Chapter 2 will examine debtor state ex 
periences and recent adjustments in some detail. Part of 
chapter 3 will focus on how some states have been able to 
avoid funding problems. Before descending to the level of in 
dividual state experiences, however, it will be useful to brief 
ly review recent developments on the benefit side of state UI 
programs.
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Benefit Payments Since 1970
State UI funding problems could originate from 
developments in program benefits or revenues or both. Table 
1-7 presents national data useful for assessing aggregate 
benefit payments. Benefit data appear for three long periods 
(1949-59, 1960-69 and 1970-79) and annually for the years 
1970 to 1983. Aggregate benefits as a percentage of total 
payroll (benefit cost rates), were very similar in the 1950s and 
1970s (1.17 and 1.15 percent respectively). 27 Slow growth due 
to frequent recessions in these decades contributed to a 
benefit cost rate that was considerably higher than during the 
1960s.
Columns 2-5 then focus on four factors that are important 
in determining benefit payments. Besides the economy©s 
overall unemployment rate, there are three ratios (insured- 
to-total unemployment, weekly beneficiaries-to-insured 
unemployment, and weekly benefits-to-average weekly 
wages) to be considered. Variations in these four factors 
cause changes in aggregate benefit outlays with increases in 
any one causing benefit payments to be higher. Growth in 
the three ratios would suggest that UI programs were becom 
ing more generous either in terms of benefit availability to 
the unemployed (columns 3 and 4) or the size of weekly 
benefits (column 5). Column 6 combines the (product of the) 
three ratios into an overall benefits index.
Unemployment rates have already been discussed. The 
average rate was higher in the 1970s than in the 1960s and 
very high in the 1980-83 period. There is a clear positive 
association between the annual data in columns 1 and 2.
Of the three components in the overall benefits index, the 
ratio of weekly benefits-to-weekly wages (often referred to as 
the gross replacement rate) demonstrates a clear upward 
trend. From the 1950s to the 1970s, the three-decade 
averages were .335, .346 and .364 respectively. This ratio has
Table 1-7 
Measures of State UI Benefit Payments and of Contributing Factors, 1949-1983
Time 
period
1949-59
1960-69
1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefit 
cost 
ratea 
(percent) 
(1)
1.17
1.00
1.15
1.01
1.23
.98
.79
1.07
2.03
1.39
1.16
.93
.94
1.34
1.17
1.72
1.43
Total 
unemployment 
rate 
(percent) 
(2)
4.6
4.8
6.2
4.9
5.9
5.6
4.9
5.6
8.5
7.7
7.1
6.1
5.8
7.1
7.6
9.7
9.6
Ratio of 
insured- 
to-total 
unemployment 
(3)
.498
.426
.413
.441
.429
.379
.374
.439
.503
.404
.380
.380
.397
.439
.368
.380
.311
Contributing factors
Ratio of
average weekly 
beneficiaries- 
to-insured 
unemployment 
(4)
.855
.854
.836
.840
.847
.843
.840
.833
.849
.819
.823
.823
.838
.854
.859
.878
.881
Ratio of
average weekly 
benefit-to- 
average 
weekly wage
(5)
.335
.346
.364
.357
.365
.361
.365
.365
.371
.371
.364
.364
.361
.364
.359
.375
.368
Overall 
benefit factors 
index 
(3)x(4)x(5) 
(6)
.143
.126
.126
.132
.133
.115
.113
.133
.158
.123
.114
.114
.120
.136
.113
.125
.101
u>
oo
H
9*.5©
OQ
Ocr
SOURCES: Data in columns (1), (4) and (5) taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Column (2) is based on the household labor force survey. Column (3) based on UI program data and household labor force data. Column (6) is the pro 
duct of columns (3), (4) and (5). Data for 1983 are preliminary 
a. Benefit outlays as percent of total covered payrolls.
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both a trend and a cyclical component. It rises in recessions 
as more experienced and high wage persons enter the pool of 
beneficiaries. 28 From column 5 it is clear that weekly benefits 
in 1980-83 are more generous relative to weekly wages than 
they were two decades earlier. Note also, however, that this 
replacement rate was not noticeably higher in 1982-83 than it 
had been in 1975-76. It may be that the replacement has 
peaked in the early 1980s. 29
Insured unemployment includes regular state UI 
beneficiaries and claimants who are not yet collecting 
benefits, e.g., those serving a waiting period and some per 
sons whose claims are in dispute. It excludes persons receiv 
ing EB, those who have exhausted benefits and persons who 
do not apply. If waiting periods were becoming shorter, the 
ratio of weekly beneficiaries-to-insured unemployment 
would rise. From table 1-7, however, it is clear there is no up 
ward trend in this ratio. If anything, it declined somewhat in 
the 1970s in comparison to previous decades. This ratio also 
has a cyclical component so that increases in 1980 and 1982 
are normal cyclical occurrences reflecting the increased 
average duration of claimants in benefit status.
The second obvious trend in the three ratios is the decline 
in the ratio of insured-to-total unemployment (column 3). 
Averages for the three decades were .498, .426 and .413 
respectively. The downtrend is the result of many influences 
among which the changing demographic mix of unemploy 
ment is undoubtedly the most important. Younger persons 
and women have come to represent an increasing share of 
total unemployment. Since they are less likely to collect UI 
benefits than are adult men, this changing mix has caused the 
ratio of insured to total unemployment to decline.
This ratio also has a strong cyclical element. In recession, 
layoffs cause the mix of unemployment to change and job 
losers become a larger share of total unemployment. Since
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they are the group most likely to collect benefits, this com 
positional change raises the ratio of insured-to-total 
unemployment. Between 1973 and 1975 the ratio increased 
from .374 to .503 and it also increased between 1979 and 
1980.
An interesting research question has arisen regarding the 
behavior of insured unemployment since 1979. Regression 
analyses by Burtless (1983) and by Vroman (1984) have 
shown that insured unemployment has been lower than ex 
pected since 1979 and that the gap between insured and total 
unemployment grew successively larger in each year between 
1980 and 1983. Note in table 1-7 that the column 3 ratio fell 
in 1981 and rose only modestly in 1982 despite the large in 
crease in unemployment of that year. The ratio then fell 
sharply in 1983 even though the total unemployment rate 
was virtually unchanged from 1982. Contributing to the re 
cent reductions in insured unemployment have been changes 
in UI laws and administrative practices as well as the 
unusually high level of benefit exhaustions since 1979.
Although it seems likely that state UI funding problems 
have contributed to recent declines in the ratio of insured-to- 
total unemployment, this has yet to be conclusively 
demonstrated by careful research. One effect of the recent 
reductions in this ratio, of course, is to lower total UI benefit 
outlays in 1980-83. 30 A second element of reduced benefit 
availability is lower amounts of EB payments since 1981. 
Because of Reagan Administration changes in EB triggers 
these payments for long-term joblessness have been much 
lower, particularly in 1982-83.
The overall benefits index combines movements in the 
three ratios to produce a summary measure. The index was 
no higher in 1970-79 than it had been in 1960-69, and both 
were lower than the average index for the 1950s. The effects 
of the gradual rise in the replacement rate were more than
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offset by the decline in the ratio of insured-to-total 
unemployment. Also note that the overall index was actually 
lower in 1982 than in 1975, and that the 1983 index is the 
lowest of any since 1970, more evidence that UI benefits 
have not been increasing relative to historic norms. Thus the 
high benefit payout rate observed since 1970 (column 1) has 
been due to higher unemployment and not to increased 
availability and generosity of UI benefits.
Summary
The state UI funding problem documented in the first part 
of this chapter has origins predominantly in high unemploy 
ment during 1970-79 and 1980-83, coupled with an insuffi 
ciently responsive revenue system. Also contributing to the 
funding problem have been unusually wide variations in 
regional growth rates, inflation and increased financial 
obligations posed by the EB program. Although borrowing 
has been widespread, even larger deficits would have been in 
curred in the 1980-83 period if there had not been recent 
reductions in insured unemployment (and associated regular 
state UI benefits) and cutbacks in EB payments.
NOTES
1. This amount refers to the debt arising from the payment of regular 
state UI benefits and the state share (half) of federal-state Extended 
Benefits or EB. Deficits in the Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account (EUCA), a federal UI trust fund account used to pay the federal 
share of Extended Benefit costs and other temporary long-term benefits 
provided during 1971-73 and 1975-77, also gave rise to borrowing by this 
account from the U.S. Treasury. At the end of 1983 the EUCA debt was 
$6.2 billion making a total debt of $19.5 billion for the entire federal- 
state system of UI programs. Because the EUCA debt is gradually being 
repaid by earmarked federal payroll taxes, this component of in 
debtedness will not be examined in the present report.
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2. The federal-state unemployment insurance system was established as 
the result of the Social Security Act of 1935 (PL 74-271). The Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act of 1939 (PL 76-379) details the federal payroll 
tax incorporating federal UI financing provisions that were originally in 
the Social Security Act. For one description of state UI see chapter 13 in 
Myers (1981).
3. For one concise description of UI financing provisions for the period 
from 1935 to 1978, see the Appendix in Mackin (1978). In addition to 
taxing employers, four states (Alabama, Alaska, New Jersey and Penn 
sylvania) also levied taxes on covered employees in 1984.
4. If a state maximum tax rate is lower, employers at that maximum 
receive less than the full offset since that maximum rather than ex 
perience determines their rate.
5. One of the federal trust fund accounts is the federal loan fund from 
which states with depleted reserves may borrow to continue to pay 
benefits.
6. There are 53 state UI programs in the United States, those in the 50 
states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 
The latter two jurisdictions will be excluded from the analysis of the pre 
sent report.
7. Prior to 1972, federal loans had been made to just three state UI pro 
grams. During the 1950s and early 1960s, loans were made to Alaska, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania. These loans were fully repaid by the late 
1960s.
8. Increments of .3 percent apply strictly in the first two years that PUT 
penalty taxes are paid by a debtor state. Provisions determining further 
increments after the second year have changed more than once. In 1984, 
for example, a debtor state may have a third year penalty tax rate of .6, 
.7, .8 or .9 percent.
9. Seven different states experienced a .3 percent FUT penalty tax rate 
for a single year. The states and years were as follows; 1974-Connecticut, 
1976-Washington, 1977-Vermont, 1978-District of Columbia and Rhode 
Island, and 1979-Delaware and Pennsylvania. Penalty taxes are due in 
January of the year following the year to which they apply.
10. The 12 were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon and 
Washington. Massachusetts and Montana completed their debt 
repayments in 1980.
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11. In fact, not one of the four with the largest debts passed comprehen 
sive legislation to improve the fiscal balance in their UI program prior to 
1980. New Jersey, which did raise average employer tax rates in 1977-79 
and indexed its taxable wages base in 1976, made small voluntary 
repayments in 1978 and 1979 and Connecticut did so in each year from 
1976 to 1979. All of these repayments, however, were made in lieu of 
PUT penalty taxes and were not truly voluntary repayments.
12. Actual payment of PUT penalty taxes takes place at the end of 
January in the year following their accrual.
13. The rate applicable has been 10 percent. For one description of these 
legislative provisions see Hobbie (1982).
14. This legislation also changed the triggering mechanism used to ac 
tivate EB programs in the states. Subsequent EB payments have been 
much lower than what would have been paid previously. Because half of 
EB payments are state financed, this change also helped improve the 
fiscal balance of UI programs.
15. See Hobbie (1982).
16. The FSC program has no direct financial implications for the states 
as these long term jobless benefits are financed entirely from federal 
general revenues. The program was subsequently extended three more 
times and scheduled to last until the end of March 1985.
17. The 1983 Wisconsin legislative changes that satisfy these TEFRA 
financial requirements are described in chapter 2.
18. For a state forced to borrow in 1983, the increase in net solvency 
must be at least 25 percent in 1983 and then 35 and 50 percent in 1984 and 
1985. Some states that have made adjustments, e.g., Michigan, made 
more than a 50 percent net solvency adjustment immediately in 1983. 
The change in net solvency is computed as the sum of two percentage 
changes: the increase in taxes and the reduction in benefits where both 
are measured as changes from a baseline projection based on prior UI 
laws.
19. To be eligible for lower interest rates in the second and third years of 
indebtedness, the increases in net solvency needed to be 80 and 90 percent 
respectively.
20. See Hobbie (1983).
21. See, for example, Perry (1970).
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22. Insured unemployment rates (or ILJRs) are measured as the ratio of 
insured unemployment to covered employment. The national trigger was 
eliminated in 1981 and the state trigger thresholds were also revised up 
ward by the 1981 legislation.
23. Data on EB benefit payments are shown in U.S. Department of 
Labor (1984a). Estimates of annual tax payments by employers for the 
federal share of EB costs can be made from this same publication.
24. In 1983 a second "temporary" increase in PUT tax rates became ef 
fective. The PUT rate was increased by . 1 percent to .8 percent of taxable 
payroll. Part of the increased tax rate was earmarked to pay for the 
federal share of EB costs.
25. Noncharged benefits are not assigned to individual employer trust 
fund accounts. They are treated as a common cost to all employers and 
are financed by flat rate state taxes.
26. Because of changes in the EB triggering mechanism enacted under 
the Reagan Administration, the EB program will be much smaller in the 
future. Thus it will not contribute to UI funding problems in future 
years.
27. Recall from table 1-4 that unemployment rates for men 25 and older 
were also very similar in the 1950s and 1970s.
28. For one time series analysis of the gross replacement rate see Hight 
(1980).
29. Until 1979, UI benefits were received as tax-free income. Thus when 
weekly benefits are considered in relation to after tax weekly wages, the 
net replacement rate probably rose more rapidly than the gross replace 
ment between the late 1940s and 1978. Hight (1980) has examined both 
replacement rates. Because UI benefits have been taxable since 1979, this 
has definitely lowered net replacement rates in recent years.
30. For one analysis of reduced UI benefit payments in the 1980-83 
period see Vroman (1984). The paper examines payments under regular 
state UI programs and extended jobless benefits under the EB and FSC 
programs.
2 
Debtor State Experiences
Underlying the aggregate state UI funding problem are the 
varied experiences of individual state programs. Some have a 
longer history of borrowing and debt than others which first 
needed large loans in 1982. Certain states that borrowed in 
the 1970s have been debt free in the 1980s while others re 
quired additional loans. The present chapter focuses on 10 
states whose debts were the largest at the end of 1983. Their 
combined indebtedness totaled $12.2 billion or 92 percent of 
the national total. Thus, the state UI funding problem is 
most acute in these particular jurisdictions.
This chapter has two main objectives: to provide 
background information on individual state funding prob 
lems and to describe the recent legislation enacted to improve 
the balance between program revenues and outlays. Follow 
ing a narrative description of individual state experiences, 
there is a cross-state comparison of debtor state responses. 
Summary observations are then given at the end of the 
chapter.
Developments in 10 Debtor States
Table 2-1 identifies 10 states with the largest UI trust fund 
debts at the end of 1983, listing them according to the total 
amount of debt (column 5). Measured both by the size of 
their 1980-83 loans and their 1983 indebtedness, it is obvious 
that four states have especially large financial problems:
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Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan and Ohio. A very similar 
indication of serious debt problems emerges when debts are 
measured relative to covered payrolls (column 6). 1 Of the 21 
states with debts at the end of 1983, there were nine where 
the debt exceeded 1.5 percent of payrolls and five where the 
debt exceeded 3.5 percent of payrolls. The four states with 
the largest absolute amounts of debt all have debts larger 
than 3.5 percent of payrolls, and West Virginia is the fifth 
state with such a large relative debt. Of the four states with 
debts between 1.5 and 3.5 percent of payrolls, three are also 
identified in table 2-1 (Wisconsin, Louisiana and Minnesota 
but not Rhode Island). Thus eight of the nine states with the 
largest relative debts are present in table 2-1. By and large, 
the states with big absolute debts also have large relative 
debts.
Note in table 2-1 that three of the states (Pennsylvania, 
Illinois and New Jersey) already had substantial debts at the 
start of 1980, and that the other seven entered the 1980s with 
generally low reserve ratio multiples. Of the 10, only 
Wisconsin had a multiple that exceeded 1.0. This group, in 
other words, includes neither of the two states (Kansas and 
Mississippi) with adequate reserves, i.e., with reserve ratio 
multiples of at least 1.5 in January 1980, and only one 
(Wisconsin) of the eleven states whose multiples fell between 
1.0 and 1.49 on that date (recall table 1-2). Column 3 shows 
that 7 of the 10 (all but Texas, New Jersey and Minnesota) 
had higher than average unemployment between 1980 and 
1983. With low trust fund reserves and higher than average 
unemployment, it is hardly surprising that these states ac 
cumulated debts. The 10 borrowed $13.6 billion or 91 per 
cent of all loans extended during the 1980-83 period. Thus 
recent loans as well as trust fund debts are heavily concen 
trated in the 10 jurisdictions.
The following pages briefly review the salient 
developments in these 10 states. Accompanying the text for
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each state is an appendix table that shows important sum 
mary data on the state©s trust fund balances, loans, benefit 
payments and taxes. These tables that cover the years 1970 to 
1983 provide back-up for statements that appear in the text.
Many debtor states enacted important legislation in late 
1982 and early 1983 designed to improve the net solvency of 
their programs. Projections of increased revenues and reduc 
ed benefit outlays for later years made at the time of their 
legislation were contingent upon assumptions about future 
economic developments, e.g., state unemployment rates and 
inflation rates. These assumed conditions were not always 
realized, as some economic recoveries occurred more rapidly 
than expected while others (particularly in energy-producing 
states) lagged behind expectations. Even though the actuarial 
projections may prove to be in error, they are useful for 
showing what the states thought would happen following 
their UI legislation. Therefore, where available, these ac 
tuarial projections will be used in the present chapter for 
describing debtor states© revenue and benefit adjustments. 
Particular attention will be focused on the years 1983-86 
since debtor states have been given strong financial incen 
tives, e.g., interest deferrals, to improve net solvency in these 
years. The size of the state adjustments will be examined as 
well as the mix of tax increases and benefit reductions.
Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania economy experienced a prolonged 
period of slow economic growth in the years after World 
War II. Covered employment was 3.10 million in 1948 but 
only 22 percent higher at 3.78 million in 1979. Over this same 
period, covered employment in the U.S. grew by 116 percent 
and, as a consequence, Pennsylvania©s share of the total 
declined from 9.4 to 5.3 percent. Employment in coal mining 
and basic steel manufacturing have grown slowly and both 
industries are very important to the state©s economy.
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Pennsylvania has a long history of using federal loans to 
assist in UI program financing. As net reserves declined 
sharply in the late 1950s, loans totaling $112 million were ob 
tained during the three years 1959-61. Although only a small 
fraction of this borrowing was actually used to pay benefits, 
net trust fund reserves were very low for several years (less 
than $100 million at the end of each year from 1959 to 1963) 
and reached a minimum of $3 million at the end of 1961. 
Between 1964 and 1968, these federal monies were repaid 
and trust fund reserves were then accumulated throughout 
the 1960s. One factor contributing to the loan repayment 
and reserve buildup was an increase in the tax base from 
$3,000 in 1963 to $3,600 in 1964. A rough estimate (using 
historic average tax rates on taxable payroll) suggests this 
$600 increase in the tax base raised roughly $190 million in 
extra revenues between 1964 and 1971. The net reserve ratio 
multiple, however, never reached the recommended 1.5 
minimum standard.
Pennsylvania is a high benefit state in compensating 
unemployed workers. Column 8 of appendix table Al shows 
that benefits averaged 1.63 percent of covered payroll during 
the 1970s while the national average was 1.15 percent of 
payroll. During these 10 years, the average unemployment in 
the state was only slightly higher than the national average 
(6.3 versus 6.2 percent). Two primary indicators of high 
benefit payouts were a consistently high ratio of insured-to- 
total unemployment and a high ratio of weekly benefits-to- 
weekly wages (see columns 10 and 11 of table Al). 
Throughout most of the 1970s, its maximum average poten 
tial benefit duration of 30 weeks was the highest of all state 
UI programs. In 1972 the weekly benefit maximum was rais 
ed substantially (from $60 to $85), indexed to be 60 percent 
of the state©s average weekly wage and dependents© benefits 
were instituted. This benefit liberalization caused the gross 
replacement rate (average weekly benefits divided by the
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average weekly wage) to rise from .361 in 1971 to .424 in 
1972 (column 11), and the replacement rate has exceeded .40 
in all but one of every subsequent year. This particular 
benefit liberalization occurred just prior to the major infla 
tionary episode of 1973-74, and was not matched by a cor 
responding indexation of the taxable wage base.
Although statutory tax rates might be increased rapidly to 
overcome revenue shortfalls arising from an unresponsive 
tax base, this did not occur to a sufficient degree in Penn 
sylvania during the 1970s. The average tax rate on taxable 
wages exceeded the national average in most years (decade 
averages were 2.42 percent and 2.11 percent respectively), 
but this was largely offset by a lower taxable wage propor 
tion, the latter caused by higher than average wage levels in 
Pennsylvania. As a result, for the decade as a whole, taxes as 
a percent of total payroll were only slightly higher than the 
national average: 1.08 percent versus 1.00 percent national 
ly.
The national recession of the mid-1970s was strongly felt 
in Pennsylvania. The overall unemployment rate rose from 
5.1 percent in 1974, to 8.3 percent in 1975 (rates slightly 
below the national average in both years). From 1976 
through 1983, however, the unemployment rate in Penn 
sylvania has exceeded the national average in every year with 
the disparities being especially pronounced in 1982 (10.9 ver 
sus 9.7 percent) and 1983 (11.8 versus 9.6 percent). Severe 
recessions in coal mining and basic steel manufacturing are 
important causes for the very high unemployment of these 
two recent years.
High unemployment coupled with insufficiently respon 
sive revenues have combined to produce a major UI financ 
ing problem in Pennsylvania. Federal loans have been re 
quired in every year since 1975 and the amounts have exceed 
ed $200 million in seven different years. In 1982 and 1983,
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lending grew to $.8 billion and $1.2 billion respectively. The 
loan total since 1975 exceeds $3.8 billion and more than $2.6 
billion was still outstanding at the end of 1983.
Pennsylvania has been slow in repaying these federal ad 
vances. Nothing was repaid prior to 1980 when PUT penalty 
taxes were first levied (on 1979 taxable payrolls). Over $400 
million of penalty taxes were paid between 1980 and 1983. 
The only voluntary loan repayments occurred in 1982 and 
1983 when over $700 million of interest-bearing debt was 
repaid. Even with these repayments, however, the state©s 
interest-bearing debt exceeded $1.1 billion at the end of 
1983.
When asked why state taxes were not raised more sharply 
following the onset of chronic annual deficits, Pennsylvania 
officials have noted the mixed signals conveyed by federal 
legislation of the late 1970s. Although there existed a 
mechanism for automatically imposing PUT penalty taxes, 
these were overridden twice by federal legislation. There 
were discussions of outright forgiveness of debts while cost 
equalization and reinsurance proposals held out the prospect 
of partial debt forgiveness for the state. Given the possibility 
of (partial or total) debt forgiveness, there was a reluctance 
to enact legislation that would increase costs for state 
employers.
After the start of the 1980 recession, Pennsylvania did 
enact legislation that reduced benefits and raised taxes. 2 Im 
portant benefit provisions included lowering the statutory 
benefit-wage replacement rate from .58 to .54, instituting a 
waiting week (which was compensated after four weeks in 
benefit status), shortening maximum potential benefit dura 
tion for some claimants from 30 to 26 weeks, increasing the 
base period earnings requirement and imposing a more 
severe disqualification for refusing suitable work. Major tax 
changes included raising the taxable wage base (to $6,300 in
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1980-81 to $6,600 in 1982), increasing the maximum ex 
perience rated tax rate (from 4.0 percent in 1979 to 4.9 per 
cent in 1982 and later years), increasing flat rate taxes on 
covered employers (from 1.7 percent in 1979 to 1.75 percent 
in 1980-81 and to a maximum of 1.9 percent in 1982 and later 
years), and increasing the tax rate on new employers. Also a 
(partly rebatable) flat rate tax of 1 percent of taxable payroll 
was imposed starting in 1980. Table Al shows that average 
tax rates did rise in 1980. 3 Despite this legislation the state 
continued to borrow in 1981 and even more in 1982 as the 
state unemployment rate rose to 10.9 percent.
When new loans began to carry interest charges in 1982, 
ambiguities about the federal attitude towards state in 
debtedness were ended. Under the Reagan administration, 
states were to be fully responsible for all old and new debts. 
As noted, the 1983 Social Security Amendments gave debtor 
states a way of reducing and deferring their interest costs. 
This provided a strong incentive for state legislation and 
Pennsylvania responded very quickly.
An initial set of UI proposals made by Governor Thorn- 
burg©s administration in April 1983 was found unacceptable 
by both labor and management representatives. A tripartite 
committee (labor, business and "neutrals" with the latter in 
cluding an academic committee chairman and represen 
tatives from state agencies, the legislature and the executive 
branch) was formed and held negotiating sessions that lasted 
more than two months before reaching an acceptable 
legislative proposal. 4
Legislation enacted in July 1983 included provisions to in 
crease business taxes, to tax employees and to reduce UI 
benefits. Eight separate provisions of the 1983 legislation 
and their 1983-86 budgetary effects were as follows. 5 
(1) Retroactive compensation for the waiting week (after 
four weeks of benefits) was ended ($183 million). (2) The
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maximum duration for regular benefits was reduced from a 
26-30 week range to a 16-26 week range ($197 million). 
(3) The weekly benefit amount was reduced by 5 percent 
from what would have been paid under the prior law ($247 
million). (4) A .1 percent payroll tax on total annual wages 
and salaries of all covered employees was instituted ($236 
million). (5) The taxable wage per employee was raised from 
$7,000 in 1983 to $8,000 in 1984 and later years ($427 
million). (6) Employer tax rates were modified in several 
ways with the effect of substantially increasing average tax 
rates. The tax rate computation schedule was revised to ex 
plicitly recognize recent experience in paying benefits and the 
reserve ratio balances of individual employers. A statewide 
flat tax was imposed for years starting in 1984. The max 
imum tax to defray noncharged and ineffectively charged 
benefits was reduced from 1.9 to 1.5 percent. In addition to 
raising total taxes, these provisions increased the importance 
of experience rating in determining employer taxes ($833 
million). The range of employer tax rates was increased from 
4.1 percentage points in 1983 to 7.0 percentage points in 1984 
and wider ranges in subsequent years. (7) A 15 percent sur 
charge was added to employer taxes in 1983 ($155 million). 
(8) A flat rate interest tax was imposed starting in 1984 ($447 
million). From their sheer number, it is clear that the 1983 
legislative provisions represent a major change in the state©s 
UI statutes and program solvency.
The combined budgetary impact of all eight provisions 
(tax increases plus benefit reductions) was estimated to be a 
$2,712 million increase in program solvency for the four- 
year period 1983-86. Combining employee benefit reductions 
($612 million) with the new employee tax ($236 million) as 
employee sacrifices, these made up 31.3 percent of the 
change, while employer tax increases ($1,862 million) ac 
counted for the other 68.7 percent.
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Due to its 1983 legislation, Pennsylvania can defer interest 
payments on outstanding loans, pay a lower interest rate (9 
percent) in 1983 and be eligible for reduced FUT penalty 
taxes after 1983. The combined effects of these three provide 
substantial savings for Pennsylvania employers. Over the 
1983-86 period, the total savings is estimated to be $846 
million, $552 million in deferred and reduced interest 
payments on loans and $294 million in lower FUT penalty 
taxes. 6 To give a more accurate assessment of increased 
employer costs in 1983-86 due to the 1983 legislation this 
$846 million should be netted out against the $1,862 million 
increase noted above. When this is done the net increase in 
employer taxes over the 1983-86 period becomes $1,016 
million and the employer share of the total sacrifice falls 
from 68.7 percent to 54.4 percent. From the standpoint of 
net employer tax increases, the burden sharing with workers 
comes much closer to a 50-50 split.
Under either a net or gross measure of employer tax 
burdens, it is clear that higher taxes are in store for Penn 
sylvania employers for several years. The recent legislation, 
however, clearly improves the program©s net solvency and 
provides the means for eventually eliminating the state©s 
large UI trust fund debt. Even after the enactment of this 
legislation the problem of UI debt will be present for several 
years. Under current actuarial projections the indebtedness 
that was accumulated over so many past years will not be ful 
ly eliminated until 1991. The projections show the total debt 
declining in every year after 1983, voluntary repayments oc 
curring during 1984-86 and FUT penalty taxes (levied at in 
creasing rates) being paid until 1991. Should another reces 
sion occur before 1991, of course, the state will face the pros 
pect of renewed borrowing and a further postponement in 
achieving debt-free status.
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Illinois
Illinois is a major industrial state with important concen 
trations of employment in the manufacture of basic steel, 
farm and construction equipment, and electronic equipment. 
Its UI program borrowed heavily in the 1970s and again in 
the present decade. Total indebtedness at the end of 1983 
was $2,423 million, the second highest total of any state.
Throughout most of its history the UI program in Illinois 
could be characterized as a low cost benefit program. During 
the periods 1949-59 and 1960-69, for example, employer UI 
taxes in Illinois as a percentage of covered payroll, averaged 
about two-thirds of the national average. Table A2 shows 
this situation persisted in the first half of the 1970s as well. 
Benefits as a percent of total payroll (column 8) remained 
below the national average in 1970-74 as each of three impor 
tant contributors to low benefit costs was also lower than 
average. Specifically, the state©s overall unemployment rate 
was relatively low, insured unemployment was a low propor 
tion of total unemployment, and weekly benefits were a low 
proportion of average weekly wages (columns 9, 10, and 11 
respectively).
During 1975-79, Illinois continued to experience below 
average unemployment but UI benefit costs rose sharply. 
Partly this was due to a generally higher unemployment rate 
(6.3 percent in 1975-79 versus 4.4 percent in 1970-74) but 
also there was a substantial liberalization of benefit 
availability and benefit levels. The latter were the direct con 
sequence of 1975 legislation that took effect in the second 
half of the year. 7 Traditionally, UI legislation in Illinois had 
followed the recommendations of a tripartite (labor, 
management and public) Employment Security Advisory 
Board where labor representatives focused mainly on ques 
tions of benefits while management representatives were 
more responsible for financing provisions. Between the early
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1960s and 1975, management representatives were not will 
ing to propose any important tax increases. Finally, in 1975 
labor changed its tactic by offering a bill in the legislature 
that had not previously been approved by the Advisory 
Board. The provisions of the bill called for substantial 
liberalizations of both benefit duration and benefit levels. 
After employer representatives realized the package was like 
ly to pass, they tried to add financing provisions to the 
legislation but were not successful. Thus a bill passed that 
changed benefits without changing taxes. Many expected this 
bill to be vetoed by then Governor Walker, but it was signed 
and became effective on July 1, 1975.
There were three important benefit changes in the 1975 
legislation. (1) The range of maximum weekly benefit (in 
cluding maximum dependents© allowances) was raised from 
$60-105 to $97-135 starting in July 1975. (2) Maximum 
potential benefit duration was changed from a 10 to 26 week 
range to a uniform 26 weeks. This increased maximum 
potential duration for many unemployed workers. 
(3) Retroactive compensation of the waiting week (after 
three weeks of benefits) was instituted. The consequences of 
these changes are apparent in table A2. Weekly benefits as a 
proportion of weekly wages rose from .343 in 1974 to .412 in 
1976 and have remained above the national average in all 
subsequent years. Similarly the ratio of insured to total 
unemployment rose and has also remained above the na 
tional average ratio. Due to these statutory changes and to 
increased unemployment, benefits as a percent of payroll 
have been consistently higher than average since 1976.
Illinois entered the 1970s with a rather modest UI trust 
fund balance. Although the balance stood at $500 million at 
the start of 1970, this represented a reserve ratio multiple of 
only 1.17. Table A2 shows that the multiple thus fell below 
1.0 during 1970 and never returned even to this modest level. 
Borrowing, which first occurred in 1975, was especially
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heavy in 1976 ($446 million) and an additional $431 million 
was borrowed in 1977 and 1978. Thus over the 1975-78 
period, a debt of $946 million was accumulated, second in 
size only to Pennsylvania©s debt.
Although average tax rates on taxable wages increased 
measurably in 1976 and 1977, the increases were not suffi 
cient to match the increased benefit payments. Average 
statutory tax rates did not rise much after 1977 and there was 
no important increase in the taxable wage base other than the 
mandatory 1978 increase to $6,000 under the Federal 
Unemployment Tax. Although the state©s gross trust fund 
reserve balance did increase during 1978 and 1979, net 
reserves remained negative because the state did not raise 
taxes by enough to repay its loans. At the start of 1980, the 
state©s gross reserve balance was $486 million but the $946 
million of 1975-78 loans was fully outstanding, leaving a net 
reserve balance of minus $460 million (column 2 of table 
A2). In fact Illinois did not make any loan repayments until 
1981 when PUT penalty taxes were first paid (on the basis of 
1980 taxable payrolls). Hopeful of partial or total debt 
forgiveness, labor and management representatives were 
reluctant to initiate repayments until federal policy on the 
treatment of outstanding federal loans was known with cer 
tainty.
After a long period of below average unemployment, the 
Illinois unemployment rate rose sharply in 1980 to 8.3 per 
cent (1.2 percentage points above the national average) and 
then again higher to 11.3 percent in 1982. As a consequence 
the state has experienced benefit payout rates in the 1980s 
that are higher than in the entire previous history of its pro 
gram. 8 Having no substantial trust fund balance to draw 
upon, a small loan of $38 million was needed in 1980 and 
then loans of $487, $844, and $1,178 million were required in 
1981, 1982, and 1983. To reduce interest payments the state
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repaid over $700 million of interest-bearing loans, mainly 
during 1983.
Illinois enacted legislation in both 1981 and 1983 to im 
prove the fiscal health of its UI program. Although the 1983 
legislation was the more significant of the two, the 1981 bill, 
a product of recommendations by the Advisory Board, is 
also worth noting. 9 It ended the retroactive compensation of 
the waiting week, raised base period monetary eligibility re 
quirements, imposed an emergency flat rate tax surcharge of 
.4 percent and raised the taxable wage base to $7,000 in 1982. 
At the time of its passage this bill was expected to reduce the 
accumulation of new debt over the next few years by more 
than $400 million.
As 1982 unfolded, it became clear that the UI program 
continued to have a fiscal imbalance. The total amount of 
new loans in 1982 was the largest in the entire history of the 
program. Governor Thompson had previously appointed a 
Labor-Management Task Force in November 1981 to ex 
amine the program and propose a legislative package. Dur 
ing late 1982 the Task Force, whose members included 
leaders from labor, management, and the state government, 
assembled for a legislative proposal to substantially raise 
taxes and reduce benefits. For the 1983-86 period, its pro 
posals were estimated to increase program solvency by about 
$2 billion. Through internal negotiations, the Task Force 
agreed that 60 percent of the total change was to be tax in 
creases and 40 percent to be benefit reductions. Their pro 
posals were eventually passed but with a sunset provision. As 
of July 1, 1986 all changes were to terminate and tax and 
benefit statutes were to automatically revert to their former 
status. 10
The legislative package was passed in mid-April 1983 and 
took effect on April 24. Although it had been drafted prior 
to the passage of the 1983 Social Security Amendments, the
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Illinois law enabled the state to take advantage of some of 
the federal law©s interest deferral and PUT penalty tax provi 
sions. The state was able to defer 80 percent of interest 
payments due in 1983 and 1984 (but not in 1985) and to 
reduce FUT penalty taxes starting in 1983.
Important benefit provisions in the 1983 law were as 
follows. (1) The replacement rates (benefits as a percentage 
of base period average weekly wages) were lowered from 
50 to 48 percent for single persons, from 60 to 55 percent for 
a beneficiary with a dependent spouse and from 66.1 to 62.4 
percent for a beneficiary with dependent children. (2) The 
computation of the base period average weekly wage was 
changed from high quarter wages divided by 13 to highest 
two quarter wages divided by 26. For many claimants this 
change reduces the average weekly wage used in determining 
weekly benefits. (3) The automatic indexing of the maximum 
weekly benefit to the state average weekly wage was suspend 
ed between April 1983 and June 1986. Predetermined max 
imum weekly benefit amounts were assigned for this period. 
Thus, for a new beneficiary with no dependents, the previous 
maximum of $168 was reduced to $154 between April 1983 
and January 1984 and then to $161 between February 1984 
and June 1986. The effect of these three changes on weekly 
benefits is already apparent. Average weekly benefits fell 
from $151.15 in the final three months of 1982 to $136.04 (or 
by 10 percent) in the final three months of 1983.
There were also major changes in several tax provisions. 
(4) The taxable wage base was raised to $8,000 between April 
1983 and December 1984 and then to $8,500 for the follow 
ing 18 months. (5) The maximum experience rated employer 
tax rate was increased from 5.3 percent in 1983 to the follow 
ing ranges: 5.5-6.3 percent in 1984, 6.4-6.6 percent in 1985 
and 6.5-6.7 percent in 1986. M (6) An adjusted state ex 
perience factor was added to the 1983-1986 tax rate schedule.
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In 1983 the factor was 21 percent, meaning that experience 
rated tax rates were multiplied by 1.21 in arriving at the final 
tax rate. It is expected that similar sized state experience fac 
tors will also apply in each of the years 1984-86. (7) The flat 
rate emergency surcharge in effect since 1982 at a rate of .4 
percent wa;s raised temporarily to .6 percent for the first half 
of 1986. (8) The taxation of local government units was 
changed from a flat 1 percent rate (irrespective of ex 
perience) to an experience rated arrangement like that ap 
plied to private sector employers. 12 The combined effects of 
these tax changes was both to increase average employer tax 
rates and to increase the effective degree of experience 
rating.
The 1983 Illinois law will bring about a major change in 
the program©s actuarial balance. The total change in pro 
gram solvency during 1983-86 is estimated to be $1,940 
million with benefit cutbacks of $780 million (40 percent) 
and tax increases of $1,160 million (60 percent). We were not 
able to secure actuarial data showing the budgetary impacts 
of individual provisions, merely the totals for the tax and 
benefit changes. 13
It should be noted that the $1,160 million of employer tax 
increases refer just to gross tax increases from this legisla 
tion. It is estimated that the 1983 legislation will save Illinois 
employers $530 million between 1983 and 1986 in the form 
of deferred interest payments ($389 million) and lower PUT 
penalty taxes ($141 million). 14 When these savings are con 
sidered, the net tax increase becomes $630 million and the 
employer share of the net change in program solvency 
becomes 44.7 percent.
Clearly the 1983 legislation will bring about a major im 
provement in the solvency of the Illinois UI program. It does 
a great deal to offset the fiscal imbalance created by the 1975 
legislation. At the time of its enactment it was estimated that
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the state©s borrowing needs during 1983-86 would be reduced 
from $2.9-3.0 billion to $.9 billion. Since it has a July 1986 
sunset provision, however, it also seems clear that Illinois 
will need to reexamine its program©s solvency again in 1985 
or 1986. When the legislation expires in mid-1986, the state©s 
debt may still be between $600 million and $1,000 million.
Michigan
Because so much automobile production occurs in this 
single state, the health of the Michigan economy is closely 
tied to the fortunes of the U.S. automobile industry. De 
mand for autos is extremely volatile and changes in produc 
tion show up immediately in state economic indicators. Since 
late 1979, demand for domestic autos has been un 
characteristically low for a very long period. This is reflected 
in the state©s very high unemployment rate and in its UI trust 
fund difficulties. Between 1980 and 1983 Michigan borrowed 
$3.0 billion, more than any other state in these years.
Michigan is one of three states whose UI program received 
loans prior to 1972. Three years of low auto demand in the 
mid-1950s (1954, 1956, and 1958) caused its trust fund to be 
sharply reduced and $113 million was borrowed in 1958. 
Although this loan was never actually used to pay UI 
benefits, the state©s net reserves fell below $100 million at the 
end of 1958 and 1959 and again in 1961 and 1962. The 1958 
loan was paid off between 1963 and 1968 and net trust fund 
reserves were also accumulated. Net reserves were $630 
million at the start of 1970 but the reserves ratio multiple was 
only .85 (see columns 1 and 2 of table A3). Thus Michigan 
entered the 1970s with a net reserve balance slightly more 
than half of the suggested ICESA minimum standard.
Michigan has higher than average UI benefit costs. During 
the 1970s, benefits as a percent of covered payroll averaged 
1.41 percent compared to a national average of 1.15 percent. 
Table A3 shows that two factors in the high rate of benefit
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payouts are high unemployment rates and a higher than 
average ratio of insured unemployment to total unemploy 
ment. Michigan©s unemployment rate exceeded the national 
average in every year from 1970 to 1983 and the difference 
averaged 1.7 percentage points (7.9 versus 6.2 percent) in the 
1970s. The high ratio of insured to total unemployment 
reflects several factors. These include the large share of state 
unemployment in manufacturing, usually more likely to be 
insured than other unemployment, and eligibility re 
quirements that tended to be less stringent than they were 
elsewhere in that period.
Although Michigan is a high wage state, its UI benefit 
levels had been quite modest. In 1979, the weekly benefit 
maximum was $97 for a single person (up to $136 with 
dependents© allowances) and the average replacement rate 
for weekly benefits (column 11 of table A3) was below the 
national average. Starting in 1981, benefit levels were sharp 
ly increased as a result of UI legislation (to be described 
below). Prior to that time, however, the high rate of benefit 
payments reflected high unemployment and a high propor 
tion of the unemployed receiving compensation but not a 
high level of weekly benefits.
Employer taxes have also tended to be higher than the na 
tional average in Michigan. Tax rates on taxable wages 
averaged nearly 3 percent in the 1970s compared to a na 
tional average of 2.11 percent. Because it is a very high wage 
state and because its tax base has not exceeded the PUT tax 
base systematically by large amounts, the ratio of taxable to 
total wages in Michigan is much lower than average. This 
low ratio offsets much of the effect of high average statutory 
rates. Thus, the state©s average tax rate on total wages during 
the 1970s was 1.22 percent compared to the national average 
of 1.00 percent.
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When unemployment rose to 12.5 percent in 1975, 
Michigan©s modest UI trust fund balance was quickly 
depleted. Loans in 1975 and 1976 totaled $571 million and 
represented 37 percent of combined payouts for regular 
benefits and for EB. Statutory tax rates and the taxable wage 
base were then increased by enough in the 1976-79 period to 
pay off the federal loans. However, the trust fund balance at 
the start of 1980 was only $112 million and the reserve ratio 
multiple was a scant .07. When unemployment rose in the 
1980s there was no outstanding debt, but neither was there a 
sizeable trust fund cushion to help defray large increases in 
benefit payouts.
Payouts rose sharply in 1980 as the state©s unemployment 
rate moved upward to 12.4 percent, just .1 percent below its 
previous peak reached in the trough recession year 1975. 
Unemployment remained high in 1981 and then increased to 
15.5 percent and 14.2 percent in 1982 and 1983 respectively. 
Over these four years, total benefit payments from 
Michigan©s UI trust fund were $5.2 billion and employer 
taxes only covered about half of this total. To meet this 
unusual demand for benefits, the state borrowed about $3.0 
billion in four years and $2.3 billion remained outstanding at 
the end of 1983. Of the $724 million in loan repayments 
made during 1982 and 1983, all but $40 million were volun 
tary payments to reduce the interest bearing debt. As 1983 
ended, this component of the total debt equaled $800 
million.
Michigan has enacted two major UI laws in the 1980s. The 
first bill passed in late 1980 had three main provisions that 
took effect on March 1, 1981. 15 (1) The qualifying require 
ment for monetary eligibility was increased from 14 to 18 
weeks of work in the base period and the minimum weekly 
earnings was raised from $25.01 to 20 times the minimum 
wage (or to $67.00 in 1981). (2) The disqualification period
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for a voluntary quit without good cause was changed from a 
13-week benefit suspension to a suspension for the duration 
of unemployment. (3) Weekly benefits were increased 
substantially and the basis for computing benefits was 
modified. The previous benefit formula replaced 60 percent 
of gross weekly wages subject to a maximum that ranged 
from $97 to $136 (the maximum for a claimant with four or 
more dependents). The new formula replaced 70 percent of 
after-tax (or net) weekly wages up to a maximum of 58 per 
cent of the state©s average weekly wage (or $182 in 1981). 
This benefit liberalization is clearly reflected in published 
data on weekly benefits that increased from $101.87 in 1980 
to $154.38 in 1982 and gross replacement rates (column 11 in 
table A3) which rose from .316 in 1980 to .416 in 1982. The 
change in weekly benefits was the largest for any two-year 
period in the history of Michigan©s UI program.
Enactment of a substantial benefit liberalization in a year 
when the state©s UI program had to borrow $842 million is a 
monumental example of poor timing that also shows the in 
fluence of labor union legislative strength. Weekly benefit 
maximums in Michigan had been frozen at the $97-$ 136 
range since 1975, and labor representatives felt it appropriate 
to raise and index maximum benefits. Although it could be 
argued that an increase in weekly benefits was desirable, the 
extent of the increase was excessive. Two factors aided in the 
passage of this bill: optimism about the future course of state 
unemployment and strong employer opposition to the 
previous treatment of voluntary quits. Employer groups 
believed that benefits paid to voluntary quitters represented 
a major abuse in the UI program and that as much as $200 
million was being spent annually to compensate quitters. By 
trading the revised, i.e., toughened, treatment of quits along 
with higher qualifying requirements for the weekly benefit 
liberalization, labor representatives were able to build a 
coalition to pass the 1980 bill.
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Cost estimates underlying the 1980 bill suggested that 
perhaps as much as half of the extra payouts arising from 
higher weekly benefits would be recouped by the changes in 
monetary eligibility and the voluntary quit disqualification. 16 
This might have been true if unemployment had declined. 
Because unemployment remained high in 1981 and then in 
creased again in 1982, subsequent benefit outlays greatly ex 
ceeded those expected at the end of 1980. A rough calcula 
tion suggests that 1981 and 1982 outlays were $217 and $577 
million higher as a result of the increases in weekly 
benefits. 17
As the economic downturn of 1981-82 progressed, it 
became obvious that Michigan©s UI debt was destined to 
keep growing. In 1982 alone, the state borrowed $1,184 
million and $694 million was interest-bearing debt. Early in 
1982 a Working Group of employer representatives was ap 
pointed by the director of the State Department of Com 
merce. The Group was asked to study the state©s UI financ 
ing system and to develop policy recommendations. One 
outgrowth of the Working Group©s efforts was a careful and 
systematic description of Michigan©s current and likely 
future debt situation if no steps were taken. 18 Under its cur 
rent law the state debt was projected to grow to $3.8 billion 
by the end of 1986. Major increases in interest costs and PUT 
penalty taxes were clearly in store starting in 1983.
Later in 1982 a set of legislative recommendations was for 
warded to Governor Milliken and a legislative package was 
proposed in September. Several of the original provisions 
were modified or dropped altogether, e.g., a payroll tax on 
covered employees, in subsequent legislative developments. 
Eventually, however, a major UI bill was assembled and 
enacted in December 1982. At the time of its passage the bill 
was projected to increase taxes and reduce benefits by about 
$3.6 billion over the four years 1983-86. 19 One of the tax pro-
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visions was to raise the tax base to $8,000 in 1983 and to 
higher levels in 1984-86. Since 1982, federal legislation 
(TEFRA) raised the PUT tax base from $6,000 in 1982 to 
$7,000 in 1983, only the increments of Michigan©s tax base 
above $7,000 should be counted in estimating the effects of 
the December 1982 law. After this correction is made, the 
estimate of the total increase in program solvency becomes 
$3.1 billion, 20 still a major change in benefits and taxes.
Four major changes in benefits and their 1983-86 
budgetary impacts were as follows. (1) The weekly benefit 
maximum was frozen during 1983-86 at its 1982 level of $197 
($601 million). (2) The replacement rate was reduced from 
.70 to .65 of after-tax weekly wages ($257 million). (3) The 
base period weeks of work requirement was raised from 18 
to 20 weeks ($150 million). (4) The weekly wage used to 
qualify as a week of work in the base period was raised from 
20 to 30 times the minimum wage, i.e., from $67 in 1982 to 
$100 in 1983 ($84 million). Benefit reductions under these 
four provisions totaled $1,092 million.
There were six main tax provisions. (5) The taxable wage 
base was raised to $8,000 in 1983 and by $500 increments for 
the next three years ($724 million). (6) The maximum annual 
percentage point increment allowed in the tax rate on an 
employer already at a rate of 5.0 percent or higher was in 
creased from .5 to 1.0 in 1983, to 1.5 in 1984, to 2.0 in 1985 
and totally eliminated in 1986 ($168 million). (7) The compo 
nent of the state tax schedule designed to hasten the ac 
cumulation of balances by low and negative balance 
employers was modified. This so-called Account Building 
Component (or ABC) had its replenishment proportions and 
maximum rate increased so that deficient balances would be 
eliminated more quickly ($417 million). (8) Starting in 1984 
the state share of extended benefits was to be experience 
rated ($250 million). (9) The partial tax credit allowed
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against the flat-rate Nonchargable Benefit Component (or 
NEC) of the state UI tax for payment of PUT penalty taxes 
was eliminated for negative balance employers ($88 million). 
(10) A special solvency tax for negative balance employers 
was instituted to finance interest charges on the debt with 
maximum rates of .5 percent in 1983, 1.0 percent in 1984 and 
2.0 percent in later years ($347 million). These tax changes 
raised substantial new revenues ($1,994 million in 1983-86) 
and increased the effective degree to which Michigan 
employers were experience rated.
The 1982 Michigan tax changes were especially notable for 
the way they concentrated increased tax burdens on negative 
balance employers. The maximum UI tax rate of 10 percent, 
plus a solvency tax for interest that could rise to 2.0 percent, 
could apply in 1986 while the minimum rate could be as low 
as 1 percent. This combined with an increased flexibility of 
year-to-year tax rate changes will produce a revenue struc 
ture that is more responsive to trust fund balances than in 
earlier years.
As noted, the Michigan legislation will cause a major im 
provement in program solvency over the 1983-86 period. 
Gross employer tax increases of $1,994 million coupled with 
benefit reductions of $1,092 million were estimated to in 
crease program solvency by $3,086 million in these four 
years. Of the gross changes, employer tax increases account 
for 64.6 percent of the total while benefit reductions account 
for the remaining 35.6 percent.
Subsequent to its passage the 1982 Michigan law was 
found to satisfy the conditions for interest deferrals and 
PUT penalty tax relief given in the Social Security Amend 
ments of 1983. 21 The state qualifies for deferral of 80 percent 
of its 1983-85 interest payments, lower interest rates on its 
1983-85 loan balances and a partial cap on its PUT penalty 
tax rate. Combined, these elements of financial relief will
68 Debtor State Experiences
save Michigan employers $606 million over the 1983-86 
period. 22 Thus, the net increase in employer taxes is $1,388 
million, i.e., the $1,994 million less $606 million. When these 
tax savings are recognized, the employer share of the net 
change in program solvency becomes 56.0 percent. Under 
either measure of employer-employee burden sharing, the 
state has made a major improvement in UI program solven 
cy. Even with this improvement, however, the state will 
probably have a debt of at least $500 million at the end of 
1986.
Ohio
Ohio is another large industrial state that has experienced 
a major UI funding problem in the 1980s. The state economy 
is dependent upon basic steel and auto manufacturing. Both 
industries have suffered from low demand between 1980 and 
1983 and this underlies the state©s recent UI trust fund prob 
lems. Borrowing that has exceeded $200 million in each year 
since 1980 was especially large in 1982 and 1983.
Ohio has traditionally had a low cost/low benefit UI pro 
gram. Average employer tax rates and benefit cost rates were 
roughly three-quarters of their respective national averages 
in the 1970s (see columns 8 and 12 in table A4). Because it 
depends on cyclical durable goods industries, the state has a 
history of volatile unemployment rates. Ohio©s unemploy 
ment rate exceeded the national average in trough years like 
1970, 1971, and 1975, but for the 1970s as a whole, 
unemployment in the state was roughly equal to the national 
average. Lower than average benefit costs have traditionally 
been the result of two factors; a lower than average propor 
tion of the unemployed are compensated and weekly benefits 
have replaced a low percentage of worker wages (columns 10 
and 11 in table A4). Major changes in the computation of 
weekly benefits were enacted in the mid-1970s. Between 1973 
and 1974, the weekly benefit maximum for a single claimant
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was raised from $60 to $77 and in 1975 the maximum was in 
dexed to the state©s average weekly wage. Since that time, the 
state©s benefit replacement rate has consistently exceeded the 
national average.
Throughout the history of its UI program employer tax 
rates have been quite low. This has been accomplished by 
having low statutory tax rates on taxable wages and by keep 
ing the tax base equal to the base for the Federal Unemploy 
ment Tax (PUT). During the 1970s, Ohio©s average tax rate 
on taxable wages exceeded the national average only in 1977 
(column 15 of table A4). Because it is a high wage state that 
has always used the FUT taxable maximum, taxable wages as 
a percent of total payroll have been lower than the national 
average in all years.
Ohio©s reserve ratio multiple at the start of 1970 (column 
1) was below 1.5 but remained near 1.0 until 1975 when the 
recession substantially depleted its trust fund. The reserve 
ratio multiple has not been as high as .5 in any year since 
1975. A very small federal loan ($2 million) was obtained in 
1977 but repaid in the same year. Although average tax rates 
w$re raised substantially in 1977 and 1978 (to 2.84 and 2.71 
percent respectively) they were then permitted to decline in 
1979 and 1980 even though the state©s trust fund had not yet 
been rebuilt to an adequate level.
When unemployment increased sharply in 1980, the com 
paratively small trust fund balance of $513 million was 
quickly depleted and loans of $246 million and $354 million 
were needed in 1980 and 1981. A further sharp rise in 
unemployment in 1982 to 12.5 percent led to loans of $1,136 
million and $574 million in the next two years. Many of these 
loans were interest-bearing and, despite repaying $275 
million of interest-bearing loans in 1982 and 1983, interest- 
bearing debt at the end of 1983 stood at $1,040 million. 
Thus, although a sizable debt was only recently acquired,
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much of the debt carries interest charges that require financ 
ing through some form of tax increase.
As events of 1982 unfolded, it was clear that legislation 
was needed to restore fiscal balance in the state©s UI pro 
gram. Interest groups representing labor and management, 
however, were both adamant that their own constituents not 
shoulder most of the adjustment costs. There also was a 
reluctance to recognize the full extent of the fiscal im 
balance, hence the scale of the required legislative remedy.
In late 1982 a UI bill based largely on ideas of the state©s 
seven-person Unemployment Compensation Advisory 
Council was introduced into the Ohio legislature. This bill 
was passed in December 1982. It changed both taxes and 
benefits for 1983 but had a sunset provision cancelling all 
changes as of January 1, 1984. Although it was obvious to 
many that Ohio©s UI financial imbalance was a much more 
serious long-run problem, the sunset provision was included 
to satisfy concerns about overreacting to the current deficit. 
Many Ohio employer representatives felt a strong economic 
upturn was in the offing and that the upturn would substan 
tially reduce the need for a long term legislative remedy.
After the 1983 Social Security Amendments were enacted, 
Ohio legislators could see the financial advantages of legisla 
tion covering a longer time period. In June 1983, a second UI 
bill was passed whose provisions covered 1984 and 1985. 
This built upon and extended many provisions of the 1982 
bill. It also had a sunset clause to restore benefits and taxes 
to pre-1983 schedules after its expiration in 1985. 23 These 
two bills made Ohio eligible for interest deferrals in 1983-85, 
a lower interest rate in 1983 and lower PUT penalty tax rates 
after 1983. The total 1983-85 change in program solvency 
was $1,339 million. 24
Important provisions of the Ohio legislation and 1983-85 
budgetary impacts were as follows. (1) The maximum week-
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ly benefit amounts were frozen at their 1982 levels for the 
succeeding three years, i.e., $147 for a single person and up 
to $233 including dependents© allowances ($213 million). 
(2) Compensation for the waiting period after three weeks in 
benefit status was ended ($106 million). (3) The level of 
weekly earnings required to be counted as a base period week 
of employment toward satisfying the qualifying requirement 
was raised from $20.00 to $85.10 ($17 million). (4) The com 
putation of the weekly benefit amount was modified so as to 
be rounded down, instead of rounded up, to whole dollars 
($13 million). The total of all benefit reductions was $351 
million.
Four major tax changes were also legislated. (5) The tax 
base per employee was raised to $8,000 in 1984 and 1985 
($304 million). (6) The range of experience rated tax rates 
was expanded from .1-3.8 percent in 1982 to .2-5.1 percent in
1983-84 and to .2-5.4 percent in 1985 ($342 million). (7) The 
mutualized flat rate tax applied to all covered employers was 
increased from .5 percent in 1982 to .6 percent in 1983-85 
($68 million). (8) The minimum safe level tax rate (a 
statewide flat rate tax to increase the state©s account balance) 
was raised from .5 percent in 1982-83 to 1.0 percent in
1984-85 ($270 million). Combined tax increases were pro 
jected to raise revenues by $988 million in 1983-85. 25
As in the other three states with very large debts the Ohio 
legislation included several major changes in both the 
revenues and benefit sides of its UI program. Of the $1,339 
million change in program solvency, $988 million or about 
three-fourths of the total took the form of employer tax in 
creases. Because the Ohio laws qualified the state for interest 
deferrals, lower interest charges and lower FUT penalty 
taxes, the gross employer tax increases are partly offset by 
reduced interest costs and lower FUT penalty taxes. It is 
estimated that these savings in 1983-85 are $456 million ($411 
million in interest payments and $45 million in penalty
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taxes). 26 Thus the legislation represents a net increase of $532 
million in employer taxes for the three years. Of the total 
$883 million net change in program solvency ($1,339 million 
less $456 million) the employer share is computed to be .602 
or three-fifths.
As a result of the 1982 and 1983 legislation Ohio debt at 
the end of 1985 is projected to be considerably smaller than it 
otherwise would have been. At the time of its passage, the 
1983 bill was projected to reduce the debt from $3,568 
million to $2,274 million at the end of 1985. 27 Because actual 
benefit outlays in 1983 and 1984 have declined by more than 
anticipated, the debt has declined more rapidly than ex 
pected. Thus, in the short run the debt has been reduced but 
by no means eliminated. It is likely the debt will be between 
$600 million and $1,000 million at the end of 1985. Since the 
provisions of the 1983 legislation will expire at that time it 
seems likely that additional legislation will be required to 
eliminate the remaining debt.
Texas
The Texas economy has experienced rapid and sustained 
economic growth since World War II. As a major repository 
of petroleum reserves and as the largest oil producing state, 
it benefited from the sharp oil price increases of 1973-74 and 
1979-80. The state has also been successful in encouraging 
the growth of defense-related production and many other 
manufacturing activities. Texas, which grew especially rapid 
ly in the the 1970s, now has the third largest state economy, 
ranking behind only California and New York.
Two growth indicators available from UI program data 
clearly illustrate the long-run prosperity of the Texas 
economy. Total covered employment increased from 1.19 
million in 1948 to 2.57 million in 1969 and then to 5.21 
million in 1982. Respectively, the Texas share of national
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employment was 3.6, 4.9, and 7.4 percent for these three 
years. For the same three years the Texas average weekly 
wage in covered employment grew from 77.0 to 93.3 and 
then to 105.2 percent of the U.S. average weekly wage. Thus 
both the employment share and relative wages in Texas have 
grown markedly since 1948.
Traditionally the Texas UI program has paid low benefits 
and imposed very low tax rates on covered employers. For 
the periods 1949-59 and 1960-69 employer taxes averaged .44 
and .46 percent of covered payroll. With the state©s boom 
economy of the 1970s, the average tax rate was even lower, 
averaging only .27 percent of covered wages for the years 
1970-79. Despite its long-run prosperity, Texas exhausted its 
trust fund reserves in 1982 and required federal UI loans in 
1982, 1983, and 1984.
Table A5 displays summary data on UI benefits, taxes and 
trust fund balances for the years 1970-83. Benefits as a per 
cent of payroll during the 1970s averaged .34 percent in 
Texas compared to a national average of 1.15 percent. Three 
reasons for low benefits were: (i) lower than average 
unemployment, (ii) a low ratio of insured to total unemploy 
ment and (iii) a low ratio of weekly benefits to average week 
ly wages (columns 9, 10 and 11). For the 14 years covered by 
table A5, each of the three benefit indicators was below the 
national average in every year with only two exceptions (the 
ratio of weekly benefits-to-weekly wages in 1982 and 1983). 
The ratio of insured-to-total unemployment in Texas has 
typically been less than half of the U.S. average. The only in 
dicators showing a benefit liberalization is the weekly 
benefit/weekly wage ratio. Since 1977 Texas has indexed its 
maximum weekly benefit to increase by $7 for each $10 in 
crease in manufacturing average weekly wages. As a result, 
the maximum benefit rose from $63 in 1977 to $168 in 1983 
or from .298 to .480 of the state©s average weekly wage. The
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replacement rates shown in column 11 of table A5 reflect 
these increases in the maximum since 1977.
Texas has long been noted for its low employer tax rates. 
Its tax base per worker has never exceeded the tax base for 
the Federal Unemployment Tax. Its statutory rates on tax 
able wages have typically been one-quarter of the national 
average. The combination of low tax rates and a low tax base 
has meant that effective tax rates are unusually low. In many 
years taxes as a percent of payroll have been lower in Texas 
than in any other state UI program.
Texas entered the 1970s with a reserve ratio multiple of 
2.19. This dipped below 1.5 during 1973 and then below 1.0 
in 1975. Note in table A5 that the reserve ratio multiple (col 
umn 1) was never rebuilt to 1.0 (much less to 1.5) despite the 
continued prosperity and low unemployment of the late 
1970s. In the 1980s, the Texas unemployment rate has re 
mained well below the national average but it did increase to 
6.9 percent in 1982 and then to 8.0 percent in 1983. The 
1980-83 recession finally affected the energy producing in 
dustries in 1982 and this is responsible for much of the recent 
increase in Texas unemployment.
Because its start of year trust fund balance was very low in 
1982, the increased benefit payouts exhausted the trust fund 
and loans of $143 million were required late in the year. 
Then as unemployment rose in 1983 an added $661 million 
was borrowed. All of the Texas debt, $685 million at the end 
of 1983, is interest-bearing. The size of the debt, however, is 
much smaller than in the four largest debtor states. Express 
ed as a percentage of 1982 total state payrolls, for example, 
the 1983 Texas debt is .8 percent whereas the 1983 debt in 
Ohio is 3.6 percent of its payrolls (column 6 in table 2-1).
Early in 1982 it became apparent that Texas would soon 
exhaust its net reserves and need additional funds to keep 
paying benefits. Although general revenues could have been
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used for this purpose, it was decided in a special three-day 
September legislative session to borrow from the federal UI 
loan fund (like other debtor UI programs) and then repay the 
loans in 1983 and 1984. 28 At the time of the 1982 legislation it 
was anticipated that the state would need to borrow about 
$250 million through May 1983. The September 1982 bill had 
tax provisions to finance the interest payments on an 
ticipated borrowings (flat rate taxes on taxable payroll of .3 
percent in 1982 fourth quarter and .1 percent in 1983 first 
quarter) as well as surtaxes to pay off the loans and rebuild 
the trust fund. The latter were to be levied at rates of .3 per 
cent in 1983, no higher than .5 percent in 1984 and possibly 
higher rates in 1985. Anticipated surtax rates for 1984 and 
1985 were .5 and .3 percent respectively. For employers with 
tax rates above the state minimum there were small addi 
tional surtax levies that ranged from .05 percent to .25 per 
cent.
A major motivation for the September 1982 legislation 
was the desire to avoid even larger tax increases in 1983. 
Under the prior statute a special surtax was levied on 
employers at a rate of . 1 percent for each $5 million that the 
trust fund fell below a $225 million floor (as of the previous 
October 1). Since the balance on October 1, 1982 was only 
$77 million, the prospective 1983 surtax rate was 3.0 percent 
of taxable payrolls. This flat rate assessment, about six times 
the 1982 average tax rate, would have increased tax revenues 
by roughly $1 billion. To avoid such a sharp increase in 
employer taxes, the surtax rate schedule was revised. The 
new schedule added . 1 percent for each $45 million that the 
trust fund was below the $225 million floor. Application of 
the new schedule in 1983 resulted in a surtax rate of .3 per 
cent rather than 3.0 percent.
Under economic projections made in the fall of 1982, it 
was anticipated that the Texas trust fund balance would re 
main negative throughout 1983, but then become positive in
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mid-1984 and exceed $200 million by mid-1985. At that time 
it appeared that the 1982 legislation accomplished three 
things: prevented a sharp tax increase in 1983, provided 
funding for interest payments on federal loans and enhanced 
revenues by enough to gradually rebuild the trust fund 
balance. Compared to what would have been raised by a 
perpetuation of prior tax rates, the 1982 legislation was ex 
pected to increase 1983-85 revenues by more than $550 
million.
The Texas economy did not experience the anticipated 
recovery in 1983, but rather continued to decline and the 
unemployment rate increased above 1982 levels. By early 
1983 it appeared the state might have to borrow as much as 
$1 billion rather than the $250 million expected in the 
previous September. In late January 1983, the Governor©s 
Task Force on Emergency Jobs and the Unemployment 
Trust Fund was created. An eight-member committee was 
charged "to develop a plan ... to set the Unemployment 
Compensation Trust Fund on a course of long-term solven 
cy." 29 Task Force recommendations made in April were the 
basis for a legislative package that was enacted in late May.
The May 1983 legislation provided for substantially in 
creased tax revenues between 1983 and 1986. 30 It also 
prevented yet another sharp notch in future employer sur 
taxes. The maximum surtax for 1984 was .5 percent but pro 
jections suggested the October 1984 trust fund debt would be 
nearly $1 billion. Under the revised surtax schedule (.1 per 
cent for each $45 million below a $225 million floor) the 1985 
surtax rate could have been 2.5 percent. Ironically, it was 
precisely this type of sharp tax increase that the 1982 legisla 
tion was designed to avoid. As in 1982, then, the 1983 legisla 
tion caused future tax rates to increase but by less than what 
the previous law would have required. This is a second exam 
ple of a statute that raised tax revenues but by less than its
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predecessor. Between 1983 and 1986 state taxes will be in 
creased by over $1 billion (compared to a continuation of 
1982 tax rates) and there will also be PUT penalty taxes. As 
with the 1982 legislation, all of the 1983 solvency ad 
justments were made in taxes with no changes in UI benefits.
The main tax provisions and estimated 1983-86 revenue ef 
fects were as follows. 31 (1) There were increased taxes to pay 
for interest charges on the higher loan amounts. A surcharge 
equal to 5 percent of 1982 taxes was levied in the second 
quarter of 1983 ($34 million). Surtaxes equal to 25 and 10 
percent respectively of previous year taxes were due in 1984 
and 1985 ($166 million). A flat rate tax of .1 percent was to 
be levied in 1986 ($31 million). The total of new interest taxes 
was $231 million. (2) Loan repayment taxes of .1 percent 
were imposed for eight consecutive calendar quarters start 
ing in the third quarter of 1983 ($400 million). (3) The basis 
for levying taxes to rebuild the state©s trust fund was chang 
ed. In the future, the floor and ceiling on the October 1 trust 
fund balance were to be respectively 1 and 2 percent of tax 
able wages. When the actual balance fell below the floor, ex 
perience rated taxes with potential annual rate changes of up 
to 2 percent of taxable payroll were to be imposed.This 
replaced the previous schedule of a flat . 1 percent for each 
$45 million that the balance fell short of the floor. (No 
estimate is available for the effect of this change on 1983-86 
revenues.) (4) The basis for financing benefit payments that 
cannot be assigned to the individual accounts of active 
employers (noncharged benefits, ineffectively charged 
benefits and uncollectable charges) was changed. Previously 
the replenishment tax that covered these charges had been 
levied as a proportionate surtax added to each employer©s 
basic UI taxes. In future years the replenishment tax will be 
levied half as a proportionate surtax and half as a flat rate 
tax with rates of .34, .23 and .20 percent in 1984, 1985 and 
1986 respectively. This change which is projected to leave
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total replenishment tax revenues unchanged effectively shifts 
more of this tax burden to employers with low UI tax rates.
The increased revenues under the 1983 law will not be suf 
ficient to repay all loans by the end of 1984. Therefore Texas 
employers are faced with the prospect of PUT penalty taxes 
with rates of .3 percent in 1985 and .6 percent in 1986. The 
total revenue to be raised from these taxes will be about $450 
million. Texans anticipate their debt will be totally repaid 
during 1986. Current projections suggest that the trust fund 
balance will reach $500 million by the end of 1986.
The recent deficits and borrowing in Texas illustrate that 
even a very robust state economy can develop a UI financing 
problem if taxes are kept low and trust fund reserve ratios 
are allowed to shrink. The scale of the state©s financing prob 
lem is small compared to that of the four large debtor states. 
State tax increases arising from 1982 and 1983 legislation 
coupled with FUT penalty taxes will eliminate the debt by the 
end of 1986. Part of the state©s motivation to repay the debt 
promptly is the interest that now accrues on outstand 
ing debts. One positive consequence of the 1982 and 1983 
legislation is that Texas now has a much better procedure for 
making annual tax rate adjustments, i.e., one that produces 
smoother rate adjustments, in response to fluctuations in 
trust fund balances. The minimum and maximum fund 
balances are indexed to taxable wages, and tax rates change 
automatically when balances fall outside the proscribed 1 to 
2 percentage point range. Some years of experience with the 
current tax adjustment mechanism will be needed before full 
confidence can be placed in it. Also, since it has such low UI 
benefits (as a percent of total payroll) it seems sensible that 
recent adjustments to improve program solvency should take 
the form of tax increases. Finally, it should be noted that if 
the 1982 and 1983 bills had not been enacted, 1983 taxes 
would have increased sharply and the state would not have 
developed a long-term debt.
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Unlike other debtor states, Texas is not eligible for interest 
deferrals or reductions in PUT penalty taxes. The reason is 
that the state©s 1982 UI legislation caused a reduction of 1983 
tax effort compared to what was previously scheduled to 
take place. Texas avoided having a $1 billion tax increase in 
1983. The previous tax schedule is the benchmark used in the 
1983 Social Security Amendments for judging state tax ef 
forts. As a consequence the debt is subject to full interest 
payments and Texas employers face PUT penalty taxes of .3 
percent in 1985 and .6 percent in 1986. If the state economy 
rebounds rapidly in 1984 and 1985 it may obviate the need 
for 1986 PUT penalty taxes. Thus, the debt problem in Texas 
is on a much smaller scale and has been more easily remedied 
than in the four states with larger trust fund debts.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin was the first state to institute unemployment in 
surance. Its law passed in 1932, three years before the Social 
Security Act of 1935 which caused UI programs to be 
adopted by all the states. Wisconsin was among the first 
states to implement such innovative ideas as experience 
rating of individual employers, changing maximum benefit 
duration over the business cycle and indexing maximum 
weekly benefits.
During most of the program©s history, important UI 
legislative proposals have originated with the Wisconsin 
Unemployment Compensation Advisory Council. This 
11-member body which has 5 representatives from business, 
5 from labor and is chaired by a nonvoting departmental 
employee serving as a public member has traditionally 
developed proposals using open procedures and receiving in 
puts from diverse economic interests within the state. Be 
tween 1932 and the mid-1970s, it was usually possible to 
balance the diverse economic interests of employers and 
employees within the Advisory Council to arrive at mutually
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acceptable UI legislation. The result was an innovative state 
program that successfully adapted to changing cyclical con 
ditions. Its benefit structure could be termed liberal when 
compared to most states, but the program was not unusually 
expensive.
In the late 1970s, the labor and business policy positions at 
Advisory Council meetings became increasingly polarized as 
each side became less willing to make concessions in for 
mulating needed UI legislation. Labor was unwilling to per 
mit any benefit reductions and employer groups would agree 
to increases in UI tax schedules only if there were sharp 
benefit cutbacks. As a result an impasse developed at 
precisely the time when unemployment rose to un 
precedented levels. During 1982 and 1983, Wisconsin bor 
rowed $802 million, the first time loans were needed in the 
program©s history. The scale of borrowing was so large that 
the state©s debt was projected to reach $1.7 billion by the end 
of 1986 unless major legislation to restore fiscal balance was 
enacted. 32
During the 1970s, benefit payments as a percent of total 
payroll in Wisconsin were nearly identical to the national 
average. Column 8 of table A6 shows the two percentages 
were respectively 1.16 and 1.15. Indicators of benefit 
availability and weekly benefit generosity, however, show 
that unemployed Wisconsin workers were paid at higher 
than average rates. The state ratio of insured-to-total 
unemployment exceeded the national ratio in 9 of 10 years 
while the ratio of weekly benefits-to-weekly wages was above 
average in all 10 years (see columns 10 and 11 respectively). 
Low unemployment in the decade offset the effect of these 
two high ratios. Between 1970 and 1979, the Wisconsin 
unemployment rate averaged 1.4 percentage points less than 
the national average and fell below the national rate in each 
of the 10 years. Thus, through the 1970s Wisconsin was able
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to provide its workers with generous UI benefits (e.g., no 
waiting week, maximum duration in excess of 26 weeks, in 
dexed weekly benefits with the maximum changing twice per 
year) without imposing above-average costs on its 
employers.
Wisconsin entered the 1970s with a trust fund balance of 
$333 million (on January 1, 1970) and a reserve ratio multi 
ple of 2.40, well above the 1.50 ICESA minimum standard. 
Reserves were drawn down somewhat during 1971 and 1972 
but were then rebuilt to $300 million in 1973. Due to infla 
tion, the reserve ratio multiple continued to decline 
somewhat in 1973 and 1974 but at the start of 1975 it still 
stood at 1.47, just below the recommended minimum ac 
tuarial standard.
When unemployment rose to 6.9 percent in 1975, trust 
fund reserves were quickly reduced to $120 million by the 
end of that year. As reserves dropped, the state responded by 
raising both employer tax rates and the taxable wage base (to 
$6,000) in 1976. Between 1976 and 1979 revenues exceeded 
benefit payments in each year and trust fund reserves were 
rebuilt to $465 million by the end of 1979. Although this was 
the highest amount of nominal reserves in the program©s 
history, the reserve ratio multiple stood at only 1.06, an in 
dication of how much inflation had occurred in the late 
1970s.
Higher unemployment of 1980 and 1981 again quickly 
depleted the UI trust fund. Although actuarial projections 
from 1980 onward showed a clear need for loans, the Ad 
visory Council was unable to agree upon a set of legislative 
recommendations. The labor members refused to accede to 
any benefit cuts, and business representatives would not 
agree to any tax increases until there were benefit cutbacks. 
Despite sharply higher unemployment in 1982 this impasse 
continued. For the year as a whole, benefit outlays exceeded
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tax revenues by more than $400 million. Payouts were 2.27 
percent of total payroll, the highest payout rate for any year 
in the entire history of the program. Loans for this single 
year totaled $430 million.
In November 1982, a new governor was elected. After tak 
ing office in January 1983, Governor Earl moved quickly to 
break the impasse that had developed in the Advisory Coun 
cil. He appointed a special panel of four (the Republican and 
Democratic leaders of the Assembly and Senate) with the 
Secretary of the Department of Industry, Labor and Human 
Relations named as the nonvoting chair. This group quickly 
developed a legislative package, made its recommendations 
in early April, and a bill was then enacted on April 15. The 
entire legislative process was conducted without input from 
the Advisory Council, something unique in the history of 
Wisconsin UI legislation.
Individual provisions of this legislation and estimated 
1983-86 financial impacts were as follows. 33 (1) The weekly 
benefit maximum was frozen for four years at $196, its level 
on January 1, 1983 ($78 million). (2) Maximum potential 
duration of regular UI benefits was reduced from 34 to 26 
weeks when insured unemployment falls below certain trig 
ger thresholds ($82 million). (3) Provisions with respect to 
those who quit jobs (or refuse suitable work) were tightened. 
A "quit-to-take" (a new job) provision was added. To con 
tinue eligible for benefits under this provision, a claimant 
must work at least four weeks in the new job (which must be 
in covered employment) and must meet certain other condi 
tions. Otherwise, a claimant who quits must work at least 
seven weeks in covered employment after the quit and earn 
at least 14 times the weekly benefit amount; the remaining 
benefits based on work for the quit employer are reduced by 
half. Under prior law, a person who voluntarily quit could 
requalify for full benefits by working four weeks and earning
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$200, not necessarily in covered employment ($158 
million). 34 (4) Those who are discharged for misconduct 
must requalify for benefits by working at least seven weeks 
in covered employment, with earnings at least 14 times the 
weekly benefit rate. Previously, only a three-week wait was 
required. As under prior law, all credit weeks with respect to 
the discharging employer are cancelled ($2 million). (5) Base 
period weeks of employment were raised from 15 in 1983 to 
18 in 1984 and then to 19 in 1986. To qualify for benefits in 
1984, a claimant needs base period earnings in covered 
employment of at least $1,646 18 weeks times the state 
average weekly wage ($304.80) times 30 percent. (The claim 
ant meets this requirement even if the $1,646 is earned in 19 
or more weeks.) There was no equivalent requirement in 
prior law. As before, benefit checks are not paid based on 
work for an employer where wages averaged $72 per week or 
less ($118 million).
There were several important changes in employer UI 
taxes. (6) The taxable wage base was raised to $8,000 in 
1983, to $9,500 in 1984, and to $9,700 in 1986 ($449 million). 
(7) The tax rate schedule was revised upward from a 0-7.4 
percent range in 1983 to a .4-8.5 range in 1984. The latter is 
the highest of four possible rate schedules (the lowest has a 
.1-5.4 percent range) and it will probably also apply in 1985 
and 1986 as well ($189 million). (8) The cap on the maximum 
annual tax rate increase for covered employers was raised 
from 1 percent to 2 percent ($97 million). (9) The tax treat 
ment of employers with large negative account balances was 
changed. Previously negative balances above a certain size 
were written off (like a bad debt). Under the new law, no 
writeoffs will be allowed in 1984 and 1985, and in later years 
they will be allowed only where the firm has paid the top rate 
for at least two years in succession (13 million). (10) Provi 
sions permitting firms to "buy" a lower rate by making 
voluntary contributions exactly sufficient to move their
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balances into lower brackets were tightened by limiting such 
rate reductions to a single bracket and sharply reducing 
bracket size ($22 million). (11) Starting in 1984 payments for 
extended benefits were to be experience rated ($23 million). 
(12) A temporary surtax (8 percent of the basic tax) was 
levied in 1984 to avoid a 1984 PUT penalty tax. This tax in 
crease will be offset by a one-year reduction in solvency taxes 
in 1986 ($32 million net revenue loss in 1984-86).
The Wisconsin legislation was projected to increase pro 
gram solvency by over $1 billion during the four years from 
1983 to 1986. 35 Over these four years it raised revenues by 
$761 million and reduced benefits by $438 million for a 
63/37 division between state tax increases and benefits cuts. 
As a consequence, the state©s UI debt at the end of 1986 was 
projected to be $600 million instead of $1.7 billion.
The 1983 Wisconsin bill was clearly influenced by the pro 
visions of 1982 and 1983 federal UI legislation that affect 
debtor states. The changes in taxes and benefits will enable 
the state to avoid PUT penalty taxes on 1984 and 1985 
payrolls. Also, the increase in net solvency is large enough to 
qualify the state both for 80 percent deferrals in 1983-85 in 
terest payments and for (one percentage point) lower interest 
rates in 1983-85. The total resulting savings to Wisconsin 
employers in 1983-86 is $96 million in reduced PUT penalty 
taxes and $257 million in reduced and deferred interest 
charges. 36 When these savings are subtracted from the $761 
million of tax increases projected under the 1983 legislation, 
the net employer tax increase becomes $408 million. Com 
pared to benefit reductions of $438 million, the net tax 
change represents 48.2 percent of the combined net tax in 
crease and benefit reduction. Thus, employers and workers 
will experience roughly a 50-50 split in the net change in pro 
gram solvency over the 1983-86 period.
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Wisconsin was able to act after devising a way to circum 
vent the deadlock in its Unemployment Compensation Ad 
visory Council. The state has enacted a major bill that will 
substantially reduce future indebtedness. Even after the 1983 
legislation, however, the state will still have a UI debt well 
beyond the end of 1986.
Louisiana
An unemployment insurance funding problem became ap 
parent in Louisiana in 1982 when the state needed $102 
million in federal loans. Unusually high benefit payments 
reflect continued increases in unemployment dating from 
late 1979. A downturn in petroleum production was the 
primary contributor to financing problems in this major 
energy-producing state. Further increases in unemployment 
during 1983 led to additional borrowing of $427 million. 
Thus a state that had never previously borrowed acquired an 
interest-bearing debt of nearly $500 million (or 2.2 percent of 
1982 payrolls) in just two years.
Despite being an important energy-producing state, Loui 
siana has experienced above-average rates of unemployment 
in most years since 1970. During the 1970-79 decade, its 
unemployment rate averaged nearly a full percentage point 
above the national average, i.e., 7.1 versus 6.2 percent (see 
volumn 9 in table A7). Traditionally, UI in Louisiana has 
compensated a low proportion of the unemployed and week 
ly benefits have been lower than average. Columns 10 and 11 
in table A7 display data showing below average ratios of in 
sured to total unemployment and, through 1976, below 
average ratios of weekly benefits to weekly wages. In 
September 1976, however, a major liberalization of the 
weekly benefit statute became effective. The weekly benefit 
maximum was raised from $90 to $120 and was indexed to 
two-thirds of the state©s average weekly wage. Since then, the 
ratio of weekly benefits to weekly wages has consistently ex-
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ceeded the national average. Despite generally high 
unemployment since 1970 and generous weekly benefits since 
late 1976, Louisiana©s benefit costs have been lower than 
average in most years. Between 1970 and 1982 the ratio of 
benefit payments to total payroll in Louisiana (column 8 in 
table A7) exceeded the national average in just four years. 
Unfortunately, 1982 and 1983 have been years of extraor 
dinarily high benefit costs, the highest in the history of Loui 
siana©s program.
Louisiana is not known for high employer UI taxes. Its tax 
base has never exceeded the PUT tax base and its average tax 
rates on taxable wages have never been unusually high for a 
sustained period. This situation prevailed in 1982 as 
unemployment rose and the state©s trust fund was depleted.
Since 1970 there has been a rather steady downtrend in the 
Louisiana UI trust fund. As can be seen in column 1 of table 
A7, the state©s reserve ratio multiple has declined in most 
years, with 1979 providing one important exception. Prior to 
1983 employer UI tax rates were determined by a combina 
tion of their own reserve balances and the aggregate balance 
in the state trust fund. There were 10 different tax rate 
schedules, and the highest schedule became effective on the 
following January 1 if the June 30 trust fund balance fell 
below $125 million. The balance fell below this minimum 
threshold in 1978 causing tax rates to rise sharply in 1979. 
The range of rates shifted upward from .1-2.7 percent in 
1978 to 1.63-4.53 percent in 1979, and the average rate on 
taxable wages (column 15) increased from 1.74 percent to 
3.27 percent. Because of the higher taxes, the state trust fund 
balance increased by $114 million during 1979 (from $124 to 
$238 million) and the reserve ratio multiple rose from .46 to 
.77. Effective tax rates declined after 1979 and the trust fund 
balance gradually eroded in 1980 and 1981.
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The increase in Louisiana©s unemployment rate since 1980 
has been particularly sharp. While the national unemploy 
ment rate rose from 7.1 to 9.6 percent between 1980 and 
1983, Louisiana©s rate jumped from 6.7 to 11.8 percent. The 
unusually severe state recession has been directly responsible 
for the accumulation of a substantial UI trust fund debt. 
Heavy layoffs in 1982 caused benefit outlays to rise sharply 
in that year and exhausted all the state©s trust fund reserves.
Because the trust fund balance was below $125 million on 
June 30, 1982, Louisiana employees faced the prospect of 
sharply higher tax rates in 1983 when the 1.9-4.5 percent tax 
rate schedule was slated to go into effect. Additionally, 
because the debt was interest-bearing, there would also have 
to be new taxes to pay the required interest costs. Since 1982 
benefit payments were much larger than tax revenues and an 
economic upturn was not taking place, it was obvious that 
large additional debts would accumulate unless corrective ac 
tion was taken.
The primary reason for a special legislative session called 
in January 1983 was to address the state©s UI funding prob 
lem. At the end of January, two bills were passed, one deal 
ing with UI benefits and the other with taxes. 37 The tax 
changes were made retroactive to January 1, 1983 while the 
benefit changes became effective on April 3, 1983. At the 
time of their passage it was anticipated that the tax and 
benefit changes in conjunction with a strong economic 
recovery would cause the state©s debt to be paid off by the 
end of 1986.
Individual provisions of the 1983 legislation were as 
follows. 38 (1) The weekly benefit maximum was frozen for 
an indefinite period at $205, the maximum in effect since 
September 1982. (2) Retroactive compensation for the 
waiting week was stopped. Previously the waiting week was 
compensated after a worker had received benefits for six
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weeks. (3) The maximum potential duration of regular UI 
benefits was shortened from 28 to 26 weeks. (4) The range of 
experience rated tax rates was widened. Under the previous 
statute, the range of rates in 1983 would have been from 1.9 
to 4.5 percent. The new range was from .3 to 4.5 percent 
with the maximum experience rated rate (for employers with 
the biggest negative reserve balances) then rising in suc 
cessive years and reaching 6.0 percent in 1986. (5) To help 
repay the federal loans a solvency surtax was added for the 
years 1983-1986. The surtax was to be a 20 percent add-on to 
basic employer taxes in 1983 and up to 30 percent in later 
years. 39 (6) A special surtax was instituted for employers 
with chronic negative account balances. Those with negative 
account balances on the June 30 tax computation date in two 
successive years were subject to a special tax of 5 percent 
which was added to their basic experience rated tax. (7) An 
explicit tax to cover noncharged benefits (also called social 
charges) was instituted. This too was computed as a propor 
tional add-on to the basic experience rated tax rate. (8) An 
interest surtax was added. It was levied on the previous 
year©s taxable wages at a single flat rate sufficient to cover 
interest accruals on the previous year©s debt. The 1983 rate 
was .2 percent and it is anticipated that the 1984 rate will be 
about .6 percent.
The Louisiana tax changes will lead to systematically 
higher program revenues in the years after 1983. They also 
have the effect of increasing the degree of experience rating. 
In 1983, for example, the range of possible tax rates was in 
creased from 2.6 percentage points under the previous law 
(i.e., the 1.9-4.5 percent range of the preceding tax schedule) 
to 5.3 percentage points (from 5.7 down to .4 percent). By 
1986 this maximum range could be as wide as 7.9 percentage 
points (from .4 to 8.3 percent), 40 about three times the range 
of the pre-1983 tax rate structure. Because the tax changes 
preempted a major increase in minimum tax rates previously
Debtor State Experiences 89
scheduled for 1983, however, actual 1983 tax revenues were 
somewhat lower than what would have been collected under 
the previous law. The average 1983 tax rate on taxable wages 
was about 3.3 percent, but it would have been close to 3.8 
percent under the preceding law. 41
Thus because tax effort declined relative to the standard 
provided by the previous law, Louisiana does not qualify for 
any of the interest deferral provisions of the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments. The state has opted for a somewhat 
smoother time path of average employer tax rate increases 
and greater degree of reliance on experience rated taxes to 
generate added revenues. Starting in 1985, Louisiana 
employers will also be subject to PUT penalty taxes.
Because the Louisiana economy did not recover in 1983, 
the state has continued to accumulate debts subsequent to its 
1983 legislation. Under current (mid-1984) projections, all 
loans are expected to be repaid in either 1987 or 1988. 
Solvency surtaxes of 30 percent are expected for each of the 
years 1984-86. For the years 1985-87, PUT penalty taxes are 
expected to generate at least $160 million for loan 
repayments. Thus, Louisiana has taken action to improve UI 
program solvency, but net solvency was not improved by 25 
percent in 1983 and the state did not qualify for the potential 
financial relief available under TEFRA and/or the 1983 
Social Security Amendments. 42
New Jersey
New Jersey©s UI program experienced a serious funding 
problem in the mid-1970s. Between 1975 and 1978, loans in 
excess of $700 million were required and over $400 million 
was still outstanding at the end of 1983. The state economy 
has performed relatively well in the 1980s and there has not 
been a tendency towards chronic borrowing as in the 
previous decade. New Jersey still has a comparatively large
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debt (the debt of $476 million at the end of 1983 represented 
1.0 percent of 1982 payrolls), but since 1980 it has been 
reduced by over $200 million. Because its debt is based on 
old (interest free) loans, recent New Jersey legislation has 
aimed to reduce PUT penalty taxes and has been influenced 
more by 1982 TEFRA provisions than by the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments.
Historically New Jersey has provided its residents with a 
high benefit/high tax UI program. During the 1949-59 and 
1960-69 periods, benefits as a percent of total New Jersey 
payroll average 1.58 and 1.35 percent respectively as com 
pared to national averages of 1.17 and 1.00 percent respec 
tively. The differential was even wider in the 1970s when the 
New Jersey average was 1.91 percent while the national 
average was 1.15 percent (see column 8 in table A8). Between 
1970 and 1979, the state©s unemployment rate averaged a full 
percentage point more than the national average (7.2 versus 
6.2 percent), and unemployment remained very high in 1976 
and 1977 after the national economy recovered from the 
1974-75 recession. Table A8 also shows that New Jersey 
compensates a relatively high proportion of its unemployed. 
The ratio of insured-to-total unemployment exceeded the na 
tional average in every year between 1970 and 1983. Thus 
high benefit costs in the 1970s reflect both high unemploy 
ment rates and high ratio of insured to total unemployment.
New Jersey entered the 1970s with a trust fund balance of 
$483 million and a reserve ratio multiple of 1.22. Reserves 
were largely depleted in 1971 and 1972 and not rebuilt in the 
next two years. Thus when unemployment rose sharply (to 
10.2 percent) in 1975 the state quickly exhausted all reserves 
and had to borrow $352 million in that year alone (column 
3). Additional loans of $383 million were then required in 
1976-78. Continuing deficits occurred despite annual in 
creases in the taxable wage base and increases in average
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taxes on taxable payroll to above 4 percent. 43 In New Jersey, 
taxes as a percent of total payroll in 1977 and 1978 were 
higher than in every other state except Alaska, Hawaii and 
Oregon. A deep and prolonged recession coupled with liberal 
UI benefit availability caused the state to borrow a total of 
$735 million despite imposing very high UI tax rates.
Accumulation of new debts has not been a problem for 
New Jersey in the 1980s. The state©s unemployment rate has 
remained below the national average and it fell by 1.2 
percentage points (from 9.0 to 7.8) in 1983. As a conse 
quence, benefit payments as a percentage of payroll (though 
still higher than the national average) have averaged less in 
1980-83 than they did for the decade of the 1970s. A second 
factor aiding program solvency in the 1980s has been the 
presence of an indexed taxable wage base. Since 1975, the 
wage base has been 54 percent of the state©s average wage, 
reaching $9,600 in 1984. Indicative of improved solvency, 
the only loan required between 1980-1983 was a 1983 ad 
vance of $79 million that was repaid in the same year. Thus 
all of the state©s UI debt continues to be the result of borrow 
ing that occurred in the 1970s.
Loan repayments have been made at a slow pace. Volun 
tary payments of $40 and $43 million were made in 1978 and 
1979 respectively, in lieu of FUT penalty taxes. Penalty taxes 
were first levied in 1981, and between 1981 and 1983 they ac 
counted for $230 million in repayments. As noted, the 1983 
loan was repaid in the same year.
Because New Jersey©s debt is old debt and because the 
state has not experienced large deficits in the 1980s, there 
was less pressure to enact legislation immediately in 1983 to 
take advantage of financial provisions of the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments. The absence of large current deficits 
has meant that smaller scale adjustments could be made in 
comparison to states with much larger debts. Furthermore,
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the PUT penalty taxes provide an automatic mechanism for 
ensuring loan repayments. In 1983, a bill was proposed that 
would have improved program solvency and hastened the 
pace of debt reduction. Although that initiative was not suc 
cessful, a similar bill was passed in March 1984 that raises 
taxes and causes a faster rate of loan repayment and a faster 
restoration of the UI trust fund.
New Jersey©s 1984 legislation can be viewed as having two 
components; temporary measures to hasten debt repayment 
and rebuild the trust fund and longer run measures to im 
prove the overall solvency of the program. Based on ac 
tuarial materials supplied by the state, it is estimated that the 
legislation will improve program solvency but by a rather 
modest amount during the 1984-87 period. 44 Temporary 
measures include a two-year 10 percent surtax on employers 
and a one-time transfer of monies from a state disability 
trust fund to the UI trust fund. 45 The permanent measures 
improve solvency by more than $50 million per year, but 
because of timing differences they do not start to have im 
portant effects until calendar year 1987. Permanent changes 
in benefits become effective in October 1984 whereas the per 
manent tax changes do not take effect until July 1986.
Individual provisions and their effects on program solven 
cy during 1984-87 are as follows. (1) The formula for deter 
mining weekly benefits was modified. Previously, weekly 
benefits were two-thirds of base period weekly wages with a 
maximum equal to half of the state©s average weekly wage. 
The new benefit formula lowers the replacement rate to .6, 
raises the weekly maximum to .567 of the state©s weekly 
wage and pays dependents© benefits. For a single person, the 
weekly benefit maximum in 1984 was increased from $170 to 
$192. This change leads to increased benefit payouts ($104 
million reduction in net solvency). (2) In calculating weekly 
benefits, future computations will round the benefit amount
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down to the nearest dollar ($23 million). (3) Base period 
earnings requirements were increased. In 1985 a worker will 
need 20 weeks of employment at weekly wages of at least 20 
percent of the statewide average (or $71) rather than the cur 
rent $30. Also, for workers with earnings concentrated in 
just a few weeks of the year the dollar amount for the alter 
native base period earnings requirement was raised from 
$2,200 to $4,100 ($62 million). On balance, the changes 
cause benefit payments to increase by $19 million over the 
1984-87 period. 46
Several tax changes were also made. (4) The employee tax 
rate on taxable wages was increased from .5 to .625 percent 
in July 1986 ($41 million). (5) A temporary surtax of 10 per 
cent was added to employer taxes due between October 1984 
and September 1986 ($147 million). (6) A one-time transfer 
of funds from the New Jersey Temporary Disability In 
surance (TDI) fund to the UI trust fund will be made in 1985 
($50 million). (7) The range of employer tax rates was in 
creased from 1.2-6.2 percent to 1.2-7.0 percent effective July 
1986 ($34 million).
The total impact of the seven changes during 1984-87 will 
be a $253 million increase in program solvency. The 
employee share (increased employee taxes plus the transfer 
from the state disability trust fund47 less the small net 
liberalization in weekly benefits) will be $72 million. The 
employer share (the temporary 10 percent surtax plus the in 
creased maximum tax rate) is $181 million or 71.5 percent of 
the total.
This law raises the state©s solvency in 1984-87 and helps 
qualify New Jersey employers for a cap on their PUT penalty 
tax rate. Although the state might have qualified for a cap in 
1984 that would have maintained a .6 percent rate even 
without this law, it is more likely the rate would have risen to 
.8 percent (payable in 1985). 48 During 1985 and 1986, it is
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estimated that the savings in PUT penalty taxes, i.e., the .6 
rather than the .8 percent rate, is about $85 million. 49 Since 
the debt will be repaid by the end of 1986, there will be no 
savings in PUT penalty taxes in 1987. When this $85 million 
PUT tax reduction is considered in calculating the net in 
crease in program solvency for the 1984-87 period, the total 
change becomes a $168 million net increase and the employer 
share ($96 million, or $181 million less the $85 million PUT 
penalty tax saving) is 57.0 percent of the total.
As a consequence of its 1984 law, New Jersey has improv 
ed UI program solvency, enabling the state to repay its debt 
more quickly and rebuild its trust fund more quickly. Unlike 
other debtor states, weekly UI benefits have been increased 
somewhat while at the same time improving program solven 
cy. This was possible because the program already has had a 
balance between revenues and benefits in the 1980s, and 
because the state does not have to contend with the costs of a 
large interest-bearing debt.
Minnesota
Minnesota©s UI program has experienced financing prob 
lems in the 1970s and again in the present decade. The earlier 
debt, accumulated between 1975 and 1977, was fully repaid 
by the end of 1979. Despite PUT penalty taxes and required 
interest payments that are levied on the 1980s debt, the state 
has not yet found an acceptable way to make major im 
provements in program solvency and reduce its in 
debtedness. A 1984 legislative proposal to substantially 
revamp Minnesota©s program was turned down in the 
legislature. At the end of 1983, the state has a $350 million 
debt (1.7 percent of 1982 total payrolls) and it faced the pros 
pect of higher PUT penalty taxes and continued interest 
payments on a substantial share of its debt.
Although Minnesota is generally known as a generous 
state in the provision of social services, its UI program has
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traditionally been less costly than the U.S. national average. 
For example, during the 1970s UI benefits as a percent of 
payroll averaged 1.01 and 1.15 percent in Minnesota and in 
the U.S. respectively (see column 8 in table A9). Lower than 
average costs are largely accounted for by the state©s general 
ly low unemployment. Between 1970 and 1979 its unemploy 
ment rate averaged 4.7 percent while the national average 
was 6.2 percent. Column 9 in table A9 shows that the state©s 
unemployment rate was below the national average in every 
one of the 14 years between 1970 and 1983.
The effects of low unemployment on benefit costs are 
partly offset by the state©s rather liberal UI program. The 
ratio of insured-to-total unemployment in Minnesota 
typically exceeds the national average, and, since 1974, 
weekly benefits have replaced a higher than average fraction 
of weekly wages. The computation of the weekly benefit was 
substantially liberalized in the mid-1970s by two changes; 
raising the weekly benefit maximum from $85 in 1974 to 
$105 in 1975 and indexing the maximum to two-thirds of the 
state©s average weekly wage after 1975. As can be seen from 
table A9 the ratio of weekly benefits to weekly wages has ex 
ceeded the national average in every year since 1974.
Despite its high weekly benefits and the high ratio of 
insured-to-total unemployment, Minnesota©s benefit cost 
rates have usually been less than the national average. The 
effects of a liberal benefit structure have been offset by low 
unemployment rates. Thus in table A9, the only years when 
benefits as a percent of payroll (column 8) exceeded the na 
tional average were the years 1980-82. In 1982 benefits were 
1.89 percent of payroll, the highest cost ratio in Minnesota 
since 1940 and higher than the national average of 1.72 per 
cent.
For several years Minnesota has maintained a taxable 
wage base that exceeds the base for the Federal Unemploy-
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ment Tax. This has helped to offset effects of a low average 
tax rate on taxable wages. During the 1970s, for example, the 
average state tax rate was 18 percent below the national 
average (column 15 in table A9). Between 1970 and 1982 the 
state©s average tax rate was always lower than the national 
average.
Minnesota entered the 1970s with UI trust fund reserves of 
$120 million, but a reserve ratio multiple of only 1.11. Low 
reserves in 1970 represent the continuation of a generally low 
reserve position that had existed throughout the 1960s. 
Following earlier recessions in 1958 and 1960-61, the state 
did not raise taxes and/or restrict benefits by enough in the 
1960s to rebuild the trust fund. 50 Between 1970 and 1975 the 
reserve ratio multiple (column 1) gradually declined 
(reaching .45 at the start of 1975). When unemployment rose 
to 5.9 percent in 1975 and 1976 the trust fund was soon ex 
hausted and loans of $172 million were needed in the 1975-77 
period. After its initial borrowing, Minnesota took steps to 
increase program revenues. The tax base was raised substan 
tially in 1976 and 1977 and average tax rates on taxable 
wages were also increased. Finally, the trust fund was suffi 
ciently rebuilt in 1979 that the state fully repaid the $172 
million. At the start of 1980, however, the trust fund balance 
stood at only $70 million.
Increased unemployment in 1980 caused the state to need 
more loans. Loan demand was especially high in 1982 and 
1983 when the unemployment rate rose to levels not ex 
perienced in the preceding decade. Because recent loans 
carry interest charges, the state repaid almost half of these in 
the year that they were obtained ($177 of $358 million). The 
repayment of 1980-82 interest-free loans has been limited to 
FUT penalty taxes which were first paid in January 1983. 
Thus, between 1980 and 1983 the state borrowed $550 
million but repaid $200 million leaving a debt of $352 million 
at the end of 1983.
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After borrowing substantial amounts in 1982 and early 
1983, the Minnesota legislature enacted a bill during its 1982 
session that was intended to improve program solvency. 
Three important provisions in the bill were the following. 
(1) The maximum weekly benefit amount was frozen at $184 
effective June 30, 1982, and limited to $7 annual increases 
for each subsequent year through June 30, 1985. (2) The 
amount of weekly wages required to qualify for a base 
period week of covered employment was increased from $50 
to 30 percent of the average weekly wage ($81 in 1982, $87 in 
1983 and $94 in 1984). (3) The taxable wage base for 
employers was raised from $8,000 to 60 percent of the an 
nual average wage ($8,300 in 1982, $9,000 in 1983 and $9,800 
in 1984). These plus other changes were expected to balance 
revenues with benefit payments. When unemployment con 
tinued upward in late 1982, however, the state needed addi 
tional and larger loans even though these 1982 provisions 
were in place.
During 1983 and 1984, Minnesota has not been able to 
assemble a legislative package designed to further improve 
program solvency that can command majority support in the 
state legislature. A temporary surtax adding 10 percent to 
employer taxes in 1983 and 1984 was passed in 1983 to cover 
the interest costs on the state©s debt. Legislation in Min 
nesota often closely follows recommendations of the Depart 
ment of Employment Security Advisory Council, a body that 
has labor, management and public representatives. 
Throughout most of its history, the Advisory Council has 
been able to make unanimous legislative recommendations 
that have been subsequently enacted. In 1983, a recommend 
ed package did not command unanimous support within the 
council and did not pass in the legislature.
A 1984 legislative proposal that added provisions limiting 
benefits had unanimous council support and the backing of 
most employer organizations. The 1984 bill included a
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limitation on increases in maximum weekly benefits, a 
solvency tax to repay the debt, an extension of the temporary 
surtax and an increase in the maximum employer tax rate. 
Despite its strong backing, this bill was not passed. Opposi 
tion came from an effective group of employer represen 
tatives who wanted larger benefit reductions and smaller tax 
increases. Special issues not addressed by the bill also raised 
impediments to its passage. 51 Since the 10 percent employer 
surtax expired at the end of 1984 it would seem that Min 
nesota needs to consider UI legislation again in 1985.
Minnesota employers first paid PUT penalty taxes in 1983. 
The January 1984 payment was .6 percent of 1983 federal 
taxable wages. Penalty taxes on federal taxable wages in the 
following two years were to repay about three-fourths of the 
$204 million of outstanding debt remaining at the end of 
1984. If no new borrowing takes place, voluntary 
repayments in 1985 and 1986 can be expected to eliminate the 
remainder of the state©s debt. Minnesota and West Virginia 
are the only two of the ten largest debtor states that did not 
pass important solvency legislation between the end of 1982 
and 1984. Although it appears that debt repayments will be 
completed by 1986 in Minnesota, much of this will have been 
the result of PUT penalty taxes. Under its current UI 
statutes, substantial trust fund accumulations do not appear 
to be in store for the state.
West Virginia
West Virginia has experienced a major UI funding prob 
lem in the 1980s that reflects the poor overall condition of 
the state©s economy. Between 1980 and 1983 the state ac 
cumulated a UI trust fund debt of nearly $300 million (or 3.7 
percent of 1982 payrolls). As coal production has declined 
the state©s average unemployment rate has grown from 6.7 
percent in 1979 to 18.0 percent in 1983. This 1983 unemploy 
ment rate was by far the highest in the U.S. 52 Persistently
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high and rising unemployment since 1979 explains how the 
state could accumulate a large debt while at the same time 
having among the highest average employer tax rates in the 
nation.
Traditionally, UI program costs have not been unusually 
high in West Virginia. Between 1949 and 1959, benefits as a 
percent of covered payroll did exceed the national average as 
the U.S. economy completed a major changeover from coal 
to oil in both commercial and residential usage. Since soft 
coal mining is the state©s largest industry, West Virginia ex 
perienced a prolonged period of high unemployment and low 
growth from 1945 to 1959. This was responsible for a high 
rate of benefit payouts. During the next two decades, 
however, the state had UI benefit costs that were, in fact, 
below the national average. Table A10 shows that benefits as 
a percent of covered payroll (column 8) fell below the na 
tional average in every year between 1970 and 1977, and for 
the 1970-79 period they averaged .93 percent compared to a 
national average of 1.15 percent.
During the late 1970s, three developments led to rapid in 
creases in UI benefit payments in West Virginia. First, there 
were liberalizations in the computation schedule used to 
determine weekly UI benefits. The weekly benefit maximum 
was raised from 67 to 70 percent of the state©s average week 
ly wage in 1979, and in both 1978 and 1980 the replacement 
rate computation formula for high wage workers was 
liberalized. Second, the state increased the maximum poten 
tial benefit duration for regular UI benefits from 26 to 28 
weeks effective in 1979. Third, and more important, state 
unemployment began to increase in 1979 and it increased in 
every subsequent year through 1983. As a result of these 
three developments, benefits were 3.01 percent of total 
payroll in 1982, the highest of any year since World War II 
and a higher percentage than in all other states except
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Michigan and Pennsylvania. Because of benefit liberaliza 
tions and because many recent claimants have been high 
wage coal miners, the ratio of weekly benefits-to-weekly 
wages (column 11 in table A10) has risen from .290 in 1977 
to .400 in 1982. Also, average duration in benefit status has 
been higher in the 1980s than earlier because of the high 
unemployment. Thus, since the mid-1970s, West Virginia 
has become a state of chronically high UI benefit costs.
West Virginia first required UI loans in 1980. It borrowed 
$47 million in 1980 and $53 million in 1981. After it became 
clear that the state had a serious UI financing problem, a ma 
jor bill was enacted in 1981 to increase program solvency. On 
the benefits side, there were some increased restrictions on 
benefit availability. Payments for partial unemployment 
were reduced and several disqualification penalties were in 
creased. The most important changes took place on the 
revenue side of the program. The tax base was immediately 
raised to $8,000. A surtax equal to 1 percent of taxable 
payroll was added to each employer©s contribution rate start 
ing in 1981. This tax is to remain in effect until the UI trust 
fund is restored to an adequate level (defined as equal to 
average level of benefit payments for the preceding three 
calendar years). Also, the range of experience rated tax rates 
was widened substantially. Previously, rates ranged from 0 
to 3.3 percent. Including the 1 percent surtax, the new range 
was from 2.5 to 8.5 percent. 53 Finally, tax rates applied to 
new employers and construction industry employers were 
raised.
At the time of enactment it was felt that the 1981 legisla 
tion would restore balance between program revenues and 
outlays. Because the 1981-82 downturn affected energy- 
producing industries so severely, however, the state con 
tinued to experience deficits despite a major increase in tax 
collections. Between 1980 and 1982, total contributions more
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than doubled, from $79 to $166 million. Nevertheless, loans 
were still needed and in 1983 the loan total ($152 million) ex 
ceeded the sum for the preceding three years. As long as coal 
production remains depressed, it appears West Virginia will 
continue to experience UI trust fund deficits.
Debt accumulation has been so serious in West Virginia 
that a further set of benefit reductions and tax increases may 
be legislated in 1985. In mid-1983, a Special Commission on 
the Unemployment Compensation Trust Fund was 
formed.The Special Commission has three members each 
from the state senate, the state house of representatives, 
labor and industry, plus the director of the Governor©s Of 
fice of Economic and Community Development and the UI 
Commissioner as an ex-officio member. The Commission is 
due to make legislative recommendations in January 1985.
Unlike other debtor states, West Virginia was under less 
pressure to make large adjustments in net solvency during 
1983 and 1984 as it is not immediately liable for the full in 
terest charges on its interest-bearing debt. Because it raised 
taxes in 1981 causing the 1982 tax rate on total payroll to ex 
ceed 2 percent, the state qualifies for 80 percent interest 
deferrals during 1983-85. The 2 percent tax rate threshold in 
1982 was an alternative interest deferral eligibility criterion 
included in the 1983 Social Security Amendments.
Financial pressures to improve the program©s fiscal 
balance will be increasing in the next few years. FUT penalty 
taxes were first payable in January 1983. Penalty rates for 
the first three years were .3, .6, and .7 percent of federal tax 
able wages. The exact rates in subsequent years are not 
known with certainty. Future increases will be smaller if new 
legislation is enacted. In 1986 and later years there will be no 
interest deferrals, while deferred amounts from earlier years 
will also fall due. Thus, to prevent further debt accumulation 
and to reduce future interest charges, it is clear that West
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Virginia will be under strong pressure to enact a major UI 
legislative package early in 1985. Unlike the states with the 
largest debts, however, the inducement to enact legislation to 
improve the West Virginia UI program©s solvency will be 
stronger in 1985 than it was in 1983 and 1984.
Debtor State Comparisons
The individual state experiences just described show a 
diversity of developments to be expected in the federal-state 
system of unemployment insurance programs. After the 
costs of borrowing increased in 1982, debtor programs were 
placed under greater financial pressure to repay debts and 
prevent the accumulation of sizeable new debts. The volume 
of loan repayments made in 1983 and 1984 (nearly $4 billion 
and $6 billion respectively) and the amount of debtor state 
legislation enacted between late 1982 and early 1984 both in 
dicate a sharp break with the past. The 1983 Social Security 
Amendments provided an added spur to debtor state legisla 
tion by offering an explicit quid pro quo; reduced and/or 
deferred costs of debt in return for a major improvement in 
program solvency.
This section presents a comparative analysis of recent 
debtor state legislation. Although emphasis will be placed on 
common developments across the 10 debtor states, the fact 
of their diversity of circumstances and responses should not 
be downplayed. The following five examples provide good 
indications of debtor state diversity. (1) Minnesota did not 
develop a legislative package in 1983 or 1984 that could be 
enacted, despite accumulating a large interest-bearing debt. 
(2) West Virginia is able to defer most of its 1983-85 interest 
payments because of its 1981 legislation. Thus the pressure 
for new legislation to improve program solvency will be felt 
more acutely in 1985 and 1986 than it was in 1983. (3) New 
Jersey has been retiring debt in the 1980s and does not have
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to contend with interest payments. This helps explain why it 
was slower to act than most other debtor states. (4) When 
Texas and Louisiana acted in late 1982 and early 1983, one 
concern was a desire to retard sharp scheduled increases in 
employer tax rates. They had accumulated interest-bearing 
debts that required legislative remedies, but the tax provi 
sions of their legislative responses precluded these two states 
from financial relief under the 1983 Social Security Amend 
ments. (5) Sunset provisions were included in both the Il 
linois and the Ohio legislation. From the likely sizes of their 
debts in 1985-86, it seems clear that additional legislation will 
be required to ensure permanent improvements in program 
solvency. It would be simpler, but, also incorrect, to discuss 
the financing problem as if it were the same in all states.
Factors Related to Debt Accumulation
Although the general causes for the state UI funding prob 
lem were discussed in chapter 1, there are some additional 
considerations that become obvious after the individual 
debtor states have been studied. Table 2-2 presents state data 
related to three issues: low trust fund balances, liberaliza 
tions in weekly benefits, and unusually high benefit outlays 
in the 1980s.
The minimum reserve ratio multiple of 1.5 is a guideline 
that states can use in determining the adequacy of trust fund 
balances. 54 A state whose reserve ratio multiple falls below 
1.5 is more likely than others to need federal loans following 
the onset of high unemployment. Columns 2, 3, and 4 in 
table 2-2 show reserve ratio multiples in the 10 states one, 
three, and five years before the year of their first loans 
(shown in column 1). Thus, for West Virginia, a state that 
first borrowed in 1980, reserve ratio multiples are shown at 
the start of 1979, 1977, and 1975. Not one of these 10 states 
had a multiple of 1.5 five full years prior to their first loan. 
For all 10 states, these pre-loan years can be characterized as
Table 2-2 
Factors Related to Loans and Debt Accumulation in Ten Debtor States
Reserve ratio multiple 
at the start of selected
pre-loan years
State3
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Texas
Wisconsin
Louisiana
New Jersey
Minnesota
West Virginia
Year of
first
loan
(1)
1975b
1975
1975b
1977
1982
1982
1982
1975
1975
1980
One
year
prior
(2)
.64
.75
.57
.37
.40
.58
.63
.29
.61
.34
Three
years
prior
(3)
.98
.60
.40
1.06
.68
.93
.46
.57
.76
.54
Five
years
prior
(4)
1.24
1.17
.85
1.07
.55
.54
.83
1.22
1.11
1.10
Effect of weekly benefit liberalizations
on average gross wage replacement rate
First full
year of higher
benefits
(5)
1972
1976
1982
1975
1978
NA
1977
NA
1976
1981
Replacement
rate in
that year
(6)
.424
.412
.415
.400
.302
NA
.404
NA
.410
.366
Two-year
change in
replacement rate
(7)
.063
.069
.099
.069
.030
NA
.058
NA
.021
.076d
Year of highest
benefit cost
rate 1947-82
(8)
1982
1982
1958C
1982
1958
1982
1982
1975
1982
1982
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SOURCE: Data in columns (l)-(4) and (6)-(8) taken from Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Column (8) refers to benefits as a
percent of total payroll. Column (6) refers to the ratio of average weekly benefits to average weekly wages. Column (5) based on the author©s
judgment about state law changes.
a. States are arrayed by the absolute size of their outstanding debt as of December 31, 1983.
b. This refers to the first loan after 1970.
c. The second highest benefit cost year was 1982.
d. This change refers to the four-year period from 1977 to 1981 because benefit liberalizations occurred in 1978, 1979, and 1980.
NA - Not applicable as there was no major liberalization of the benefit formula.
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ones of low and/or declining reserve positions. Had actions 
been taken to increase trust fund balances when the multiples 
fell below 1.5, there would not have been much large-scale 
borrowing and debt accumulation in subsequent years.
Some readers may consider a minimum reserve ratio 
multiple of 1.5 to be too conservative a standard for judging 
trust fund adequacy. With the numerous and severe reces 
sions experienced since 1969, there has been such a 
widespread loss of reserve adequacy that fewer and fewer 
states have met the 1.5 multiple standard. Even if a lower 
ratio of 1.0 were to be considered as minimally adequate, 
however, all states in table 2-2 still had inadequate reserve 
positions well before their first year of borrowing. Only one 
(Wisconsin©s) of the 10-state multiples exceeded 1.0 three 
years prior to the year of their first loan. From these data it is 
hardly surprising that these particular states required loans.
One development that took place in most of the 10 debtor 
states before or at the time of their need for loans was a 
significant liberalization in weekly benefits. Columns 5-7 of 
table 2-2 identify the timing of benefit liberalizations in eight 
states and associated changes in gross replacement rates 
(average weekly benefits paid as a proportion of average 
weekly wages in covered employment). In six of the eight 
states the gross replacement rate rose by at least .058; per 
centage increases in this rate among the six ranged from 17 to 
31 percent. These liberalizations significantly raised the ratio 
of weekly benefits-to-weekly wages and thus increased the 
amounts that the debtor states needed to borrow. 55
The weekly benefit liberalizations noted in table 2-2 
became fully effective in different years ranging from 1972 in 
Pennsylvania to 1982 in Michigan. Because they were spread 
out, their individual year-to-year effects on the U.S. average 
replacement rate in national data are not large. Table 2-2 
shows only a small increase in the overall replacement rate
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between 1970 and 1982. When the individual states are ex 
amined, however, it becomes obvious that benefit liberaliza 
tions have contributed to the funding problems of several 
debtor states.
Finally, column 8 in table 2-2 shows that unusually heavy 
demands for benefits have been made in most debtor states 
in the 1980s. For seven of the ten, 1982 was the highest year 
of relative benefit costs for the entire period between 1947 
and 1982. In Michigan 1982 was the second highest year of 
benefit costs for this 36-year period. The high benefit cost 
rate years shown in column 8 mirror the high unemployment 
rates shown previously in column 3 of table 2-1. Texas and 
New Jersey have had lower than average unemployment in 
the 1980s and this is reflected in table 2-2, i.e., their highest 
benefit cost rate occurred prior to the 1980s.
From the state data appearing in table 2-2, three factors 
are seen to contribute to funding problems in the ten states. 
(1) They had low trust fund balances for several years prior 
to their first loans. (2) Significant liberalizations in weekly 
benefits occurred prior to or at the time of their borrowing. 
(3) Due primarily to high unemployment, they have been 
faced with unusually heavy demands for benefit payments in 
the 1980s.
Sizes of Deficits and Sizes of Adjustments
Table 2-3 presents summary measures of debts, deficits in 
1980-83 and the projected fund impact of recent legislation 
enacted in the ten states. Column 1 shows their outstanding 
debts at the end of 1983. To provide a sense for the scale of 
the individual UI programs and the extent of their recent 
fiscal imbalances, columns 2 and 3 respectively show annual 
averages of benefits as a percent of total payrolls for the 
years 1979-82 and the average annual increase in debt during 
1980-83 expressed as a percent of total payrolls for 1979. For 
the U.S. as a whole, benefits averaged 1.29 percent of
Table 2-3 
Debts and Effects of Recent Legislation to Improve UI Program Solvency, Ten Debtor States
Annual average
State3
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Texas
Wisconsin
Louisiana
New Jersey
Minnesota
West Virginia
Debt
outstanding
December 31,
1983 ($000)
(1)
2,617
2,423
2,322
1,976
685
626
476
422
352
288
Benefits paid
as a percent of
total payrolls
1979-82
(2)
1.66
1.86
2.27
1.85
.40
1.61
1.33
1.72
1.36
2.15
Debt change
(1980-83)
as a percent of
1979
total payrolls
(3)
.70
.64
1.27
.99
.29
.80
.75
-.17
.51
1.05
Date of major
UI legislation
(4)
July 1983
April 1983
December 1982
June 1983
May 1983
April 1983
January 1983
March 1984
NA
1981
Average annual
solvency change
(1983-86)
as a percent of
1982 total
payrolls
(5)
1.18
.75
1.64
.82b
.32C
M2H
.31 d
.14e
NA
g
Eligibility in
Deferral
of interest
(6)
1983-85
1983-84
1983-85
1983-85
No
1983-85
No
Nof
NA
1983-85
1983-85 for:
Reduced
interest
rate
(7)
1983
No
1983-85
1983
No
1983-85
No
Nof
NA
No
SOURCES: Column (2) taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (1), (3), and (5) are 
based on data from the U.S. Labor Department and the UI programs in the individual states. Calculations underlying columns (3) and (5) made 
at The Urban Institute.
a. States arranged by the absolute size of their outstanding debt as of December 31, 1983. 
b. Average based on the three years 1983-85.
c. The tax increases refer just to taxes levied in 1983-86 to restore solvency to the Texas UI trust fund, 
d. Based on estimates of tax increases and benefit reductions made at The Urban Institute, 
e. Average based on the four years 1984-87. 
f. New Jersey has no interest bearing debt.
g. West Virginia qualifies for 80 percent interest deferrals in 1983-85 because 1981 state legislation caused the ratio of taxes to total payroll to ex 
ceed 2 percent in 1982. This is the alternative criterion for obtaining interest deferrals. 
NA - Not applicable as no major bill was enacted in 1983 or 1984.
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payroll in the 1979-82 period. Thus seven of the ten states 
have paid unusually high amounts of benefits, with average 
payout rates ranging 1.61 to 2.27 percent of payroll. Loui 
siana and Minnesota have had somewhat above average 
benefit payout rates and Texas stands out for its very low 
rate of benefit payouts. As can be seen from column 3, nine 
of the ten states (all but New Jersey) increased their in 
debtedness in 1980-83. Like Pennsylvania and Illinois, New 
Jersey entered the 1980s with a large UI debt, but it reduced 
its debt by $230 million (from $652 to $422 million) in these 
four years. In eight states, annual debt accumulation during 
1980-83 averaged at least .5 percent of total payrolls, and in 
three (Michigan, Ohio and West Virginia) it averaged 1 per 
cent or more. Texas is again unusual in that it has had a low 
rate of debt accumulation compared to the other eight states 
with increased 1980-83 debts.
The timing of the recent UI legislation is shown in column 
4. Five states enacted major bills between April and July 
1983. Michigan and Louisiana had already enacted major 
legislation prior to April 1983. 56 In New Jersey and Min 
nesota, bills were introduced but not enacted in the 1983 
legislative session. A New Jersey bill was subsequently pass 
ed in March 1984, but a 1984 Minnesota bill failed to be 
enacted. Only in West Virginia has there been no attempt to 
pass a major piece of UI legislation between December 1982 
and mid-1984. However, it qualifies for 1983-85 interest 
deferrals because of unusually high 1982 tax rates that are 
partly the result of its 1981 legislation. Thus, eight of the ten 
states enacted major legislation between the end of 1982 and 
March 1984.
In five states (Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Wisconsin) the recent legislation will cause a large improve 
ment in UI program solvency. Column 5 shows that the 
estimated average annual change in solvency (tax increases 
plus benefit reductions) for 1983-86, expressed as a percent
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of 1982 total payrolls, equals or exceeds .75 percent in these 
states. In each of the five, the change in program solvency 
compares favorably with the column 3 rate of debt ac 
cumulation experienced during 1980-83.
To qualify for the financial advantages offered by the 
1983 Social Security Amendments, a state must make 
minimum improvements in "net solvency" with that term 
given a very specific meaning. The improvement in net 
solvency is measured as the sum of two percentage changes: 
(1) the percentage reduction in annual benefit payments 
compared to a baseline projection of benefits under the 
previous law and (2) the percentage increase in annual tax 
revenues compared to projected revenues under the previous 
law. If the sum of these two percentage changes is 25 percent 
in 1983, the state qualifies for a deferral of 80 percent of its 
1983 interest payments. The required percentages of net 
solvency gains for interest deferrals rise to 35 and then to 50 
percent in the two subsequent years. Even larger increases in 
net solvency (50, 80, and 90 percent in the first, second and 
third years respectively) qualify the state for a lower interest 
rate on its debts. Columns 6 and 7 show the states that 
qualify for interest deferrals and lower interest rates. Six 
qualify for interest deferrals57 and four for lower interest 
rates. Five of the six that can defer interest are the same 
states where the column 5 percentage is at least .75 percent. 
Clearly, all five have benefited from the financial provisions 
of the 1983 Social Security Amendments. Only Illinois in this 
group fails to qualify for a lower interest rate sometime in 
the 1983-85 period.
The other three states with recent law changes (Texas, 
Louisiana, and New Jersey) also warrant additional com 
ments. The scale of their net solvency adjustments is much 
smaller than in the five other states. In column 5, the ad 
justments as a percent of 1982 payroll range from .14 to .32 
percent. Even though they do not qualify for favorable treat-
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ment of interest payments under the 1983 Social Security 
Amendments, these states can benefit from 1982 TEFRA 
provisions affecting PUT penalty taxes. New Jersey, in fact, 
will save on these taxes as a result of its 1984 legislation. 58 
Since the state has only old debt, i.e., pre-1980 debt, there 
are no interest charges to be saved or deferred. Texas and 
Louisiana have interest-bearing debts. Both will reduce 
future indebtedness because taxes have been raised and/or 
benefits have been reduced. (In Texas, all of the adjustments 
have taken the form of tax increases.) However, as noted 
above, the tax increases resulting from bills passed in 1982 
and 1983 will actually be lower in 1983 (and again in 1985 in 
Texas) than what would have occurred under the 1982 laws 
in effect when debts were first incurred. Thus the Texas and 
Louisiana tax changes represent tax reductions, i.e., reduc 
tions from previously scheduled tax increases, even though 
the average tax rate on employers will increase noticeably in 
both 1983 and 1984. Consequently, Texas and Louisiana do 
not qualify for interest deferrals.
Employer Tax Increases Versus Benefit Reductions
One of the issues addressed by recent legislation in eight of 
the debtor states is the ratio of employee sacrifices (benefit 
reductions and, in two states, employee tax increases) to 
employer sacrifices, i.e., higher employer taxes. Inability to 
resolve this issue in Minnesota is a major reason why the 
state did not enact important legislation in 1983-84. In the 
eight states there was a varied mix of employee and employer 
sacrifices. All enacted employer tax increases and seven (all 
but Texas) made benefit reductions.
For the eight UI programs table 2-4 shows that aggregate 
benefit reductions plus employee tax increases projected for 
the 1983-86 period were $3.7 billion and that employer tax 
increases were $8.2 billion. Thus the total change in solvency 
was $12.0 billion and the employer share was .689. Employer
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shares of the total change (column 9) ranged from 1.00 in 
Texas to .475 in Louisiana. Thus the relative political effec 
tiveness of business and labor representatives in protecting 
their own constituents© interests varied considerably across 
the eight states.
Because of the 1983 legislation, debtor states were able to 
reduce 1983-86 interest payments and PUT penalty taxes. 
For the eight jurisdictions, total reductions were $2,913 
million with $2,199 million in reduced interest payments59 
and $714 million in reduced PUT penalty taxes. Columns 4 
and 5 in table 2-4 show the estimated dollar amounts for 
these two items in each state. If these savings had not occur 
red, employers in the debtor states would be required to pay 
higher payroll taxes during 1983-86. Thus the tax increases 
legislated in 1983 overstate the true increases in employer 
taxes that will occur in the 1983-86 period.
Column 3 shows net employer tax increases for 1983-86, 
the difference between the legislated increases and the sav 
ings on interest payments and PUT penalty taxes. The latter 
equal 35 percent of the legislated tax increases. Columns 8 
and 10 then show net changes in program solvency and the 
employer share after recognizing these savings. For the eight 
states, the net increase in program solvency was $9.0 billion 
and the employer share was .588. In the individual states the 
employer share of the net change ranges from a low of .39 in 
Louisiana to 1.0 in Texas. The employer share of the ag 
gregate sacrifice (benefit reductions plus tax increases) is 
thus reduced from .689 to .588 when these employer tax sav 
ings are recognized.
Table 2-4 shows that nearly $3 billion in interest charges 
and PUT penalty taxes will be avoided in 1983-86 as a conse 
quence of solvency legislation in the debtor states. It should 
be emphasized that almost all of the relief is just a deferral of 
financial obligations, not an outright reduction in such
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obligations. Because PUT penalty taxes have been capped 
and interest payment schedules have been lengthened, both 
forms of repayment activities have only been delayed and 
will now entail increased state financial obligations in the 
period from 1987 to 1989. Should the overall economy ex 
perience another recession in the latter half of the 1980s, 
these deferred financial obligations will fall due at a most in 
opportune time.
Changes in Individual Program Provisions
To improve program solvency, all eight debtor states have 
enacted multiple changes in their statutes governing benefits 
and taxes. Table 2-5 shows the changes affecting weekly 
benefits, weeks per beneficiary, base period earnings re 
quirements, disqualifications and employee taxes. Seven 
states enacted benefit reductions and two raised taxes on 
employees. At least three provisions were changed in each of 
the seven states. Thus the states have relied on multiple 
statutory changes in extracting sacrifices from employees.
The most common benefit changes were freezing max 
imum weekly benefits, lowering statutory replacement rates 
and requiring increased weekly earnings in computing base 
period credit weeks. Effects of these changes on average 
weekly benefits are already apparent. For the U.S. as a 
whole, average weekly benefits only increased from $119.34 
in 1982 to $123.55 in 1983. The increase (3.5 percent) is the 
smallest percentage increase in weekly benefits since 1965. 
This low growth in weekly benefits is partly due to a 
slowdown in the overall rate of wage inflation. Also, 
however, many debtor states have frozen their weekly 
benefit maximums through the end of 1985 or 1986. Thus 
smaller overall percentage increases in weekly benefits will 
persist for at least two more years and will cause some reduc 
tion in the overall replacement rate.
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Table 2-5
1983 Changes in UI Provisions Affecting Workers 
in Seven Debtor States9
_____Provisions and change______PA IL MI OH WI LA NJ
Weekly benefit amount:
Freeze maximum Xb X X X X c 
Lower replacement rate XXX X 
Lower wage basis X 
Round down weekly benefit X X
Regular duration of 
weeks payable: 
End retroactive payment of the
waiting week X XX 
Lower maximum duration 
payable X XX
Base period requirements 
(mimimum):
Increase weeks of work (or 
high quarter or
weekly benefit multiple) X X 
Increased earnings per week 
(or quarter or year) XXX X
Disqualifications: 
Stiffen penalties X X
Employee taxes: 
Add or increase X X
SOURCE: Based on materials previously described in this chapter using state and other
sources noted therein.
a. These are seven of the ten states with the largest debts as of December 31, 1983. The
other three states did not change their benefit provisions in this period.
b. Maximum set at one level from April 1983 to January 1984 and then at a higher level
from February 1984 to June 1986.
c. Maximum weekly benefits were increased under New Jersey©s legislation.
Multiple changes were made in all eight states in employer 
tax provisions. Table 2-6 displays important tax changes by 
state. Five raised the taxable wage base per employee and all 
made changes in tax rates. Typically, flat rate taxes and 
percentage surtaxes, as well as a wider range of experience 
rated tax rates, were all affected by the legislation.
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Table 2-6
1983 Changes in Employer UI Tax Provisions 
in Eight Debtor States3
Provision and change
Higher taxable wage base
Higher taxes:
Flat rate taxes
Percentage surtaxes
Increased range of tax rates
Higher taxes for negative
balance employers:
Modify tax rate limiters
Increased account
building taxes
Eliminate writeoffs of
negative balances
Surtax for negative balances
PA
X
X
X
X
X
IL
X
X
X
X
MI OH TX
X X
X X
X
XXX
X
X
X
WI
X
X
X
X
X
X
LA
X
X
X
X
NJ
b
X
X
SOURCE: Based on materials previously described in this chapter using state and other
sources noted therein.
a. These are eight of the ten states with the largest debts as of December 31, 1983. The other
two states did not change their tax provisions in this period.
b. State has an indexed taxable wage base that was not affected by its recent legislation.
Although five debtor states raised the taxable wage base, 
they did not go that far above the federal taxable wage base 
and not one of the five indexed its wage base. In 1985, while 
the current FUT tax base of $7,000 is still slated to be in ef 
fect, the five state maximums will be as follows: Penn 
sylvania-SB,000; Illinois-$8,500; Michigan-$9,000; 
Ohio-$8,000; and Wisconsin-$9,500. Not one will have 
reached $10,000 by 1985. Since all five are high wage states, 
they will continue to tax less than half of all covered wages 
even after the increases in their taxable wage bases. This 
could contribute to renewed problems of revenue inadequacy 
in future years.
A controversial issue in nearly all states was how the 
burden of tax increases was to be allocated between 
employers with positive and negative account balances. 60
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Many researchers and others with a policy interest in state UI 
programs feel that a greater degree of reliance should be 
placed on experience rated employer taxes. A provision of 
TEFRA enacted in 1982 called for all states to have a max 
imum employer tax rate of at least 5.4 percent by 1985. 
These considerations would lead one to expect debtor states 
to raise maximum employer tax rates and make other 
changes to increase the degree of experience rating. One 
manifestation that experience rating has become more per 
vasive would be higher taxes on employers with negative ac 
count balances. Table 2-6 shows that such changes were 
enacted in 1983 in Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, and 
Louisiana. Michigan in particular made three changes to in 
crease taxes on negative balance employers. By avoiding very 
large flat rate surcharges in their 1983 legislation, it seems 
clear that Texas and Louisiana have increased their degree of 
experience rating. Because five of the debtor states in table 
2-6 raised their taxable wage base, this change will also help 
the states to impose higher effective tax rates on employers 
with low and negative balances. This too can enhance the ef 
fective degree of experience rating.
A full assessment of the experience rating issue cannot be 
made here, but table 2-7 presents some useful summary data 
on recent changes in minimum and maximum employer tax 
rates in all 10 debtor states. The table covers the years 1978, 
1982 and 1986. Only three states changed minimum tax rates 
between 1978 and 1982 (Pennsylvania, Illinois, and West 
Virginia), and in each the change was the result of legislation 
enacted in 1980 or 1981. Between 1982 and 1986, however, 
four states will have raised minimum rates. The 1986 
minimum rates will be 2 percent or higher in only two states 
(Pennsylvania and West Virginia) and the arithmetic average 
of the ten is only 1.15 percent.
Maximum tax rates will increase measurably between 1978 
and 1986 with much more than half of the total of the change
D
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occurring after 1982. Note that seven of the maximum rates 
already exceeded 5.4 percent in 1982, three years before they 
are mandated under TEFRA to reach this level. By 1986 the 
lowest of these state maximum rates will be 7.0 percent, a 
full 1.6 percentage points above 5.4 percent. Thus the in 
crease in the required maximum rate does not appear to have 
affected these debtor states in an important way.
Recent state legislation clearly has increased the range of 
experience rated tax rates. In the eight states with recent 
legislation, the range of rates in 1986 is wider than in 1982 
and in three (Pennsylvania, Texas, and Louisiana) the in 
creased range is at least 3 full percentage points. From table 
2-7 it is clear the recent legislation has definitely increased 
the potential degree of experience rating and probably the 
actual degree as well. A more definitive conclusion would re 
quire an examination of micro data on employer tax rates.
Summary
By requiring interest payments on new loans made after 
March 31, 1982, the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act significantly increased the costs of UI debts. The 1983 
Social Security Amendments offered debtor states a quid pro 
quo: the ability to reduce and defer the costs of debt in 
return for enacting legislation to improve UI program 
solvency. From the events described earlier in this chapter, it 
is clear that most debtor states responded by enacting major 
legislative packages that raised taxes and reduced benefits.
Because debtor UI programs have enacted major changes 
to improve fiscal solvency, they will be less likely to incur 
future debts. It is also clear that when future debts are incur 
red they will be repaid much more quickly than they were in 
the 1970s. A major change in repayment behavior is already 
evident in the 1983 and 1984 repayment data shown in table 
1-3 of chapter 1.
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To achieve improvements in program solvency, debtor 
states have enacted mutiple changes in both their tax and 
benefit statutes. In the aggregate, the shares of the total 
sacrifice in eight large debtor states for the 1983-86 period 
are roughly 69 percent employer tax increases and 31 percent 
benefit reductions. These respective percentage shares 
change to 59 and 41 percent when other employer tax savings 
gained in the period due to improved solvency (reduced PUT 
penalty taxes and reduced and deferred interest payments) 
are considered. It also appears that the recent legislation will 
cause these UI programs to place a greater degree of reliance 
on experience rated employer taxes.
In the future, state UI programs will be more financially 
self-reliant and there will be less federal monies involved in 
benefit provision, i.e., fewer loans to debtor UI programs, 
faster debt repayment and fewer EB benefit payments. This 
is a change desired by the Reagan administration. Their 1981 
legislative initiatives are largely responsible for this change in 
behavior at the state level.
NOTES
1. Both types of debt measures are important. Absolute debt shows 
where the macro debt problem resides. Relative debt is useful for show 
ing which states are apt to have more difficulties in repaying their loans.
2. The 1980 Pennsylvania legislation is described by Runner (1981).
3. Tax rates would have risen even more in 1980-82 if Pennsylvania 
hadn©t allowed experience rated employers to deduct their PUT penalty 
taxes in the determination of the flat rate UI taxes owed to the state. If 
this deduction feature had not been present, average state tax rates (col 
umn 15 of table Al) would have been between 4.7 and 4.8 percent in the 
1980-82 period.
4. See McCormick (1983).
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5. See State of Pennsylvania (1983), p. 13. These estimates are based on 
data taken from the October 1983 forecast for the State of Pennsylvania 
made by Chase Econometrics Inc. Using an earlier January 1983 Chase 
forecast, the total change in program solvency for the 1983-86 period was 
estimated to be $2,798 million, somewhat larger than the estimate based 
on the October forecast ($2,712 million).
6. These estimates were made at The Urban Institute.
7. For background on the 1975 Illinois legislation see Decker (1981), pp. 
33-36.
8. For the three-year period 1980-82, benefits were 1.98, 1.89, and 2.42 
percent of total payroll respectively. The highest previous benefit payout 
rates were 1.75 percent in 1975, 1.70 percent in 1958, and 1.69 percent in 
1976.
9. See Runner (1982).
10. People in Illinois have argued that an important reason for having 
the sunset provision was the uncertainty about how the legislation would 
affect benefits and revenues. The sunset provision ensures that after ex 
perience accumulates under the new law there will be a need to evaluate 
its effects and an opportunity to remedy any defects found in its actual 
operation. It could also be argued that the sunset provision reflects the 
poor understanding of many in Illinois about the seriousness of the 
state©s UI funding problem and wishful thinking that the debt will go 
away by mid-1986.
11. The exact level of these maximum rates will be determined after state 
benefit experiences are known. As of mid-1984 it seems the actual max- 
imums will be at or near the top of these ranges. The top rate for 1984, 
for example, is 6.3 percent.
12. The legislation also created a tax incentive to encourage employment 
retention (termed an Employment Incentive Program). Under this pro 
gram an employer with years of bad layoff experiences could potentially 
reduce UI taxes. If such employers reduced layoffs and raised total 
employment, maximum tax rates could decline. This provision could 
have a measurable effect on tax revenues in 1986 and later years (after 
years of bad experience are eligible for removal from the time period us 
ed for tax rate computations) but it is still too early to assess how large 
the effect may be.
13. There is also a question about the breakdown between tax increases 
and benefit reductions. Some have suggested the actual breakdown of
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sacrifices is closer to 50-50 than to the 60-40 split shown in publications 
issued by Illinois. The actuarial estimates used here are the data released 
to the public at the time of the 1983 legislation. See State of Illinois 
(1983).
14. These estimates were made at The Urban Institute.
15. See Blaustein (1981) for a description of this 1980 law.
16. Employer representatives felt there would be substantial savings to 
offset much of the extra costs arising from higher weekly benefits. Note 
in column 10 of table A3 that the ratio of insured-to-total unemployment 
did fall sharply between 1980 and 1981. The decline is partly the result of 
the 1980 legislation, but also it reflects benefit exhaustions. It is not clear 
what part of this decline should be attributed to the 1980 bill.
17. These calculations were made assuming that weekly benefits in 1981 
and 1982 averaged $102, i.e., their 1980 level.
18. See chapter 3 in Blaustein (1982).
19. See State of Michigan (1983) for a summary of the legislation. The 
Bureau of Research and Statistics of the Michigan Employment Security 
Commission estimated the effects on benefits and revenues.
20. This estimate was made at The Urban Institute.
21. In fact the 1982 Michigan law was one factor behind the debtor state 
financial relief provisions included in the 1983 Social Security Amend 
ments.
22. This estimate was made at The Urban Institute.
23. See Hemmerly (1983) for a description of important provisions in 
both bills and estimates of their effects on revenues and benefit payments 
during 1983-85. The sunset provision in the 1983 Ohio legislation partly 
reflects continued employer optimism about future growth, hence less 
need for long-run legislative remedies.
24. Hemmerly (1983).
25. Included in the total tax increases are small amounts raised by taxing 
new employers at a higher rate and increasing the interest penalty on 
delinquent tax payments. Also, there was a small benefit reduction ($13 
million) caused by changing the requalification provision for workers 
who quit their jobs voluntarily.
26. These estimates were made at The Urban Institute.
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27. This projection was made in early 1983.
28. For a description of the 1982 bill see Texas Research League (1982).
29. State of Texas (1983), p. 3.
30. See Texas Research League (1983).
31. Estimates of revenues generated by the 1983 UI legislation are based 
on projections of taxable wages and average tax rates that appear in Ar 
thur Anderson and Co. (1983).
32. Projections of potential future indebtedness appear in table 6 of 
State of Wisconsin (1983).
33. The actuarial estimates published by the State of Wisconsin (1983) 
show effects of changing individual provisions while holding all others 
constant. As a consequence, the sum of their effects on benefits exceeds 
the total for all benefit changes. The estimates shown here have been 
deflated so that their sum agrees with the total estimated cutback in 
benefits.
34. Data provided by Clifford Miller, Wisconsin Department of In 
dustry. Subsequent experience in Wisconsin under the new quit provi 
sions suggests this estimated savings in benefit outlays is too large.
35. See State of Wisconsin (1983).
36. See State of Wisconsin (1983), table 26.
37. Major provisions of the 1983 legislation are described by Runner 
(1984).
38. No data have been found to show the budgetary effects of the in 
dividual changes or of the entire 1983 Louisiana legislative package.
39. After all loans have been repaid there will continue to be a surtax 
provision in the state©s law. A surtax of 10 percent will be levied in any 
year when the trust fund balance as of the previous June 30 falls below 
$400 million.
40. This projected range is built up from the sum of three separate taxes; 
(i) the basic experience rated tax (.3-6.0 percent), (ii) a 30 percent solven 
cy surtax (.09-1.8 percent) and (iii) taxes for social charges (.03-5.0 per 
cent), after rounding to the nearest tenth of a percentage point.
41. An estimate of 3.8 percent under the previous law was made at The 
Urban Institute based on the time series pattern of earlier data, par-
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ticularly the pattern of changes in tax rates between 1978 and 1979 when 
tax rates moved to the highest tax rate schedule under the previous law.
42. Louisiana has not published estimates of the increases in program 
solvency resulting from its 1983 legislation. Rough estimates made at The 
Urban Institute show taxes to be $126 million higher and benefits to be 
$139 million lower during 1983-86 as a result of the legislation. Net 
solvency is estimated to be 5 percent lower in 1983 but then 17, 26, and 29 
percent higher in the next three years.
43. In 1977, for example, taxes were 4.15 percent of taxable payroll. New 
Jersey taxes covered employees at a flat .5 percent rate as well as taxing 
employers. Thus the 4.15 average percentage rate consists of a .5 percent 
tax on employees and an average 3.65 percent tax on employers.
44. These estimates were made at The Urban Institute using information 
supplied by the State of New Jersey.
45. New Jersey has a Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) program 
that is financed by employer and employee contributions. Monies were 
transferred from the TDI trust fund to the UI trust fund.
46. Some other benefit provisions were also changed but their financial 
effects were too small to be estimated.
47. When New Jersey©s TDI program was originally established, a TDI 
trust fund was created by transferring $50 million from the UI trust 
fund. The transferred monies were employee UI tax contributions. Thus, 
the transferral of the $50 million back to the UI trust fund should be con 
sidered as employee taxes.
48. In the absence of 1984 legislation, New Jersey might have qualified 
for a freeze in its PUT penalty tax rates at .6 percent under the four 
TEFRA conditions for a tax rate freeze.
49. This estimate was made at The Urban Institute.
50. State officials have offered two reasons why trust fund balances were 
not increased to higher levels: (i) the availability of interest-free loans 
from the U.S. Treasury and (ii) concerns by employers that a substantial 
accumulation in the trust fund could lead to further benefit liberaliza 
tions.
51. Two were the compensation of school bus drivers employed by 
private bus companies and compensation of permanent part-time 
workers who are laid off. Both issues affect small numbers of 
beneficiaries.
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52. Michigan©s 1983 unemployment rate of 14.2 percent was the second 
highest among all the states.
53. West Virginia has four tax rate schedules for its experience rated tax 
rate, all with a maximum rate of 7.5 percent but with minimum rates 
ranging from 0 to 1.5 percent. Thus the range of experience rated tax 
rates can be from 6.0 to 7.5 percentage points. The widest range applies 
when the trust fund balance exceeds 150 percent of average benefit costs 
for the preceding three years.
54. Recall that the reserve ratio multiple is the ratio of two ratios; the 
trust fund balance (as proportion of covered wages and salaries in the 
current year) divided by benefit payments for the previous highest cost 
year (as a proportion of that year©s covered wages and salaries).
55. Replacement rates are known to increase in recessions. Thus some of 
the increases reflected in column 7 of table 2-2 could be linked to the 
business cycle. To determine that the cyclical effects are small the reader 
should examine column 11 in tables A1-A10. In no state did the replace 
ment rate return to (or come close to) its previous level in later years 
following the benefit liberalization.
56. The Texas legislation of September 1982 and Ohio legislation of 
December 1982 were also intended to address their states© financing 
problems, but did not.
57. All but West Virginia qualify for interest deferrals on the basis of 
their 1983 (December 1982 in Michigan) legislation.
58. Its PUT penalty tax rate for the 1985 and 1986 payments is .6 percent 
rather than .8 percent.
59. The deferred interest payments in 1983-85 will have to be repaid, but 
the deferrals will presumably cause the payments to fall due in years of 
improved state finances and higher employer profit rates.
60. A negative balance employer is one whose cumulative benefit 
payments (measured from the date of initial UI coverage) exceed 
cumulative tax contributions.
3 
Conditions of Debt Avoidance
Although 37 of 51 state UI programs needed federal UI 
loans some time between 1972 and 1983, prolonged and 
large-scale indebtedness has been avoided in most states. The 
factors or events that lead to a state©s need for UI loans can 
be grouped into two broad categories: controllable and un 
controllable. Individual states can do very little to control 
their unemployment rate or their rate of economic growth. 
At any point in time the UI trust fund balance, which mir 
rors both past policy actions affecting program solvency and 
past economic events must also be taken as a given. What the 
state can control are the statutory provisions and ad 
ministrative practices that affect UI revenues and benefit 
payments.
The present chapter examines general issues related to debt 
avoidance. Of the three uncontrollable factors (unemploy 
ment, economic growth and the current trust fund balance), 
the latter two are to be discussed. Unemployment has 
already received attention in chapters 1 and 2. The impor 
tance of active UI policy responses is to be emphasized here. 
The plan of the analysis is to start with one of the uncon 
trollable factors, trust fund balances as of 1969. Next, active 
policy responses are examined. In addition to summarizing 
the range of responses, one particular response, tax base in 
dexing, is singled out for special attention. After the effects
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of economic growth on trust fund balances are discussed, the 
chapter concludes with a few summary observations.
The analytic approach to be followed in the chapter is to 
review selected data from all 51 jurisdictions and try to iden 
tify the characteristics of state programs that are associated 
with successful debt avoidance or the avoidance of large 
scale borrowing. The analysis is descriptive and the conclu 
sions will be more tentative than definitive, because some 
states continued to borrow in 1984, because legislation to 
strengthen fiscal solvency may yet occur in 1985, and 
because with lags in data availability, information on state 
adjustments to their financing problems in the early 1980s is 
still incomplete. Therefore, the analysis will focus heavily on 
the developments in the 1970s as well as events of the present 
decade.
To place the UI borrowing and debt accumulation of the 
individual states during the 1970s and 1980s into a common 
perspective, table 3-1 displays selected data on borrowing. 
As noted, 37 jurisdictions borrowed at least once between 
1972 and 1983, and loans are shown for two periods, 1972-79 
and 1980-83. For both periods the tables shows the absolute 
amount of loans obtained and loans measured as a percent 
age of total payrolls. 1
During the 1970s, loans were made to 23 programs but on 
ly 10 required amounts that exceeded $100 million (column 
1). When loans are measured relative to the size of each 
state©s total payroll (column 2) there are 13 states where 
loans exceeded 1 percent of 1975 payrolls and 7 of these 
states are located in the North East region. In 1980-83, loans 
were made to 29 states but only in 13 did the total exceed 1 
percent of 1979 payrolls (column 4). Among this group of 
13,6 were located in the North Central region. Using 1 per 
cent of total covered wages to define large relative loan 
amounts, roughly one-quarter of the states needed large
Conditions of Debt Avoidance 127
Table 3-1
UI Loans to Individual States 1972-79 and 1980-83 
and Outstanding Debt as of December 31,1983 (37 States)
State
Total: 37 states3
Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Hawaii
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
North Dakota
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Loans in
Amount 
($ millions) 
(1)
5,532
57
30
514
47
74
42
22
946
36
63
265
624
172
10
8
735
336
2
18
1,222
111
48
149
1972-79
Percent 
of total 
1975 
payrolls 
(2)
1.0
.8
.8
5.0
2.4
2.2
.2
1.0
2.5
1.8
.6
1.6
2.3
1.6
.8
.4
3.3
.6
.0
.3
3.6
4.0
4.8
1.6
Loans in
Amount 
($ millions) 
(3)
14,903
56
118
150
64
25
34
2,547
64
253
250
528
1
3,044
550
143
9
78
17
2,310
2,587
18
6
60
803
29
11
46
302
802
1980-83
Percent 
of total 
1979 
payrolls 
(4)
1.6
.5
1.8
1.2
.4
.9
.8
4.4
.3
2.4
2.1
3.3
.0
6.7
3.2
.7
.3
.2
.9
4.6
5.2
.5
.1
.4
1.3
.6
.7
.2
4.3
4.1
Debt 
outstanding 
as of 
Dec. 31, 1983 
($ millions) 
(5)
13,279
86
113
280
44
64
2,423
127
151
476
2,322
352
90
9
422
1,976
2,617
90
696
25
291
626
SOURCE: Data on loans in columns (1) and (3) based on materials supplied by the U.S. Department of Labor. Payroll 
data used to compute columns (2) and (4) were taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Finan 
cial Data (1984). Column (5) based on U.S. Department of Labor, "Title XII Advance and Repayments as of December 
31, 1983," January 9, 1984.
a. The 14 states which did not borrow in either period were: Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wyoming. 
Washington and Wyoming borrowed in 1984.
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loans in 1972-79 and one-quarter again in 1980-83. Only four 
states (Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania) 
needed loans that exceeded 1 percent of payrolls in both 
periods. Column 5 of table 3-1 shows the amount of each 
state©s debt as of the end of 1983. The 10 with the largest 
debts have already been individually examined in chapter 2. 
Despite the large number that borrowed during the 12-year 
1972-83 period, most states have avoided accumulating ma 
jor debts, including 14 that required no loans at all.
Initial Trust Fund Balances 
and Effective Tax Rate Increases
Perhaps the two most obvious explanations for debt 
avoidance are: (1) that some states entered the 1970s with 
much higher trust fund reserves than others and (2) that 
some states have been quicker to react to declining reserves 
and to raise employer taxes by substantial amounts. Table 
3-2 presents information on trust fund balances at the start 
and end of the 1970s. Three groups of states are identified: 
the 14 that did not borrow between 1972 and 1983 (see foot 
note (a) of table 3-1), the 10 whose loans in the 1970s exceed 
ed $100 million (see column 1 of table 3-1) 2 and the 27 other 
states. The distributions of reserve ratio multiples at the end 
of 1969 and 1979 are shown in the body of table 3-2 along 
with the medians of each distribution. The arrangement of 
the three subgroups of states from left to right in the table is 
a rough indicator of borrowing needs, i.e., from the smallest 
to the greatest needs.
Entering the 1970s, the three groups of states had 
systematic differences in their trust fund balances. The me 
dian reserve ratio multiple for the 14 nonborrowing states 
(2.50) was nearly double the multiple for the 10 with the 
largest loans (1.44). Ten of the former group had multiples 
of 2.0 or larger while six of the latter had multiples below the 
minimum 1.5 level recommended as adequate.
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Table 3-2
Distribution of States by Year-End Reserve Ratio Multiples 
1969 and 1979; States Grouped by Borrowing Characteristics
Number of states by borrowing characteristics
Period and
reserve ratio
multiple
Total
End of 1969
Negative
0-.49
.50-.99
1.00-1.49
1.50-1.99
2.00-2.99
3.00 and above
Median*5
End of 1979
Negative
0-.49
.50-.99
1.00-1.49
1.50-1.99
2.00-2.99
3.00 and above
Median"
All
states
51
0
0
1
15
14
13
8
1.84
9
12
17
11
2
0
0
.63
Did not
borrow
1972-19833
14
0
0
0
2
2
6
4
2.50
0
0
4
8
2
0
0
1.19
All
other
states3
27
0
0
0
8
9
6
4
1.80
4
7
13
3
0
0
0
.60
Ten largest
borrowers
in 1970sa
10
0
0
1
5
3
1
0
1.44
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
.00
SOURCE: Year-end 1979 reserve ratio multiples taken from U.S. Department of Labor,
Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984): year-end 1969 multiples computed at The
Urban Institute based on data from the same source.
a. The identity of individual states within the three groups is indicated in footnote (a) of
table 3-1 and column (1) of table 3-1. The ten largest borrowers are states that borrowed in
excess of $100 million between 1972 and 1979.
b. Computed at The Urban Institute.
The level of initial reserve ratio multiples is clearly 
associated with state borrowing in the 1970s. Sixteen states 
had multiples below 1.5 and 13 needed loans sometime dur 
ing the decade. In contrast, only 3 of the 21 states with initial 
multiples of 2.0 or larger (the District of Columbia, Florida,
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and Washington) needed any loan and only Washington re 
quired a loan in excess of $100 million (although loans to the 
District of Columbia did represent 2.2 percent of 1975 
payrolls). Thus, low initial reserves were one important fac 
tor determining the need for loans in the 1970s.
The bottom half of table 3-2 shows that reserve ratio 
multiples in all three sets of states fell sharply during the 
decade but that the relative rankings of the medians for the 
three groups were preserved. Nonborrowing states had a me 
dian multiple of 1.19 with 10 of 14 being above 1.0 and none 
below .5. Only 5 of the 10 with loans of $100 million or more 
in the 1970s had positive net reserves and not one of this 
group had a reserve ratio multiple as large as .5. As noted in 
chapter 1, only two state UI programs entered the 1980s with 
multiples above 1.5, the recommended minimum guideline 
for trust fund adequacy. 3
Given the generally low levels of 1979 year-end reserve 
ratio multiples, the number of states requiring loans in the 
1980-83 period is, in fact, quite low. Forty-nine states had 
multiples below 1.5 and 29 of them (59 percent) borrowed 
during this four-year period. Compared to the experience of 
the 1970s, this is a much lower proportion, i.e., 13 of 16 (81 
percent) with multiples below 1.5 in 1969 borrowed in the 
1972-79 period. The lower incidence of borrowing in 1980-83 
among states with multiples below 1.5 occurred even though 
the initial distribution in the later period was concentrated 
more heavily at the lower reserve ratio multiples. Of the 
states with initial multiples in the 1.0-1.49 range, for exam 
ple, 12 of 15 (80 percent) borrowed in the 1970s while only 1 
of 11 (9 percent, Wisconsin) borrowed during 1980-83. This 
contrast in borrowing behavior strongly suggests that states 
have been more active in trying to avoid borrowing in the 
1980s when compared to the 1970s.
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To maintain adequate trust fund reserves it is important 
that employer taxes be increased after onset of a recession 
and the associated increase in UI benefit payments. Increases 
in flat rate taxes, proportional tax surcharges, increased 
taxes under pre-existing experience rating schedules and rais 
ing the taxable wage base per worker are the main ways of in 
creasing effective tax rates. States where these changes occur 
quickly are less likely to encounter financing problems than 
states that respond slowly.
Tax increases in states where reserves are declining blunt 
the effectiveness of UI as an automatic stabilizer of 
economic activity. The need for tax increases points up the 
desirability of building adequate reserve balances in periods 
of prosperity. Because recessions have occurred with such 
frequency and severity since 1969, UI programs have not ex 
perienced the sustained periods of prosperity essential for 
rebuilding trust fund reserves. Until large enough reserves 
are re-established states will be required to raise taxes, reduce 
benefits and/or borrow during recessions as a direct conse 
quence of their earlier as well as current inadequate reserve 
balances.
Table 3-3 presents summary information on changes in ef 
fective employer tax rates (based on total payrolls) following 
the major recession of the mid-1970s. The recessionary 
trough occurred in 1975 and the table shows the distribution 
of states by the percent changes in their average effective tax 
rates between 1975 and 1977. 4 For the entire U.S., the me 
dian percentage increase in tax rates was 51 percent. Eleven 
states raised effective tax rates by more than 100 percent and 
31 by at least 40 percent. Among the 10 states with the largest 
loans in the 1970s, the median increase was only 20 percent 
and 3 increased effective tax rates by less than 10 percent. 
For the other two groups of states (the 14 that have never 
borrowed and the remaining 27) the median effective tax rate
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increases were 40 and 63 percent respectively. Proportionate 
ly more states in these latter two categories made large tax 
rate adjustments. The adjustments helped to prevent larger 
debts from being incurred and hastened the pace of debt 
repayment in the late 1970s.
Table 3-3
Distribution of States by Percentage Tax Rate Increases 
Between 1975 and 1977; States Grouped by Borrowing Characteristics
Percent increase 
in average 
employer tax 
rate 1975-773
Total
Negative 
0-9.9
10-19.9
20-39.9
40-59.9
60-79.9
80-99.9
100-149.9
150 and above
Median percent 
increase0
Number of states by borrowing characteristics
All 
states
51
3 
4
6
7
10
5
5
9
2
51
Did not 
borrow 
1972-1983b
14
1 
2
1
3
2
1
1
3
0
40
All 
other 
states"
27
1 
0
3
3
6
3
3
5
2
63
Ten largest 
borrowers 
in 1970sb
10
1 
2
2
1
2
1
1
0
0
20
SOURCE: Average tax rates based on data in U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment
Insurance Financial Data (1984).
a. Effective average tax rates measured as the ratio of total contributions to total covered
wages. Tax rate increases refer to the 1975-77 period in forty-six states and to other periods
in five states. The latter five were Connecticut (1971-77), Illinois (1973-77), New York
(1975-79), Vermont (1973-77) and Washington (1971-77).
b. The identity of individual states within the three groups is indicated in footnote (a) of
table 3-1 and column (1) of table 3-1. The ten largest borrowers are states that borrowed in
excess of $100 million between 1972 and 1979.
c. Computer at The Urban Institute.
From tables 3-2 and 3-3, it is clear that the need for large 
loans in the 1970s was associated with two factors: (i) low in 
itial trust fund reserves and (ii) failure to enact major tax in-
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creases following recessions. The 10 states with the largest 
loans in the 1970s had generally smaller than average reserve 
ratio multiples at the start of the decade and most made 
smaller than average tax rate changes following the onset of 
their financing problems. When they experienced high 
unemployment rates in the 1970s, they needed large loans to 
meet the demand for UI benefit payments.
Active Policies and Debt Avoidance
It is obvious that increasing effective tax rates and reduc 
ing benefit payments are the two ways to improve a UI pro 
gram©s solvency. Chapter 2 documented important solvency 
changes made in 10 major debtor states in the 1980s. The 
issue will be further explored here: first by examining the 10 
states that borrowed the most in the 1970s and then by brief 
ly discussing California and Florida, two states that have 
successfully avoided major debt problems.
Table 3-4 helps in summarizing active policies pursued in 
the 10 states requiring the largest loans in the 1970s. Item 1 
shows total borrowing between 1972 and 1979. Combined, 
the 10 accounted for $5,074 million in loans or 91.1 percent 
of the national total for the period. The first loan year is 
shown in item 2 and for seven states it was 1975.
Key elements of active state policy to improve solvency are 
then identified in items 3 through 7. The time period covered 
by these items is from the first loan year (or just before that 
year) through 1980, i.e., a time period reflecting decisions 
made in the 1970s. High average tax rates based on taxable 
wages are noted in items 3 and 4. Seven states had average 
tax rates that exceeded 3 percent in at least three years and 
three had average rates of 4 percent or more in at least two 
years. These identify the states willing to levy high rates on 
employers. Illinois, Connecticut, and Minnesota are three 
states that did not apply such high tax rates following the 
onset of indebtedness.
Table 3-4
Ten States with the Largest Loans in the 1970s:3 
Policy Actions and Loan Activity
PA IL NJ
(1) Total borrowed in the 1970s 1222 946 735($ millions)
(2) Year of first loan 1975 1975 1975
Average tax rate (based on taxable
wages) after first loan"3
(3) Rate above 3 percent for
3 or more years X X(4) Rate above 4 percent for
2 or more years X
Taxable wage base changes
after first loan »c
(5) Temporary increase to above
PUT taxable wage base
(6) Permanent increase to above
PUT taxable wage base X(7) Freeze on maximum weekly
benefit amount after first loan
(8) 1970s loans fully repaid
(9) 1980-83 unemployment rate 9.7 9.9 7.8(percent)
(10) Major borrowing in the
1980-83 periodd X X
MI CT NY MA MN WA RI
624 514 336 265 172 149 111
1975 1972 1977 1975 1975 1973 1975
X XX XX
X X
XX X
X X
X X
X X X X X
13.6 6.2 8.1 6.7 6.8 10.2 8.3
X X
o
o
1o©
c/j
O
3
o>0"
> 
Oa."
P3 
o n
SOURCES: Items (2)-(6) based on U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Item (7) based on U.S. Department of Labor, "Significant Provisions of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws," various issues. Items (1), (8), (9), and (10) based on unpublished U.S. Labor Department data, 
a. States which borrowed $100 million or more between 1972 and 1979. 
b. Changes cover the period from the first loan year (or just before that year) through 1980.
c. Temporary increases in the taxable wage base are defined as increases which were subsequently matched or superseded by increases in the PUT taxable wage base. Permanent tax base in 
creases refer to increases that kept the state©s taxable wage base above the PUT taxable wage base, 
d. Major borrowing in item (10) is defined as 1980-83 loans equal to at least 1 percent of 1979 total covered payrolls.
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Six of the 10 states increased the taxable wage base per 
employee as a means for easing their financing problems. 
Defining as temporary a tax base increase to above the PUT 
taxable wage base if it remained above the federal base that 
applied for just a limited number of years, there were tem 
porary increases in three states (Michigan to $5,400 in 
1976-77, Connecticut to $6,000 in 1975-77, and Rhode Island 
to $4,800 in 1975-77). Three permanent increases in state tax 
able wage bases, i.e., bases that remained above the FUT 
taxable base, were also instituted. New Jersey raised its max 
imum to $4,800 in 1975 and indexed it to the average weekly 
wage starting in 1976. Minnesota©s maximum that already 
had been $4,800 since 1966 was raised to $6,200 in 1976, 
$7,000 in 1977 and $8,000 in 1979. Finally, Washington, in 
anticipation of funding problems, instituted a type of tax 
base indexing in 1971 that has been followed in subsequent 
years. Four of these debtor states (Pennsylvania, Illinois, 
New York and Massachusetts) did nothing active to their 
taxable wage bases except to match the federal base increase 
from $4,200 in 1977 to $6,000 in 1978. 5
One comparatively simple way to conserve on benefit 
payments is to freeze the maximum weekly benefit amount. 
Michigan and New York did not have indexed maximums in 
the 1970s and thus could easily restrict the growth in weekly 
benefits by not legislating new higher maximums. 
Michigan©s maximum for a single beneficiary was maintain 
ed at $97 between 1975 and February 1981. New York kept 
its maximum at $95 between 1974 and 1977 and then at $125 
between 1979 and 1983. In both states the average weekly 
benefit payment as a proportion of the average weekly wage 
in covered employment declined noticeably while the benefit 
maximums were held constant. 6 In the other eight states, 
maximum benefit amounts continued to rise.
The data summarized in items 3-7 suggest a variety of 
responses by the 10 states to their financing problems of the
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1970s. At one extreme Illinois made none of the changes 
described in the table while Pennsylvania, Connecticut and 
Minnesota made only one of the indicated changes. Policy 
changes were most obvious in Michigan but at least two of 
the three steps (high tax rates, tax base increases and a freeze 
on maximum benefits) were also taken in New Jersey, New 
York, Washington and Rhode Island.
There is some, albeit imperfect, association between the 
indicated state policy actions and two important financing 
conditions identified in items 8 and 10 of table 3-4 full 
repayment of loans from the 1970s and the need for major 
borrowing in the 1980s. 7 Among the four states with less ac 
tive policy responses, three have not paid off their loans 
from the 1970s (Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Connecticut) and 
three (Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Minnesota) have been ma 
jor borrowers in the 1980-83 period. Among the five describ 
ed as most active in making changes, three have paid off 
their loans from the 1970s (Michigan, New York, and 
Washington) while only one (Michigan) has been a major 
borrower during 1980-83. Other factors such as unemploy 
ment rates (item 9) and subsequent UI legislation also have 
effects on these two financial outcomes. From table 3-4, 
however, it seems clear that active state legislative responses 
have aided in both repaying the loans from the 1970s and 
avoiding the need for large additional loans in the 1980s.
At the end of 1983 four state UI programs had trust fund 
balances that exceeded $500 million. The states and their 
balances were as follows; California-$2,169 million, New 
York-$961 million, Florida-$888 million and 
Massachusetts-$532 million. Three of the four (all but 
California) required federal UI loans in the 1970s, but all 
three repaid these advances quite promptly. Massachusetts 
was in debt for the longest period, borrowing first in 1975 
and completing its repayments in 1980. Having quite large 
trust fund balances in 1983, at the end of a prolonged reces-
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sionary period, reflects the effects of earlier state policy ac 
tions. Massachusetts subjected its employers to very high 
average tax rates in the late 1970s. This coupled with relative 
ly low unemployment in the 1980s (observe in table 3-4 the 
average 1980-83 rate was 6.7 percent while the national 
average was 8.5 percent) resulted in a major accumulation of 
trust fund balances after 1977. 8 It has already been noted 
(table 3-4) that New York also imposed high tax rates in the 
late 1970s and sharply limited the growth in maximum week 
ly benefits between 1974 and 1983. The recent histories of the 
California and Florida programs deserve more extensive 
comments because they both illustrate how an active policy 
response can prevent the emergence of a serious UI funding 
problem.
California has a long history of vigorous policy actions to 
ensure UI program solvency. It maintained a high taxable 
wage base, i.e., one that exceeded the PUT taxable wage 
base, continuously between 1960 and 1971. When trust fund 
balances were reduced in the 1958 and 1960-61 recessions, 
large tax rate increases occurred in 1959 and again in 1962. 
Strong policy actions also helped to maintain the trust fund 
in the 1970s, a decade when the state experienced unusually 
high unemployment.
Appendix table All presents summary data on trust fund 
balances, benefits and UI taxes in California since 1970. Be 
tween 1970 and 1979, the state©s unemployment rate averag 
ed 7.9 percent (1.7 percentage points above the national 
average), and the state©s rate exceeded the national 
unemployment rate in each of these 10 years. The table 
shows that compared to the national average the California 
program compensates a similar proportion of its 
unemployed and that its average weekly benefits replace a 
slightly smaller proportion of its average weekly wages (col 
umns 10 and 11 respectively). Due to California©s high 
unemployment, annual benefit outlays averaged 1.38 percent
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of total payrolls in the 1970s, a payout rate that was 20 per 
cent higher than the national average of 1.15 percent.
California entered the 1970s with a trust fund balance of 
$1,305 million and a reserve ratio multiple of 1.43 (columns 
1 and 2 of table All). After the 1970-71 recession reduced 
reserves by about $400 million, a substantial increase in 
average tax rates levied on taxable wages (from 2.19 percent 
in 1971 to 2.72 and 3.01 percent in the next two years) helped 
restore the trust fund balance to $1,221 million at the start of 
1974. The next increased demand for benefits occurred in 
1974-75, causing the balance to be reduced to $546 million 
and the reserve ratio multiple fell to .38 by the start of 1976.
A set of policy actions fully effective in 1976 and 1977 
again helped restore the state©s trust fund balance. (1) The 
taxable wage base was raised from $4,200 to $7,000 in 
1976-77. (2) Tax rates applied to taxable wages generally 
rose during 1976-79, as the result of the state©s experience 
rated tax rate structure within a range of from 1.4 to 4.9 per 
cent. 9 (3) The weekly benefit maximum was not raised above 
its 1976 level of $104 until 1980. As a consequence, average 
weekly benefits as a proportion of average weekly wages 
declined from .335 in 1976 (already below the national 
average) to .292 in 1979. Due to these policy decisions and 
the response of experience rated taxes, the state©s trust fund 
balance was restored to $2,738 million by the start of 1980. 
This level represented about 32 percent of total net reserves 
for all 51 UI programs in the U.S. at that time. Although the 
reserve balance has not grown much since 1980, neither has it 
fallen despite the recessions. 10
To illustrate the scale of discretionary policy actions from 
the 1970s, it is useful to note the revenue effects due to rais 
ing the taxable wage base to $7,000 in 1976 and 1977. The 
higher tax base increased taxable wages by about $11.6 and 
$13.8 billion in these two years respectively. 11 Applying
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average tax rates from 1976 and 1977 (column 15 of table 
All) to these taxable wage increments yields a two-year 
estimated increase in total revenues of about $850 million. 
Subtracting these estimated revenues from the trust fund 
balance at the start of 1980 reduces it from $2.7 billion to 
$1.9 billion. The end of 1983 balance would be $1.3 billion 
rather than $2.2 billion if not for the added revenues from 
the 1976-77 tax base increase. Thus, a large trust fund 
balance in the 1980s is the direct consequence of large scale 
policy actions taken during the 1970s. California was able to 
pass through the 1980-83 period without further large scale 
changes in its UI taxes and/or benefits because of the tax 
base increases and other active policies consistently im 
plemented in the 1970s and earlier.
Florida©s history also illustrates how strong policy actions 
can restore a trust fund balance in a relatively short time 
period. Traditionally, Florida has had a UI program 
characterized by low taxes and low benefits. Between 1947 
and 1969, benefits exceeded 1 percent of payroll in just two 
years (1949 and 1962) while taxes equalled or exceeded 1 per 
cent of total payrolls in just three years (1947, 1961, and 
1962). Florida entered the 1970s with a trust fund balance of 
$256 million and a reserve ratio multiple of 2.42 (see table 
A12). A situation of low taxes and low benefits persisted in 
the first half of the 1970s as well. Table A12 shows that low 
benefit costs in Florida are partly due to compensating a low 
fraction of the unemployed (column 10) and paying relative 
ly low weekly benefits (column 11).
The recession of 1974-75 was especially severe in Florida. 
The state©s unemployment rate exceeded the national 
average in every year between 1974 and 1979 (column 9). 
Employment dropped sharply in construction and in several 
other industries causing UI claims to be particularly heavy in 
1975. Because payouts were so large in 1975, the trust fund 
balance fell from $326 million at the start of the year to $80
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million 12 months later. Over this same period the state©s 
reserve ratio multiple fell from 1.51 to .23, one of the largest 
declines ever experienced by a state UI program during a 
one-year period. Small loans were obtained in both 1975 and 
1976 to ensure that the state had adequate reserves to make 
its benefit payments.
Florida©s policy response to this situation was immediate 
and vigorous. Average tax rates on taxable wages nearly 
doubled between 1975 and 1976 (column 15) and they 
averaged above 2.5 percent in the next two years. 12 The 
weekly benefit maximum was not raised above its 1975 level 
of $82 over the next three years and then was set at $95 in 
1979 and 1980. As a result the average benefit-wage ratio 
declined from .358 in 1975 to .319 in 1978 and then to .311 in 
1980.
As benefit claims declined to more normal levels in the late 
1970s, the effects of these policy actions on the trust fund 
became apparent. The balance grew from $24 million at the 
start of 1977 to $665 million three years later. Like Califor 
nia, Florida entered the 1980s with a net trust fund balance 
more than twice as large as 10 years earlier. Although neither 
state achieved a reserve ratio multiple of 1.5, reserves have 
been adequate to meet all benefit payments in the 1980s 
without the need for federal UI loans or sharp increases in 
employer tax rates.
It should be noted that each of the four states with the 
largest trust fund balances at the end of 1983 experienced 
average or below average unemployment in the 1980-83 
period. 13 Furthermore, in both California and Florida rapid 
growth in the state©s economy has also helped to maintain 
large reserves (see section on Economic Growth and Trust 
Fund Balances). Even with active policies and good ex 
periences with uncontrollable factors such as unemployment 
and economic growth, not one of these states had a reserve
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ratio multiple as large as 1.0 at the end of 1983, much less the 
1.5 multiple often used as a guideline for judging fund ade 
quacy. If economic growth remains strong through the end 
of 1985, a 1.5 multiple is still not likely to be attained in any 
of the four states. This situation helps to illustrate the 
widespread loss of trust fund reserve adequacy that UI pro 
grams have recently experienced. Even the states with the 
largest reserve balances have low reserve ratio multiples.
From the examples of California and Florida as well as the 
experiences of the states needing large-scale loans in the 
1970s, the efficacy of state policy actions is apparent. In 
states where declining reserve balances have triggered fast 
responses of tax increases and/or benefit reductions (more 
precisely benefit freezes), debts and large-scale borrowing 
have been avoided. Even after large-scale borrowing has oc 
curred, strong policy actions have hastened the repayment of 
debts and helped to prevent renewed borrowing.
Tax Base Indexing
In chapter 1 it was noted that most state programs have in 
dexed their maximum weekly benefit amount to the state 
average weekly wage but have not similarly indexed their tax 
able wage base. With the advent of higher inflation during 
the 1970s (recall table 1-4), many social programs and 
private sector wage contracts adopted indexation provisions. 
The social security (OASDHI) program, for example, has 
had a fully indexed taxable wage base since 1975. It requires 
an active policy decision to implement indexation, but once 
in place, indexation causes a program to make certain 
automatic adjustments in an inflationary environment. In 
the past, UI programs have exhibited an ambivalent attitude 
towards indexation. Although the maximum weekly benefit 
amount has been indexed in most states, there has been a 
reluctance to index the taxable wage base. The failure of the
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taxable wage base to rise automatically with inflation has 
contributed to UI financing problems in several states. This 
section examines the experience of states that have had in 
dexed taxable wage bases for measurable periods of time.
Table 3-5 identifies 14 states that have tax base indexing 
provisions in their UI programs as of 1984. 14 In nine, the 
1984 taxable wage base (column 1) exceeded $10,000 and in 
four the base fell between $9,600 and $10,000. Although 
high tax bases could be achieved by periodic legislated in 
creases, it is interesting to note that only 9 of the 51 state tax 
bases exceeded $10,000 in 1984, and all nine were in states 
with indexed taxable wage bases. Among the states that have 
legislated their tax bases to exceed $7,000 (the FUT tax base 
since 1983) but have not indexed them, the highest 1984 tax 
bases were $9,600 in Wyoming and $9,500 in Wisconsin. 
Thus, in fact, the highest taxable wage bases are found in 
states with indexed wage bases.
Twelve of the states identified in table 3-5 (all but Mon 
tana and Washington) have what can be termed fully indexed 
wage bases. The UI laws in these states specify that the tax 
base is to be a certain percent of state average annual wage in 
covered employment. Thus the percentage increase in the an 
nual taxable wage base equals the percentage increase in 
average annual wage from a preceding calendar or fiscal 
year. In Montana, the base is to be 75 percent of average an 
nual wages but yearly increases are capped at $200. 
Washington©s base is to equal 80 percent of average annual 
wages, but $600 annual increments automatically occur 
whenever the trust fund balance falls below 4.5 percent of 
total covered wages. Since 1971, these $600 increments have 
been implemented in each year. 15 Thus Montana and 
Washington can be described as having partially indexed UI 
tax bases. Under full indexation the 1984 tax bases in Mon 
tana and Washington would be $10,800 and $14,000 respec 
tively, rather than $8,400 and $12,000 as shown in table 3-5.
Table 3-5 
States with Indexed Taxable Wage Bases, 1984
Indexation timing and percentage
State
Alaska
Hawaii
Idaho
Iowa
Minnesota
Montana6
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Dakota
Oregon
Rhode Island
Utahf
Washington^
Taxable
wage
base in
1984a
(1)
21,400a
14,600
14,400
10,400
9,800
8,400e
10,700
9,600
9,800
10,400
13,000
10,000
f
12,0008
First year
of tax base
indexation"
(2)
1981
1965
1976
1978
1982
1979
1975
1976
1978
1979
1976
1980
1977
1971
Period of
indexation
(through 1982)c
(3)
1981-82
1965-76C
1977-82C
1976-82
1978-82
1982
1979-82
1975-82
1976-82
1978-82
1979-82
1976-82
1980-82
1977-82
1971-82
Indexation 
percentage
of state
average
annual wage
(4)
60a
90
100
100
66.7
60
75e
66.7
53.8
65
70
80
70
100f
80«
Ratio of taxable to 
total payrolls
(for periods in 
column 3)"
State
(5)
.491
.683
.693
.686
.508
.461
.623
.591
.458
.547
.558
.603
.547
.654
.570
U.S.
average
(6)
.414
.500
.449
.452
.449
.405
.437
.452
.452
.449
.437
.452
.425
.449
.463
SOURCE: Data in columns (5) and (6) based on U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Data in columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) based on U.S. Department of
Labor, "Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws," various issues.
a. Reflects indexation percentage shown in column (4) for 1982, except for Alaska where this percentage changed from 60 to 75 percent after 1982.
b. This column identifies the first year when the state©s taxable wage base increased automatically to maintain a specified percentage of the state©s average annual wage in covered employment.
c. Two periods indicated for Hawaii when different indexation percentages applied.
d. Ratios are simple averages of state ratios and U.S. ratios, in columns (5) and (6), respectively, for the years indicated in column (3). Each state ratio represents state taxable payrolls divided
by total covered payrolls in the state. Each U.S. ratio represents the sum of all state taxable payrolls in all states divided by the national aggregate of total covered payrolls.
e. Although Montana©s taxable wage base is indexed to 75 percent of the state©s average annual wage, annual increases are limited to a maximum of $200. Thus the 1984 wage base was $8,400
rather than $10,800.
f. Utah©s taxable wage base was frozen at the $12,000 level from 1981 through 1983 and then set at $13,300 for 1984 by legislation which also reduced the indexation percentage to 75 percent
starting in 1985; the 1985 taxable wage base is $12,100.
g. Washington©s taxable wage base is indexed at 80 percent of its average annual wage, but annual increments are to be $600 whenever the state©s trust fund falls below 4.5 percent of total
payrolls. This latter provision has prevailed since 1971 causing the 1984 maximum to be $12,000 rather than $14,000.
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Tax base indexation is clearly a phenomenon of western 
states. Of the 14 states identified in the table, 4 are in the 
Pacific division (Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington), 
5 are in the Mountain division (Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, and Utah) and 3 are in the West North Central 
division (Iowa, Minnesota, and North Dakota). The only 
two states east of the Mississippi River with indexed bases 
are New Jersey and Rhode Island.
Indexing was instituted quite recently in most of these 
states. In some, indexing has been implemented following a 
period of discretionary tax base increases. In Alaska, for ex 
ample, the tax base has exceeded the FUT tax base in every 
year since 1955 but indexation (where the tax base rises pro 
portionately with the increase in average wages) was in 
stituted only in 1981. Of the 14 states, 9 instituted indexation 
between 1976 and 1980 (column 2) while 2 did it in 1981-82. 
Thus the adoption of indexation appears to be due at least 
partially to the recession of the mid-1970s and a recognition 
of the need to enhance UI program revenues.
Indexation formulas are quite similar across the 14 states. 
The taxable wage base varies from 53.8 percent of the prior 
average annual wage in New Jersey up to 100 percent in 
Hawaii and Idaho (and in Utah between 1977 and 1981). 
Column 4 shows these percentages. They are applied to 
average annual wages in covered employment in the state for 
an earlier 12-month base period. 16 The base period is one, 
one-and-one-half, or two years prior to the current calendar 
year to which the tax base applies. In each state the taxable 
wage base, so computed, moves upward directly in response 
to the wage inflation experienced by that state.
Columns 5 and 6 of table 3-5 show the impact of indexa 
tion by comparing average ratios of taxable-to-total payrolls 
in each state to the average ratio for the entire U.S. These 
ratios are based on years through 1982 (with the exact years
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identified in column 3), the latest year for which there are 
published data on taxable wages from all states. Among the 
14 states where tax base indexation was in effect, the column 
5 ratio is uniformly the higher of the two. 17 It is at least 40 
percent higher than the column 6 average in three states 
(Hawaii, Idaho and Utah) where the tax base was 100 per 
cent of the state©s average annual wage, and in Montana 
where it was indexed at 75 percent. The state average ratio 
was between 20 and 39 percent higher in six states and less 
than 20 percent higher in four states. From the data for 
Hawaii, Idaho, and Utah in column 5, it appears that 66 to 
70 percent of covered wages are taxable when the taxable 
wage base is set at 100 percent of the state©s average annual 
wage.
Hawaii has experienced the longest continuous period of 
wage indexation, covering the period from 1965 to the pre 
sent. A closer examination of this period is useful for il 
lustrating how the ratio of taxable-to-total payrolls depends 
on the inflation rate as well as the percentage of the state©s 
average annual wage to which the taxable wage base is tied. 
Prior to 1977, the tax base in Hawaii was set at 90 percent of 
the average annual wage for the 12 months ending on June 
30 of the previous year. Because inflation was much lower in 
the 1960s than in the 1970s, the state©s taxable-to-total 
payrolls ratio fell a little from .694 to .675 between 1965-69 
and 1970-76. After the tax base was raised from 90 to 100 
percent of the average annual wage in 1977, the average 
taxable-to-total ratio then increased to .693 in the 1977-82 
period. Due to the continued high inflation of the 1977-82 
period, however, the average ratio was not higher than in 
1965-69, despite the increase in the index percentage (from 
90 to 100) to which the taxable wage base was indexed. These 
data from Hawaii show that higher inflation does cause the 
taxable-to-total ratio to decline, but this decline is a much 
less serious problem than the erosion in the ratio that occurs 
when the taxable wage base is not indexed. 18
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Although tax base indexation has not been tried for pro 
longed periods in many states, an analysis of their financing 
problems in the 1970s and 1980s can be instructive. Table 3-6 
identifies the 10 states whose taxable wage bases have been 
continuously above the PUT taxable wage base for the 
longest periods, including years of discretionary increases 
prior to indexation in a few states. The first year of the con 
tinuously higher tax base is shown in column 1. In three 
(Alaska, Hawaii and Minnesota), this year preceded 1970 
while in five it occurred in either 1975 or 1976. Nine of the 
ten (all but Idaho) have had to borrow from the federal UI 
loan fund at some point in their history. In five (Alaska, 
Washington, Oregon, Nevada and New Jersey) the higher 
wage base was instituted at about the time they first borrow 
ed while in the other five (Hawaii, Minnesota, Idaho, Iowa 
and Utah) the imposition of a higher tax base occurred at 
least five years prior to the year of their first loan. Even 
among the latter group, however, a perception that trust 
fund balances were unacceptably low was one reason why 
their taxable wage bases were raised. Four of the five (all but 
Hawaii) had reserve ratio multiples below 1.5 at the start of 
the period of permanently higher wage bases. 19 It seems clear 
that a perceived financing problem existed in nine of the ten 
states at the time their wage bases were permanently raised. 
Higher tax bases were desired to help pay off existing debts, 
to reduce current deficits and to prevent future indebtedness.
Columns 3 and 4 then identify other actions taken by these 
states to enhance UI program revenues in the 1970s. Six of 
the ten enacted at least one more increase in their taxable 
wage base to a level above what was contemplated when the 
permanently higher taxable wage base (column 1) was first 
implemented. Indexing was introduced in Oregon (1976), 
Iowa (1978) and Utah (1977) while the indexing percentage 
was raised in Hawaii (1977). Further discretionary tax base 
increases were implemented in Alaska (1974) and Minnesota
Table 3-6
Policy Actions and Borrowing Activities in Ten States 
with the Longest Histories of Consistently High Taxable Wage Bases
State
Alaska
Hawaii
Minnesota
Washington
Oregon
Nevada
New Jersey
Idaho
Iowa
Utah
First year
state tax base
continuously
above PUT
tax base
(1)
1955
1962
1966
1971
1974
1975
1975
1976
1976
1976
Years actions taken after 
1970 to raise the trust 
fund balance
Year of
first
loan
(2)
1955
1975
1975
1973
1976
1976
1975
NA
1982
1982
Further
tax base
increase
(3)
1974, 1981,
1983
1977
1976-1978,
1982
NO
1976
NO
NO
NO
1978, 1985
1977
Major
tax rate
increase
(4)
1976
1972, 1975,
1977
1977
1972, 1978
1976
1972, 1976
1973
1977, 1984
1976, 1984
1983
Average
tax rate (as
percent of
total wages)
1977-79
(5)
2.57
2.23
1.25
1.80
2.06
.80
.93
.47
.38
.16
Major
borrowing
in the
1970s
(6)
NA
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
YES
NA
NA
NA
Average
unemploy 
ment rate in
1980-83
(percent)
(7)
9.8
5.9
6.8
10.2
10.1
8.3
7.8
8.8
7.3
7.5
Major
borrowing
in the
1980-83
period
(8)
NA
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NA
YES
NO
SOURCE: Data in columns (1), (2) and (5) based on U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, (1984). Columns (3) 
and (4) based on U.S. Department of Labor, "Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws," various issues, and the author©s 
judgment. Columns (2), (6), (7) and (8) based on unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Major borrowing in columns (6) and (8) defined as 
loans totaling at least one percent of total payroll (in 1975 and 1979 respectively). 
NA = Not applicable as the state did not borrow.
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(1976-78). Increases in the state©s tax rate schedule, i.e., in 
creases in the tax schedule that affected both the minimum 
and maximum tax rates, occurred at least once in all 10 states 
during the 1970s. Thus higher average tax rates and further 
tax base increases were common in the states that already 
had a taxable wage base higher than the PUT taxable wage 
base. In summary, all of these states took two or more policy 
actions to substantially increase program revenues in the 
1970s and the dates of these actions are shown in columns 1, 
3, and 4.
The effects of the policy actions on average effective tax 
rates are shown in column 5. During 1977-79 effective tax 
rates, as a percentage of total wages, averaged 1.30 percent 
for the U.S. as a whole. Eight of these states (all but Min 
nesota and Utah) had tax rate averages that were higher than 
the national average, and in six the state average was more 
than 30 percent higher than the national average. The state 
policy actions generally resulted in quite high average tax 
rates.
Columns 6 and 8 then examine the borrowing activities of 
these states in the 1970s and 1980s. Presumably they would 
have less need to borrow as a consequence of raising their tax 
bases and tax rates. For both the 1972-79 and 1980-83 
periods major borrowing by a state can be defined as a loan 
total that exceeds 1 percent of total wages. Recall from table 
3-1 (columns 2 and 4) that 13 states required major loans in 
1972-79 and 13 were major borrowers in 1980-83. 20 Three 
states identified in table 3-6 (Minnesota, New Jersey, and 
Washington) were major borrowers in the 1970s and two 
(Minnesota and Iowa) were major borrowers in the 1980-83 
period.
It is interesting to speculate how much borrowing would 
have occurred if these states had not instituted higher taxable 
wage bases. To pursue this question, a rough calculation was
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made to estimate the effects of the higher tax bases on trust 
fund balances and the need for loans in the 1970s. Using 
historic data on total benefit payments and average employer 
tax rates (on taxable payrolls) it was estimated that Hawaii 
and Alaska would also have been major borrowers in the 
1970s if their taxable wage bases had remained continuously 
at the level of the PUT taxable wage base between 1970 and 
1979. 21 Higher taxable wage bases prevented these two states 
from needing major loans in the 1970s. 22 Higher tax bases 
reduced the need for loans in the three states that already 
were major borrowers. The calculations suggested that Min 
nesota, New Jersey, and Washington would have needed an 
additional $27, $54 and $160 million respectively. 23 Among 
the seven states that would have had to borrow at least once 
in the 1970s (all but Idaho, Iowa and Utah) the calculations 
showed that the higher tax bases reduced total loans by $307 
million (from $1,399 to $1,092 million) or by more than 20 
percent from what would have been borrowed between 1972 
and 1979 had their tax bases remained at the level of the FUT 
tax base.
Only two of these ten states have been major borrowers in 
the 1980-83 period. Chapter 2 has already noted Minnesota©s 
problems in devising acceptable UI solvency legislation in 
1983 and 1984. Despite comparatively low unemployment 
rates, its recent legislative deadlock led to the emergence of a 
sizable debt in the early 1980s. Iowa©s 1980-83 funding prob 
lem stems directly from a long period of unusually high de 
mand for benefits. Between 1947 and 1974 the state did not 
have a single year when benefits were as high as 1 percent of 
total payrolls. In the eight years from 1975 to 1982, however, 
benefits exceeded 1 percent of payrolls in seven years and 
equaled .99 percent of payrolls in the eighth. The highest rate 
of payout occurred in 1982 (2.43 percent of payrolls) with 
1980 and 1981 ranking second and fourth respectively of all 
years since 1947. A rough calculation suggested that the
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state©s high tax base has increased total revenues by $109 
million between 1976 and 1983 and that actual borrowing 
during 1980-83 ($324 million) would have been $72 million 
higher if not for these added revenues. Thus a long period of 
high payouts has caused a need for major loans even with an 
indexed tax base. 24 Finally, observe in columns 7 and 8 that 
Alaska, Washington and Oregon have avoided large-scale 
borrowing despite the fact that their unemployment rates in 
1980-83 have been considerably higher than the national 
average of 8.5 percent. Avoiding the need for large loans in 
the face of very high unemployment is partly the result of tax 
base indexing.
A given amount of payroll tax revenue can be raised by 
various combinations of taxable wage bases and scheduled 
tax rates applied to taxable wages. Legislating higher tax 
bases could have effects on state tax rates. It has already 
been noted that the 10 high tax base states showed a will 
ingness to increase their average tax rates in the 1970s (col 
umn 4 in table 3-6). There is evidence, however, that max 
imum tax rates may be affected by the presence of high tax 
able wage bases. By 1985 all states are required by federal 
law to have a maximum tax rate of at least 5.4 percent of tax 
able wages. In 1984, 19 of the 51 states had maximum rates 
below 5.4 percent. Six of the 19 are among the 10 states with 
permanently higher tax bases identified in table 3-6. Thus 6 
of these 10 were required to raise their maximum tax rates in 
1985 whereas only 13 of the 41 other states (or 32 percent) 
had to enact such increases. More than one factor may cause 
the maximum tax rate to be generally lower in states with 
higher taxable wage bases. Part of the reason for generally 
lower maximum tax rates in the 10 states, however, may be 
that indexation has helped these states to keep revenues more 
in balance with benefit payments over the long run.
Tax base indexing has been present in enough states for 
sufficiently long periods to draw certain conclusions about
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its efficacy. (1) Indexing has resulted in much higher taxable 
wage bases. As noted above, all nine states with taxable wage 
bases above $10,000 in 1984 were states with indexed tax 
bases. (2) Tax base indexing has had major effects on tax 
revenues in both the 1970s and 1980s. Without indexing, 
Hawaii and Alaska would have been major borrowers in the 
1970s (total loans exceeding 1 percent of 1975 total wages) 
and required loans would have been much larger in Min 
nesota, New Jersey and Washington, states that already were 
major borrowers. States that had adopted tax base indexing 
by the mid-1970s required relatively smaller loans than the 
average for all other states in the 1980s. (3) Indexing has not 
eliminated the need for states to make other discretionary 
adjustments in trying to maintain program solvency. Iowa©s 
problems in the 1980s vividly illustrate this point. Because in 
dexing has tended to increase program revenues, however, it 
has reduced the size of other tax and benefit adjustments 
that states have needed to make. The borrowing of the 1970s 
and 1980s would undoubtedly have been much smaller if all 
states had entered the 1970s with fully indexed taxable wage 
bases. With indexed taxable wage bases, UI revenues would 
have maintained a better balance with benefit payments in 
the face of the high inflation rates of the 1970s and 1980s.
Tax base indexing is a discretionary policy action taken by 
certain states that has obvious positive long-run implications 
for UI program revenues. As noted in table 3-6, however, 
states with indexed tax bases have also instituted other active 
policies to produce a better balance between taxes and 
benefit payments. Conversely, states like California and 
Florida have instituted policy actions other than indexing to 
achieve the same solvency objective. Thus, tax base indexing 
by itself is neither necessary nor sufficient for maintaining 
program solvency. What it clearly has done, however, is 
reduce the scale of the UI fiscal imbalances that developed in 
several states both in the 1970s and in the 1980s.
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Economic Growth and Trust Fund Balances
At the start of chapter 3 uncontrollable factors were iden 
tified that can affect a state©s UI program solvency and bor 
rowing needs: its current trust fund balance, unemployment 
and the rate of economic growth. The effects of low trust 
fund balances and high unemployment on borrowing needs 
are immediate and easily described. Economic growth also 
can have important effects but these effects are manifested 
more in the long run that in the short run. This section 
discusses the effects of economic growth on solvency.
Chapter 1 noted that a high rate of economic growth in a 
state has a positive effect on its UI trust fund balance. 
Because disparities in regional growth rates were especially 
pronounced in the 1970s, experiences from this decade are 
particularly relevant. Companies relocated away from so- 
called frost belt states of the North to places in the South and 
West in record numbers. The absence of a previous research 
literature on this topic will prevent the present discussion 
from reaching definitive conclusions. Given the topic©s im 
portance, however, an initial analysis is appropriate.
Institutional features of UI programs cause state trust 
fund balances to be affected in a differential manner when 
there are large-scale net flows of jobs and workers from one 
state to another. Benefits and taxes both respond differen 
tially in origin and destination states when jobs and workers 
move. The net effect of geographic mobility is to raise the 
trust fund balance in destination states while lowering it in 
the states that workers leave. In the following paragraphs, 
these effects will be discussed from the perspective of a plant 
closure in one state accompanied by a plant opening in 
another state. Similar effects are also operative when 
employment levels of existing plants are reduced in one state 
but expanded elsewhere. The latter situations, in fact, prob 
ably affect more workers than plant closures and openings.
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Four effects on the benefits side of UI programs are 
noteworthy. (1) In states losing jobs due to plant closures 
and relocations, the loss of job slots will tend to raise 
unemployment, especially long term unemployment, among 
older workers who are reluctant to move. Long term 
unemployment of older workers, i.e., 45 and over, will 
reduce UI trust fund balances because these workers are the 
ones most likely to collect UI benefits. (2) For laid-off 
workers who try to secure jobs in another state but are not 
successful, claims for benefits based on prior employment 
remain the financial responsibility of the UI program in the 
state where the plant closure occurred. (3) Workers who find 
jobs in states where new plants are opened must work for a 
minimum time period and earn a minimum amount of 
covered wages before qualifying for UI benefits. Those laid 
off before the qualifying requirements are achieved cannot 
draw benefits while others who just satisfy the qualifying re 
quirements will not be eligible for maximum weekly benefits 
and maximum benefit duration. (4) States with numerous 
new plant openings are more likely to have conditions of 
strong labor demand and low unemployment. This will help 
to minimize the duration of insured unemployment and limit 
the payment of benefits to individual unemployed workers 
further conserving trust fund balances. In all four effects, 
there is either a loss to the trust fund of the origin state or a 
limit on benefit outlays from the destination state©s trust 
fund.
Two effects on the revenue side of UI programs may also 
be important. (5) Plants that close represent an immediate 
loss of UI tax revenues. In origin states, claims for benefits 
may completely exhaust the trust fund balance for a firm 
whose plant has closed. The excessive claims will eventually 
result in ineffectively charged benefits that must be covered 
by taxes paid by the remaining employers in the state. 
(6) New employers typically pay a higher-than-average UI
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tax rate in their first two or three years of operation in order 
to build up their trust fund balances. In states where fre 
quent plant openings are occurring, higher taxes on new 
employers could have an effect of raising the overall trust 
fund balance. As long as rapid growth continues to occur 
there will always be several new employers paying these 
higher taxes before they are eligible to be experience rated.
The direction of the effect on trust fund balances is clear 
in each of the six situations just described. What is crucial, 
but not known, is the aggregate importance of these separate 
factors that raise trust funds in destination states while 
lowering them in origin states.
Table 3-7 focuses on trust fund reserve ratio multiples in 
1969 and 1979 controlling for employment growth during the 
1970s. The states are stratified into three groups: the fastest 
growing 13, the next 25 and the slowest growing 13. To give 
an idea of the growth disparities, overall employment growth 
was 36.3 percent between 1969 and 1979. Idaho, the state 
with the 13th highest rate, grew 74.8 percent while 
Maryland, the state with the 13th lowest rate, grew by only 
27.2 percent. On average, employment in the top 13 grew by 
85.7 percent, more than six times the 13.7 average percent 
growth experienced by the bottom 13 during the 1970s. 25
The most rapidly growing states entered the 1970s with 
higher than average reserve ratio multiples. Table 3-7 shows 
that while the median multiple for all 51 states was 1.84 at 
the end of 1969, these states had a median of 2.24. In con 
trast, the slowest growing states entered the 1970s with a me 
dian reserve ratio multiple of only 1.46. 26
By the end of the 1970s reserve ratio multiples had declin 
ed in all states. Table 3-7 shows that states with the fastest 
employment growth were more successful at maintaining 
their reserves than were the others. While the national me 
dian multiple had declined to .63 (34 percent of its 1969
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level), the median multiple for fastest growing states had 
declined to .90 (40 cent of its 1969 level). Five of the states 
with fastest growth had 1979 reserve ratio multiples of 1.0 or 
above while not one fell below .5. In contrast, the 1979 me 
dian for the 13 slowest growing states was -.07 and only two 
had multiples that exceeded .50.
Table 3-7
Distribution of States by Year and Reserve Ratio Multiples 
1969 and 1979; States Grouped by Degree of 1969-1979 Employment
Growth
Number of states by degree of 1969-1979 employment growth3
Period and
reserve ratio
multiple
Total
End of 1969
Negative
0-.49
.50-.99
1.00-1.49
1.50-1.99
2.00-2.99
3.00 and above
All
states
51
0
0
1
15
14
13
8
Fastest
growing
states
13
0
0
0
3
2
6
2
All
other
states
25
0
0
0
6
7
7
5
Slowest
growing
states
13
0
0
1
6
5
0
1
Median multiple*© 1.84
End of 1979 
Negative 
0-.49 
.50-.99 
1.00-1.49 
1.50-1.99 
2.00-2.99 
3.00 and above
Median multiple"
9
12
17
11
2
0
0
.63
2.24
0
0
8
5
0
0
0
.90
1.96
7
6
2
0
0
.68
1.46
7
4
2
0
0
0
0
-.07
SOURCE: Based on data in U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Finan 
cial Data (1984).
a. Degree of growth based on the ratio of 1969 covered employment to 1979 covered 
employment. All the fastest growing states had an employment growth ratio of at least 
1.748 while all the slowest growing states had an employment growth ratio below 1.273. 
b. Computed at The Urban Institute.
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Slow economic growth has a clear association with UI 
financing problems. Of the 13 states with the fastest employ 
ment growth, only two (Florida and Nevada) required any 
loans in the 1970s while four (Colorado, North Dakota, 
Texas and Utah) borrowed between 1980 and 1983. 27 Texas 
and Colorado have repaid their recent loans rather slowly. 
These two states, where 1980-83 loans exceeded 1 percent of 
1979 total payrolls, can be described as major borrowers 
since 1980. 28
Lending activity has been more common and much more 
substantial among the thirteen states with the slowest 
1969-79 employment growth. Twelve borrowed sometime 
between 1972 and 1979 and nine had loans totaling at least 1 
percent of 1975 total payrolls. In the 1980-83 period, ten of 
these same states have borrowed and for four (Illinois, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania) loans during 1980-83 
totaled at least 4 percent of 1979 payrolls. Since seven of 
these slowest growing states entered the 1970s with reserve 
ratio multiples below 1.5 and seven entered the 1980s with 
negative reserve ratio multiples, it is hardly surprising that 
their ranks included so many large loan recipients in both 
periods. Given their low reserves at the end of 1979 it seems 
surprising that some have not needed even larger loans in the 
1980s.
This chapter argued that initial trust fund balances were a 
major determinant of the need for federal UI loans in the 
1970s. This same point is reemphasized by the data in table 
3-7 and the discussion just completed. The latter discussion, 
however, has stressed that economic growth is also a deter 
minant of trust fund balances and, hence, of the need for 
loans. States with high balances have achieved those 
balances not only through active policies but also through 
the effects of high growth, a factor largely beyond their own 
control.
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As noted above, serious research has not yet addressed 
and provided estimates of how much rapid growth affects UI 
trust fund balances. One approach to this research question 
would be to develop a simulation model with two states (one 
fast growing and one slow growing) that have similar UI pro 
grams but different rates of birth and death of firms in 
covered employment, different rates of unemployment oc 
currences, different average unemployment durations and a 
net flow of workers from the slow growing to the fast grow 
ing state. One could insert realistic parameters describing UI 
taxes and benefits within such a simulation framework and 
isolate the effects of differential growth on trust fund 
balances in the two states. This type of research could even 
tually provide a basis for estimating how much the fastest 
growing states in the South and West have benefited from 
the recent increases in regional growth disparities.
Until the effect of differing growth rates on UI trust fund 
balances has been isolated, certain seemingly straightfor 
ward policy recommendations for restoring fiscal balance 
must be treated with caution. It will not help a debtor state 
much in the long run to raise employer taxes if that action in 
tended to improve UI fund solvency also encourages 
employers to move their plants to other states. If faster 
growth confers major fiscal advantages to certain state UI 
programs, knowledge about the size of such effects would 
provide a basis for reinsurance and/or cost-sharing pro 
posals to help states where low growth and high unemploy 
ment are concentrated. It is sufficient to end here by noting 
that growth disparities have been especially wide since 1970 
and that financial advantages (of unknown size) have ac 
crued to the UI programs in the fastest growing states.
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Summary
This chapter has examined the issue of debt avoidance. 
One or more of the following conditions are present in states 
that have not required large scale UI loans since 1972: 
(i) large initial trust fund balances, (ii) willingness to imple 
ment active policies that raise revenues and reduce benefit 
payments when trust fund balances decline, (iii) having an 
indexed taxable wage base for UI payroll taxes, (iv) ex 
periencing a low rate of unemployment, and (v) experiencing 
a rapid rate of economic growth. The second and third items 
in this list are things that individual states can control in the 
short run. Both can be viewed as active states responses to UI 
funding problems, since state legislative action is required to 
institute tax base indexing as well as to raise tax rate 
schedules and reduce benefit provisions. Once in place, an 
indexed tax base aids in keeping the revenue and benefit sides 
of a UI program in balance.
That active policy responses can lead to debt avoidance is 
hardly surprising. From the experiences of states that 
adopted tax base indexing, it is also clear that such indexing 
has reduced the scale but has not eliminated the need for 
discretionary tax and benefit changes when stagflation is 
present. States that act in a timely manner can avoid major 
funding problems.
Given the general deterioration in state UI trust fund 
balances that has occurred since 1969 (recall tables 1-2 and 
3-2) it is also clear that states now must act more quickly in 
recessions than they ever had to in the past if they are to 
avoid borrowing. A second spur to faster state actions is the 
increased costs of loans and indebtedness in the 1980s com 
pared to earlier periods. With smaller trust fund cushions 
and more expensive loan conditions, state UI is becoming 
more of a pay-as-you-go program as opposed to an 
automatic stabilizer. Pursuing more active policies also
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means that UI programs are becoming more willing to 
reduce benefits for the unemployed during the middle and 
later stages of recessions.
In contrast to the UI policy actions that the individual 
states control, the rate of economic growth and the 
unemployment rate are beyond state control. Rapid growth 
helps trust fund balances while slow growth has negative 
trust fund effects. Although the direction of the economic 
growth effect on trust fund balances is known, its size is not. 
As indicated above, this important topic should be pursued 
by further research. Many deficit states are in areas of slow 
growth but we do not currently know how much the slow 
growth has adversely affected their trust funds. The effects 
of high unemployment on trust fund balances are obvious 
and were examined in chapters 1 and 2.
Although rapid growth automatically helps a state©s trust 
fund balance, it also seems that states in rapidly growing 
areas are more willing to use active policies to avoid UI trust 
fund debts. States in the West have pioneered in indexing the 
UI taxable wage base. They also have demonstrated a strong 
willingness to raise UI tax rates. Rapid growth may be linked 
to a state©s willingness to act decisively to avoid deficits. If 
employers and workers, through their mobility, have already 
demonstrated a preference for residing in your state, they 
may be more willing to accept the consequences of the UI 
policy actions, e.g., higher employer taxes and lower 
benefits, needed to avoid trust fund indebtedness. As a 
broad generalization, this would seem to apply to states in 
the West more so than to states in the South. Reluctance of 
midwestern states to raise employer taxes could partly reflect 
a realistic concern to prevent even more employers, jobs and 
workers from moving to sun belt states. Thus rapid 
economic growth may both reduce the need for policy ac 
tions (because it helps in maintaining trust fund balances)
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and assist a state in taking the actions necessary to avoid 
debts (by reducing concerns about out migration of 
employers, jobs and workers).
NOTES
1. Besides the 37 states identified in table 3-1, one other state (Wyoming) 
borrowed for the first time in 1984. Washington, which had borrowed in 
the 1970s but not in 1980-83, also borrowed in 1984. Washington and 
Wyoming have already repaid their 1984 loans. Thus, a total of 31 states 
borrowed between 1980 and 1984 while 38 borrowed between 1972 and 
1984.
2. Note that in nine of these ten states, 1972-79 loans also exceeded 1 per 
cent of 1975 payrolls. Except for New York, large absolute loan amounts 
during 1972-79 also implied large relative loans as well. Because large ab 
solute and relative loans cover so many of the same states, statements 
to be made about data in tables 3-2-3-4 (based on the 10 with loans in ex 
cess of $100 million) would also hold if large borrowers were defined by 
relative rather than absolute loan amounts.
3. For the 10 large debtor states examined in chapter 2, three (Penn 
sylvania, Illinois and New Jersey) had negative reserve ratio multiples at 
the end of 1979, four (Michigan, Ohio, Minnesota, and West Virginia) 
had multiples between 0 and .49, two (Texas and Louisiana) had 
multiples between .5 and .99 and one (Wisconsin) had a multiple between 
1.0 and 1.49.
4. In five states, the percentage increases in effective average tax rates 
cover somewhat different time periods. In Connecticut, Vermont and 
Washington, the three states that needed loans before 1975, the periods 
were respectively 1971-77, 1973-77 and 1971-77. Because Illinois lowered 
its tax rate in 1975 the change was from 1973-74 (the two-year average) to 
1977. The change in New York covered the period 1975-79 to give a two- 
year period following its first loan of 1977.
5. The PUT taxable wage base was increased to $6,000 in 1978, and all 
state UI programs in effect are required to have a taxable wage base at 
least equal to the PUT base.
6. In Michigan the average weekly benefit as a proportion of the average 
wage declined from .372 in 1975 to .316 in 1980. The ratio in New York 
declined from .339 in 1975 to .279 in 1982.
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7. Major borrowing in the 1980s is defined as 1980-81 loans equal to at 
least 1 percent of 1979 total covered wages.
8. Net reserves were -$159 million at the start of 1978 and they increased 
by at least $100 million in each of the next four years.
9. The tax rate range was slightly lower, from 1.3 to 4.8 percent, in 1979.
10. The net reserve balance at the end of September 1984 was $2,854 
million, about $100 million above its level of January 1, 1980.
11. This estimate was made at The Urban Institute. Using California 
data from other years its was estimated that taxable wages would have 
been .400 and .380 of total wages in 1976 and 1977 if the taxable wage 
base had remained at $4,200.
12. The minimum employer tax rate for the years 1975 to 1978 was .1, .7, 
1.1 and 1.1 percent respectively. The maximum rate remained at 4.5 per 
cent throughout the decade.
13. The U.S. unemployment rate averaged 8.5 percent for the four-year 
1980-83 period. For the same four years the average unemployment rates 
in the four states were as follows: California 8.4 percent, Florida 7.4 per 
cent, Massachusetts 6.7 percent and New York 8.1 percent.
14. Additionally North Carolina has a taxable wage base that is indexed 
to average taxable wages. Since the average taxable wage does not 
necessarily rise as general wage levels rise, this will not be considered an 
indexed wage base in the present discussion.
15. The tax base did not rise in 1974 but then it increased by $1,200 in 
1975.
16. In New Jersey the tax base is designated to be 28 times the average 
weekly wage which is equivalent to 53.8 percent of average annual wages 
in covered employment.
17. Despite limitations on full indexation in Montana and Washington, 
and the freezing of the tax base in 1981 and 1982 in Utah, the ratios in 
these states exceeded the U.S. average ratios by substantial margins.
18. For example between 1965 and 1970 the annual taxable-to-total ratio 
in Hawaii declined from .708 to .680 or by 4.0 percent. For the overall 
U.S. during the same period the ratio declined from .558 to .447 or by 
19.9 percent. A similar pattern is observed in 1978-82 when the FUT tax 
able wage base remained at $6,000. Hawaii©s ratio barely changed from 
.697 in 1978 to .696 in 1982 while the national ratio declined from .496 to 
.405.
162 Conditions of Debt Avoidance
19. Reserve ratio multiples at the start of these periods were as follows: 
Hawaii (1962) 1.92; Minnesota (1966) .64; Idaho (1976) 1.23; Iowa 
(1976) .63 and Utah (1976) .71. The low multiples in Minnesota, Idaho, 
Iowa and Utah show these states had low reserves at the time their higher 
wage bases were adopted.
20. Recall from table 3-1 that loans in 1972-79 were measured relative to 
1975 covered payrolls while 1980-83 loans were measured relative to 1979 
payrolls.
21. The calculations started with the initial trust fund balances of 
January 1, 1970 and used estimates of interest income based on average 
yields for each year in the 1970s. With lower taxable wage bases it was 
estimated that Hawaii would have needed to borrow $61 million or 2.6 
percent of 1975 total payrolls. Alaska would have needed $32 million or 
1.3 percent of 1975 payrolls. All of these calculations were made at The 
Urban Institute.
22. Alternatively, these states could have further increased their tax rates 
(on taxable wages) and/or reduced benefit payments by freezing max 
imum weekly benefits in order to avoid the need for major loans. The 
point of the calculations was more to show the revenue and trust fund 
implications of instituting higher tax bases than to provide realistic 
counterfactual simulations of how finances would have evolved under a 
regime of lower tax bases.
23. The calculations shows even larger effects on total 1970-79 tax 
receipts and net trust fund balances at the end of 1979. Total tax receipts 
in Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington were increased by $165 
million, $196 million, and $357 million respectively, while 1979 net trust 
fund balances were raised by $182 million, $282 million, and $403 
million respectively. The higher taxes allowed both Minnesota and 
Washington to end the decade of the 1970s with positive trust fund 
balances.
24. To further increase program revenues Iowa will raise its taxable wage 
base by an additional $1,100 and $1,600 in 1985 and 1986 respectively.
25. The 13 states with the highest growth rates were Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah and Wyoming. Two were from 
the North Central region, three from the South and eight from the West. 
The 13 with the slowest growth were Connecticut, Delaware, the District 
of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
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New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island. Six of 
these states are from the North East region, four from the North Central 
region, and three from the South.
26. The fact that the fastest growing states entered the 1970s with above- 
average reserve ratio multiples is partly a reflection of high growth ex 
perienced by these states in earlier periods. For example, the 13 states 
that grew fastest in the 1970s experienced a total employment growth of 
48.1 percent between 1959 and 1969. This growth rate was considerably 
higher than the national average (31.4 percent) and more than twice the 
23.1 percent 1959-69 employment growth experienced by the 13 slowest 
growing states from the 1970s. A similar situation prevailed in the 
1948-59 employment growth of 61.2 percent compared to national 
growth of 19.5 percent and growth of only 7.9 percent for the 13 slowest 
growing states (from the 1970s).
27. Wyoming which is also one of this group of states did borrow in 
1984.
28. As noted in table 2-1 of chapter 2, however, the relative size of the 
Texas debt at the end of 1983 was much smaller than the relative debt size 
in the four states with the largest debts (Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan 
and Ohio). It might also be noted that energy production is important in 
Colorado as well as Texas. Recent borrowing by both states is partly due 
to the falloff in energy production after 1980.

4 
Conclusions
The high demand for UI benefit payments since 1969 has 
created financing problems of differing severity for most 
state UI programs. Repeated and severe recessions have been 
the single most important reason for these problems, but 
chapters 1, 2 and 3 have highlighted other contributing fac 
tors such as disparities in regional growth rates, inflation 
coupled with an unresponsive tax base, unfortunate timing 
of benefit liberalizations, underfunding of the EB program 
and failure of states to act when fund balances were 
depleted. Because benefit outlays since 1969 have exceeded 
tax revenues by a wide margin, there has been a widespread 
loss of trust fund reserves, large scale borrowing and 
substantial debt accumulation. Total borrowing between 
1972 and December 31, 1984 exceeded $23.4 billion.
Regional contrasts in economic performance have been 
particularly wide in the 1970s and early 1980s. States in the 
North have experienced especially high unemployment and 
low rates of economic growth since 1969. States in the South 
and West have fared much better. The geographic concentra 
tion of UI borrowing mirrors these regional contrasts. The 
North East region had especially high unemployment in the 
mid-1970s and accounted for about three-fifths of all UI 
loans needed between 1972 and 1979. Economic problems
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were most serious in the North Central region in 1980-83 and 
about two-thirds of all loans in that period went to these 
states. Since unemployment and economic growth are fac 
tors beyond the control of the states, it may not be fair to 
hold these states fully liable for the UI debts which they have 
incurred. A detailed discussion of interstate cost sharing 
across UI programs lies beyond the scope of this volume. It 
is appropriate, however, to reemphasize here the sharp dif 
ferences in unemployment and growth which have 
characterized state and regional economies of late.
In the early 1980s, the costs of UI debt rose substantially 
and debtor states have responded. The pace of debt 
repayments has increased and several states have enacted 
substantial revisions in their UI laws. Legislation to improve 
program solvency was passed in eight major debtor states 
between late 1982 and March 1984. Chapter 2 described 
these legislative packages. Tax increases plus benefit reduc 
tions from the legislation are estimated to improve solvency 
in these states by a total of $12 billion between 1983 and 
1986. Employer and employee sacrifices constituted respec 
tively 69 and 31 percent of the total change in solvency. The 
legislation was of such a scale that employers in these debtor 
states will realize almost $3 billion of UI tax savings during 
these years due to reduction, deferral and extension of 
payments for loan interest and FUT penalty taxes. The ag 
gregate employer/worker sacrifice ratio changes from 69/31 
to 59/41 when these savings are considered. The states have 
recently demonstrated an ability to improve solvency, and 
typically the legislation has involved multiple changes in 
both their tax and benefit provisions.
Trust fund rebuilding started to occur in 1984. At the 
beginning, the year net fund reserves across all state pro 
grams were -$5.7 billion. By the end of the year net reserves 
stood at about $2 billion, almost $8 billion higher. The small
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size of this net balance is another indicator of how 
widespread the loss of fund reserves has been.
While reserves remain low, UI programs will continue to 
be extremely vulnerable to the business cycle. In this situa 
tion, UI in the aggregate will behave more like a pay-as-you- 
go program rather than the automatic stabilizer it was 
originally intended to be. Faced with high costs of borrow 
ing, the states would probably act again to raise taxes and 
reduce benefits shortly after the onset of another recession.
One obvious consequence of the recent state legislation is a 
reduction in the scale of UI relative to the overall economy. 
This reduction is apparent in several indicators, e.g., insured 
unemployment as a proportion of total unemployment and 
UI benefit payments as a percent of GNP. Payments for 
regular UI will be smaller, but with the virtual elimination of 
the EB program except for the most severe of recessions, the 
cutbacks in 1980-84 and in the future will be even larger in 
payments for long term unemployment. State UI programs 
will play a smaller future role in alleviating economic hard 
ships due to unemployment than they did prior to 1980.
This report has focused on short run adaptations by the 
states to their funding problems. What about the future? 
One optimistic view of future trust fund developments is 
contained in a recent actuarial projection made by the 
Unemployment Insurance Service of the U.S. Department of 
Labor (1984b). They project net trust fund reserves to grow 
steadily after 1984 and to reach a total of $34 billion by the 
end of fiscal year 1989. Even if this comes to pass, the im 
plied reserve ratio multiple for the U.S. as a whole will be 
roughly .75. Thus, twice this amount of reserves would be 
needed before the overall UI system of programs achieved 
the suggested minimum actuarial guideline of a 1.5 reserve 
ratio multiple. Even at the higher overall level for the U.S., 
the multiples for many state funds would still be lower than 
1.5.
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The $34 billion projected net trust fund balance may not 
be achieved by the end of fiscal 1989. The Labor Depart 
ment©s projection assumes that the average annual growth 
rate in real GNP will exceed 4 percent for the years 1985 
through 1989. This rate of growth is higher than historic 
averages and implies that no recession will occur during the 
next five years. Should a recession recur before fund bal 
ances are restored there could be a repetition of the state-level 
adjustments described in chapter 2. Since many of the debtor 
states would probably still be in debt, they would experience 
the need for further tax increases and benefit reductions.
Probably the main conclusion of this volume should be 
that UI funding problems are likely to recur before the end 
of the present decade. In the short run, they will be avoided 
only if there is no recession. In the longer run, substantial 
fund building must take place. Indexing the taxable wage 
base would aid in fund building, but increases in UI tax rates 
are also required. A recent paper by Blaustein (1984) gives a 
vivid illustration as to the scale of tax increases that are re 
quired (to a U.S. average of 2 percent of total payrolls for 
three or four years) to achieve fund solvency. The only years 
when UI programs levied such high effective tax rates were 
before and during World War II.
To this author it seems unlikely that large scale UI tax in 
creases (to even 1.5 percent of total payrolls) will take place. 
My judgment is that the states will not take the needed ac 
tions by themselves and that federal actions to promote trust 
fund accumulations are not likely, i.e., the promulgation of 
a federal solvency standard or the creation of new financial 
incentives to reward trust fund buildups. Given the observed 
responsiveness of state debt repayments in 1983 and 1984 to 
the interest rate costs of loans, it would seem that providing 
the states with positive financial incentives for fund building, 
i.e., a guarantee that a high interest rate would be paid on
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positive net reserve balances up to some level, would be an 
idea worth exploring. If substantial fund building does not 
occur, UI programs will remain exposed to the threat of 
recession and its two important consequences: the need to 
borrow to pay benefits and the need to enact additional 
legislation to improve program solvency.

APPENDIX 
Summary Data for Selected State UI Programs
The tables on the following pages present summary data 
for 12 UI programs: the 10 states with the largest debts on 
December 31, 1983 (and discussed in chapter 2) plus Califor 
nia and Florida. These tables have a common format. Infor 
mation on trust fund balances, loans, loan repayments and 
debt appear in columns 1-7. Benefit data appear in columns 
8-11 while tax data appear in columns 12-15. All tables have 
annual data for the 14 years from 1970 to 1983. Most of the 
information appearing in the tables is based on data supplied 
by the Unemployment Insurance Service of the U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor. Exact sources are listed in table Al. Note 
that the 1983 data are preliminary and subject to revision.
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Table Al 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Pennsylvania, 1970-1983
to
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.24
1.17
.98
.70
.64
.52
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
864
852
743
590
595
529
-86
-535
-902
-997
-1,091
-1,243
-1,297
-2,145
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
174
379
373
261
35
222
305
816
1,244
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
651
1,244
Loan repayments
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
57
126
237
772
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
174
553
926
1,187
1,222
1,387
1,566
2,145
2,617
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
545
1,151
Benefit indicators Tax indicators
Benefits- 
Time to-total Unemployment 
period payroll rate
(percent)
(8)
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
.15
.63
.88
 18h
.37b
.12b
.39b
1975 2.86b
1976 2.23b
1977 2.00b
1978 1.62b
1979 1.61 b
1980 2.18b
1981 1.89b
1982 3.19b
1983 2.73b
(percent)
(9)
6.2
6.3
4.5
5.4
5.4
4.8
5.1
8.3
7.9b
7.7b
6.9b
6.9b
7.8b
8.4b
10.9b
11. 8b
Ratio of insured- 
to-total 
unemployment
(10)
.413
.541
.489b
.536b
.528b
.490b
.590b
.674b
.563b
.539b
S04b
k 
.498b
.559b
.436b
.488b
.390b
Ratio of weekly 
benefits-to- 
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.406
.361 b
.361
.424b
.424b
.397b
.42 l b
.423b
.419b
.42 l b
409b
K
.422b
425b
K
.468b
.462b
Taxes- 
to-total 
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
1.08
66b
.00
.69b
 77h
1 04bk 1.14b
1.18b
1.20b
1.22b
.48b
 45b
.88b
 67h
.66b
.88b
Tax base 
per 
worker
(13)
4,320
4,440
3,600b
3,600b
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,300b
6,300b
6,600b
7,000
Taxable 
wages- 
to-total 
payroll
(14)
.476
.456
.503b
.48 l b
.510
.487
.448
.426
.404
.384
.474
.446
.418
.402
.400
.403
Taxes-to- 
taxable 
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
2.42
1.31
1.43
1.50
2.12b
2.54b
2.77°
2.96b
3.18b
3.12b
3 25bk 4.49b
4.15b
4.14b
4.65b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
Table A2 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Illinois, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.17
.90
.60
.50
.75
.81
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
500
401
280
258
424
507
-31
-505
-717
-604
-460
-918
-1,381
-2,069
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
69
446
243
188
0
38
487
843
1,174
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
488
1,174
Loan repayments
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
66
181
835
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
69
515
759
946
946
984
1,405
2,069
2,423
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
442
928
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.07
.69
.85
.77
.54
.68
.78b
.69b
 43h
.14b
 15 b
.98b
.89b
2.42b
2.03b
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
5.4
3.6
5.1
5.1
4.1
4.2
7.1
6.5
6.2
6.1
5 © 5 h
8.3b
8.5b
11.3b
11. 4b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.463
.461 b
.399
.355
.337
425
K
.602b
.589b
.530b
.455b
.473 
4fi4b
K
.41 7b
.386b
.322b
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.360
.332
.316
.338
.332
.343
.368
.412b
.389b
.380b
.385b
.380b
.410b
.427b
.424b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
.81
.22
.34
.66
1.00b
.85
.46
 72h
.07b
 36j
.38b
 36b
 27b
A5l
.55b
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,320
3,000
3,000
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,500b
6,500b
7,000b
8,000b
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.414
.411
.384
.470
.464
.431
.396
.375
.363
.433
.421
.408
.387
.386
.411
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
1.94
.54
.89
1.41
2.15b
1.96
1.18
1.92
2.95b
3.13b
3.28b
3.33b
3 29b
K3.77b
3.77b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
Table A3 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Michigan, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
854
.67
.40
.44
.57
.38
a
a
a
a
.07
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
630
491
312
383
564
395
-286
-391
-273
-7
112
-633
-1,066
-2,186
Total loans
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
326
245
53
0
0
842
233
1,182
790
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
694
790
Loan repayments 
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
624
0
0
71
653
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
326
571
624
624
0
842
1,075
2,186
2,322
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
623
800
Benefit indicators Tax indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.41
1.43b
1.40b
1.04b
.68
1.65 b
3.06b
1.52b
1 11
 94h
1.31 b
2 55b
K1.98b
3.33b
1.88b
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
793
6.7b
7 f\\   O
7.0b
5.9b
7.4b
12.5b
9.4b
8.2b
6.9b
7.8b
12.4b
12.3b
15.5b
14.2b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.456
.487b
.455b
.398b
.355
.567b
.525b
.433b
.415b
441 b
V,
.486b
.534b
.364
.349
.231
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.336
.346
.336
.319
.296
.321
.372b
.366
.345
.322
.328
.316
.368b
.415b
.398b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
1.22
.61
 63 h
1.31 b
1.25b
1.07b
1 04b
K1.47b
1.61 b
1.65b
1.59b
1.38b
1.32b
1.31 b
1.63b
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,680
3,600b
3,600b
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
5,400b
5,400b
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
8,000b
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.415
.456
.421
.444
.419
.404
.384
.425
.398
.408
.388
.368
.342
.332
.393
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
2.98
1.34
1.50b
2.96b
2.99b
2.64b
2.71 b
3.46b
4.03b
4.03b
4.10b
3.76b
3.85b
3.93b
4.37b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
Table A4 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Ohio, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.27
1.23
1.07
.96
1.06
.99
.37
.22
.23
.41
.42
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
703
693
619
626
768
777
294
190
221
452
513
-175
-558
-1,658
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
246
354
1,134
574
Interest- 
bearing loans
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
741
574
Loan repayments 
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
75
256
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
246
600
1,660
1,976
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
667
1,040
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
.87
.59
.83
.58
.36
.73
1.96
1.04
.91
 74h
.99b
2.09b
1.58b
2.74b
1.75b
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
6.1
5.4b
6.5b
5.5
4.3
4.8
9.1 b
7.8b
6.5
5<4h
5.9b
8.4b
9.6b
12.5b
12.2b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.329
.301
.325
.264
.237
.364
.441
.310
.328
.326
.391
.490b
.346
.372
.262
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.372
.324
.313
.339
.331
.390b
.400b
392b
K
.395b
.406b
.430b
.436b
.411 b
.439b
.416b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
738
.39
.38
.52
.72
.61
.56
.84
1.03
1.22
1.04
.90
.99
1.02
1.30
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,320
3,000
3,000
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.424
.417
.393
.488
.463
.438
.414
.387
.363
.449
.424
.401
.372
.359
.387
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
1.74
.93
.98
1.06
1.55
1.40
1.34
2.18
2.84b
2.71
2.46
2.24
2.67b
2.83b
3.35b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax. VO
Table A5 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Texas, 1970-1983
00
O
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
2.19
1.94
1.60
1.33
1.32
1.20
.72
.55
.59
.68
.66
.40
.31
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
358
337
294
289
325
343
231
205
249
346
397
275
254
-142
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
143
661
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
143
661
Loan repayments
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
119
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
143
685
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
143
685
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
.34
.35
.43
.35
.26
.27
.54
.34
.30
.27
.27
.35
.28
.69
1.01
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
4.8
4.4
5.0
4.5
3.9
4.3
5.6
5.7
5.3
4.8
4.2
5.2
5.3
6.9
8.0
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.194
.187
.196
.160
.164
.180
.270
.191
.181
.192
.223
.222
.173
.241
.233
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.308
.306
.298
.348
.347
.320
.301
.284
.272
.302
.302
.311
.324
.382b
.400b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
.27
.13
.13
.26
.34
.27
.18
.29
.40
.43
.31
.16
.24
.25
.41
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,320
3,000
3,000
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.487
.477
.456b
.558b
.539b
.508b
.475b
.449
.424
.506b
.477b
.442
.410
.383
.406
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
.56
.28
.29
.47
.63
.53
.39
.64
.94
.84
.64
.35
.58
.65
1.02
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
Table A6 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Wisconsin, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
2.40b
2.36
1.91
1.63
1.55
1.47
.44
.54
.68
.93
1.06
.58
.11
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
333
322
286
278
301
316
121
165
231
362
465
271
54
-413
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
430
372
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
303
372
Loan repayments 
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
158
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
413
628
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
286
501
Benefit indicators Tax indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.16
1.10b
1.26b
.96
.74
 92h
2.12b
1.31
1.16
.96b
l.ll b
2.17b
1.91 b
2.83b
2.11 b
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
4.8
4.0
4.5
4.3
4.0
4.5
6.9
5.6
4.9
5.1
4-5
7.2b
7.8b
10.7b
10.4b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.470
.507b
.502b
.449b
.376b
.414
.610b
.528b
.504b
.391 b
.508b
.586b
.47 l b
.411 b
.338b
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.415
.396 
.397 
.393b
.413b
.412b
.436b
.435 b
.420b
.421 b
.427b
.448b
.436b
.460b
.45 l b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
1.07
.73b
.64
.76
.81
.89
 87h
1.39b
1.56b
1.63b
1 44b
1.14b
.96
1.00
1.25b
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,800
3,600b
3,600b
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000 
6,000b
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
8,000b
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.479
.515b
.465 
.500
.481
.456
.429
.520 
.498 
.474
.448
.419
.392
.378
.454b
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
2.22
1.42b
1.39
1.53
1.69
1.96
2.02 
2.68b
2.89b
3.43
3.22b
2.72b
2 44b
K2.65b
2.75
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
Table A7 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Louisiana, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.74
1.49
1.23
.98
.89
.93
.81
.83
.56
.46
.77
.63
.51
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
163
146
128
118
119
138
141
165
125
124
238
223
210
-102
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
102
427
Interest- 
bearing loans Loan repayments 
(4) (5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
102
427
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
53
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
102
476
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
102
476
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.02
1.12b
1.14
 93h
.91 b
.91
1.19
 98h
1.25b
.90
.89
1.13
1.07
2 23"
K2.29b
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
7.1
6 - 7b
7.4b
7.7b
6.8b
7.1 b
7.4
6.8
7.0
7.0b
6.7b
6 © 7h
8.4b
10.3b
11. 7b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.313
.326
.287
.238
.280
.302
.403
.366
.371
.282
.277
.305
.260
.361
.352b
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.365
.329
.335
.352
.366b
.349
.346
.355
404b
.HUH
.413b
.403b
.396b
.394b
.444b
.385b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
.97
.63
.71 b
.62
 87h
l.ll b
1.18b
1.14
.96
 89h
1.58b
.97
.90
.84
NA
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,320
3,000
3,000
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.487
All
.449
.559b
540b
K
.515b
.464b
.446
425
V.
.514b
.483b
.45 l b
.418
.380
NA
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
2.01
L31h
1.58b
1.10
1.60
2.17b
2.55b
2.56b
2.26
L74h
3.27b
2.15
2.15
2.21
3.31 b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
NA = Not available.
Table A8 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for New Jersey, 1970-1983
00 
ON
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.22
1.05
.57
.28
.29
.07
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
483
448
225
138
138
41
-348
-482
-570
-547
-507
-496
-422
-423
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
352
145
142
96
0
0
0
0
79
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
79
Loan repayments 
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
43
0
39
92
177
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
352
497
639
695
652
652
612
521
422
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Benefit indicators
Time 
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits- 
to-total Unemployment 
payroll rate
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.91
1.49b
1.95b
1.89b
1.55b
1.97b
2.89b
2.16b
1.90b
.70b
 63b
.81 b
 61 h
.85 b
.45b
(percent)
(9)
6.2
7.2
4.6
5 © 7h
5.8b
5.6b
6 1 U . J
10.2b
10.4b
9.4b
7.2b
6.9b
7.2b
7.3
9.0
7.8
Ratio of insured- 
to-total 
unemployment
(10)
.413
.540
.63 l b
.656b
.575b
.561 b
.646b
.537b
409b
k 
.396b
.473 b
.512b
527b
k 
.482b
.427b
.393b
Ratio of weekly Taxes- 
benefits-to- to-total 
weekly wages payroll
(percent)
(11) (12)
.364 1.00
.369 1.59
.386b 1.13 b
.397b 1.09b
NA k 381"
k 
.369b
.366
.354
.356
.357
.352
.348
.338
.23 b
64b
k 60"
K
.67b
.94b
.94b
.90b
.77b
.69b
.353 1.65 b
.351 1.60b
Tax indicators
Tax base 
per 
worker
(13)
4,320
4,860
3,600b
3,600b
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,800b
5,400b
5,800b
6,200b
6,600b
6,900b
7,500b
8,200b
8,800b
Taxable 
wages- 
to-total 
payroll
(14)
.476
.464
.48 l b
.458b
.487
.467
.426
 451 h
469 
k 
.469b
.469
.464
447
:444b
.442b
.445b
Taxes-to- 
taxable 
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
3.44
2.35b
2.38b
2.52
3.52b
3.76b
3.70b
3.77b
4.13b
4.15b
4.10b
3.96b
3.80b
3.73b
3.60b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
NA = Not available.
Table A9 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Minnesota, 1970-1983
00oo
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.11
1.04
.76
.61
.61
.45
a
a
a
a
.22
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
120
119
92
82
92
76
-35
-19
-89
8
70
-13
-84
-288
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
47
76
49
0
0
28
86
193
241
Interest- 
bearing loans 
(4)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
115
241
Loan repayments 
(5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
172
0
0
19
178
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
47
123
172
172
0
28
114
288
352
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
96
183
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.01
.78
.98
.87
.76
1.03
1.67
1.38
1.10
.77
 78h
1.51 b
1.28b
1.89b
1.35
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
4.7
4.2
4.4
4.3
4.5
4.3
5.9
5.9
5.1
3.8
4.2
5.9
5.5
7.8
8.2
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.437
.384
.45 l b
.440b
.365
.484b
.567b
.456b
.435b
.411 b
.379
405
K401 D
h 
.401 b
.283
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.386
.359b
.345
.356
.353
.389b
.378b
.410b
.403b
.430b
.433b
.444b
.435b
.437b
.422b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
.92
.68b
.59
.74
.81
.87
.81
1.00
1.26
1.31
1.18
1.03
.93
.97
1.11
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
5,750
4,800b
4,800b
4,800b
4,800b
4,800b
4,800b
6,200b
7,000b
7,500b
8,000b
8,000b
8,000b
8,300b
9,000b
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.538
.594b
.563b
.549b
.524b
.495b
.476b
.534b
.552b
.551 b
.542b
.508b
.477b
.461 b
.461 b
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
1.72
1.14
1.04
1.36
1.55
1.76
1.69
1.87
2.29
2.38
2.17
2.03
1.94
2.11
2.41
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on 
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include 
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for 
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax. oo
VO
Table A10 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for West Virginia, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.59
1.55
1.48
1.23
1.20
1.10
.65
.54
.43
.34
.21
a
a
a
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
102
108
111
108
114
116
78
72
64
57
39
-44
-71
-144
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
47
53
45
152
Interest- 
bearing loans Loan repayments 
(4) (5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
40
152
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
100
144
288
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
39
192
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
.93
.59
.72
.76
.68
.74
1.31
.93
 "h
1.15b
1.45b
2.17b
1.96b
3.01 b
3.57b
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
7.5
7.1
"X
6-7J
9.4b
10.7b
13.9b
18.0b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
.387
.420b
.481
.474b
.432
.414b
.386b
.305
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.286
.238
.220
.274
.282
.279
.309
.282
.290
.319
.362
.383
.366
.400b
.434b
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
.74
.63
.63
.55
.70
.60
.51
.82
.83
1.00
1.16
1.09
1.72b
2.13b
1.95b
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,440
3,600b
3,600b
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,000
8,000b
8,000b
8,000b
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.469
.513b
.496b
.528b
.508b
.479b
.427
.413
.403
.479
.448
.418
.484b
.466b
.454b
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
1.61
1.23
1.27
1.05
1.38
1.26
1.20
1.98
1.07
2.09
2.59
2.60b
3.55b
4.56b
4.29b
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
NA = Not available.
Table All 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for California, 1970-1983
to
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
1.43
1.29
.93
.90
1.02
.87
.38
.38
.58
.80
1.07
1.08
1.05
.80
Start-of-year 
net reserves 
(2)
1,305
1,219
905
975
1,221
1,153
641
641
1,088
1,756
2,738
3,088
3,353
2,708
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Interest- 
bearing loans Loan repayments 
(4) (5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Benefit indicators Tax indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
1.38
1.58b
1.72b
1 ?7b
K1.12b
1.41 b
2.12b
1.54b
1.26b
1.03b
.79
1.11
1.03
1.55
1.36
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
7.9
"J
8.8b
7.6b
7.0b
7.3b
9.9b
9.2b
8.2b
7.1 b
6.2b
6.8
7 © 4h
9.9b
9.7b
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.405
.454b
.402
.369
.365
.419
.449
.395
.377
.400b
.417b
.472b
.429b
.427b
.385b
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.330
.351
.341
.333
.339
.347
.334
.335
.319
.310
.292
.295
.289
.291
.296
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
1.46
1.22
1.06b
1.36b
1.45b
1.24b
1.30b
1.83b
1.90b
1.68b
1.55b
1.18b
.99
1.00
1.01
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
5,040
3,800
3,800b
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
7,000b
7,000b
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.490
.511 b
.483b
.499
.481
.457
.424
.560b
.551 b
.482
.454
.420
.392
.363
.388
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
2.97
2.38b
2.19b
2.72b
3.01 b
2.70b
3.05b
3.26b
3 45b
K3.49b
3.41 b
2.82b
2.51 b
2.75b
2.60
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on 
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include 
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for 
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax. vo
Table A12 
Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund, Benefit and Tax Indicators for Florida, 1970-1983
Time 
period
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Start-of-year 
reserve ratio 
multiple 
(1)
2.42
2.30
2.15
1.78
1.69
1.51
.23
.07
.27
.83
1.16
1.21
1.20
1.05
Start-of-year 
net reserves
(2)
256
268
276
302
344
326
80
24
111
403
665
813
919
866
Total loans 
(3)
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
32
0
0
0
0
0
0
Interest- 
bearing loans Loan repayments 
(4) (5)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
32
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total end-of- 
year debt 
(6)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
End-of-year 
interest- 
bearing debt
(7)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Benefit indicators
Time
period
U.S. 1970-79
State 1970-79
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Benefits-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(8)
1.15
.61
.36
.44
.27
.22
.57
1.62
1.08
.74
.42
.36
.42
.41
.75
.61
Unemployment
rate
(percent)
(9)
6.2
6.5
4.3
4.9
5.1
4>3h
6.2b
1.07b
9.0b
8.2b
6.6b
6.0b
5.9
6.8
8.2
8.6
Ratio of insured-
to-total
unemployment
(10)
.413
.258
.265
.282
.213
.204
.263
.343
.302
.256
.225
.226
.257
.198
.234
.179
Ratio of weekly
benefits-to-
weekly wages
(11)
.364
.328
.277
.295
.318
.322
.403b
.358
.351
.329
.319
.305
.311
.309
.340
.332
Taxes-
to-total
payroll
(percent)
(12)
1.00
.69
.35
.38
.37
.36
.37
.49
.92
1.18
1.44b
1.08
.63
.46
.42
.52
Tax indicators
Tax base
per
worker
(13)
4,320
4,320
3,000
3,000
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
4,200
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
6,000
7,000
Taxable
wages-
to-total
payroll
(14)
.476
.517
.503b
.480b
.549b
.538b
.542b
.504b
.492b
.472b
.561 
529b
K
.502b
.470b
.441 b
.468b
Taxes-to-
taxable
wages
(percent)
(15)
2.11
1.34
.69
.79
.67
.66
.69
.97
1.87
2.49
2.56
2.03
1.25
.98
.96
1.11
SOURCES: Most data taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data (1984). Columns (3) and (9) based on 
unpublished U.S. Labor Department data. Columns (5), (10) and (15) estimated at The Urban Institute. Taxes in columns (12) and (15) include 
contributions from covered nonprofit organizations and governments. Data in columns (2)-(7) are measured in millions of dollars. Data for 
1983 are preliminary.
a. Not shown because the net trust fund balance is negative.
b. State data for the year exceed the corresponding national data. For column (13) the comparative national indicator is the tax base for the
Federal Unemployment Tax.
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